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Thesis Abstract 
International finance studies the dynamics in the areas such as international portfolio 
diversification, foreign investments, global financial systems, exchange rates, etc. This 
thesis brings together a set of chapters that summarises and synthesises varied areas of 
international finance maintaining a balance between the micro- and macro-level studies. 
This thesis is composed of three main empirical chapters contributing to varied aspects of 
international finance, mainly the areas of international portfolio diversification and home 
bias puzzle; development of bond markets and access to external finance; exchange rate 
uncertainties, output volatility and exports. 
Chapter 1 provides an outline and introduction of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides an 
extensive literature review on home-bias puzzle, explains the evolution and existence of 
home-bias puzzle, and gives various institutional and behavioural-based explanations 
which are considered as the main reasons for the existence of this puzzle. It discusses the 
advantages of international portfolio diversification and also the disadvantages of under-
diversification in international portfolios. It gives a detailed empirical literature on the 
home bias puzzle and the relation between education and portfolio diversification. 
Further, this chapter empirically analyses a panel of 38 countries over a period of 2001-
2010 to study the impact of different levels of education on home bias and international 
portfolio diversification. The results highlight that education is crucial in reducing equity 
home bias. After dividing the countries on the basis of their stock market capitalisation the 
results show that less developed countries with more university graduates have lower 
equity home bias. Finally, the results show that the benefits of education are larger during 
the recent financial crisis for the less financially developed economies. 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed analysis of the trends in Asian financial markets since 
the 1990s. It provides the main objectives of the Asian bond market policy initiatives. It 
also gives a detailed empirical literature of external finance, bond market development 
across the world and external finance-investment spending nexus. This chapter 
empirically analyses the impact of policy initiatives co-ordinated by Asian national 
governments on firms' access to external finance by using a unique firm-level database of 
eight Asian countries- Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand over the period of 1996-2012. Using difference-in-
differences approach and controlling for firm-level and macroeconomic factors the results 
show a significant impact of policy on firms' access to external finance. After splitting 
firms into constrained and unconstrained, using several criteria, the results document that 
unconstrained firms benefited significantly in obtaining external finance as compared to 
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their constrained counterparts. Finally, the results show that the increase in access to 
external finance, after the policy initiative, helped firms to raise their investment 
spending, especially for unconstrained firms. 
Chapter 4 focuses on how exporting decision of firms are affected by volatility at the 
macro and micro levels, using a rich dataset of UK manufacturing firms for the period of 
1990-2009. The results show that both types of volatility have an adverse impact on firms’ 
real export sales. After taking into account firm-level heterogeneity, the results show that 
the negative impact of exchange rate and firm volatility on exports is higher for 
constrained firms as compared to unconstrained firms. Further, this chapter considers the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of early 1990s and the global financial 
crisis of 2008. The results indicate that during the ERM crisis constrained firms face a 
significant adverse impact of exchange rate volatility on exports, while the impact of firm-
level volatility is mostly insignificant. On the contrary, during the global financial crisis, 
constrained firms face a significant negative impact of firm-level volatility on exports and 
an insignificant impact of exchange rate volatility on exports. Finally, Chapter 5 provides 
the conclusion of the thesis highlighting the contributions, implications and future 
research avenues of each empirical chapter.  
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Introduction 
The degree of financial integration has increased tremendously around the world 
during the past decades. The main factor influencing the process of financial integration is 
the increased globalisation of investments and capital flows across countries for 
diversification of risk and increasing rate of return. Many countries across the world have 
encouraged easy access to world capital markets by reducing restrictions and controls on 
capital outflows and foreign direct investments (FDI). The countries are also focusing on 
improving the economic environment of their country by announcing various market-
oriented reforms and policies. International financial integration helps in the 
diversification of portfolios which reduces the degree of riskiness of a portfolio. Financial 
openness of a country also helps in promoting investment and growth by fostering the 
development of domestic financial markets. Increased depth and breadth of domestic 
financial markets improve the efficiency of the financial intermediation by lowering costs 
(Caprio and Honohan, 1999). 
The world of finance has also experienced various changes during the past decades 
with financial institutions becoming less regulated and more international. Financial 
markets are now less divided and any change in money markets, bond markets, foreign 
exchange and stock markets are becoming more interconnected. International financial 
markets are also expanding with developing countries, such as China and India, which are 
experiencing strong economic growths and are improving financial markets and 
institutions. Finally, the variety of financial instruments available to investors and 
borrowers has increased tremendously such as junk bonds and derivative instruments like 
swaps, futures, options, etc. (Pilbeam, 2005). 
Over the last few decades the international debt markets have faced major variations, 
increasing the role of corporate debtors. Gozzi et al. (2010) stressed that the share of 
international debt as part of corporate debt has increased significantly over time and is 
continuing to grow further in both developed and developing countries. Emergence of 
corporate debt markets has helped firms in increasing their access to international finance, 
in particular international bonds. Recent studies also show a positive impact of private 
sector’s share of international debt on financial stability and sovereign creditworthiness of 
a country (Celasun and Harms, 2011). Hallak (2013) highlighted that private sector’s 
share of international debt reduces the cost of debt in a country. Also, corporations that 
are able to tap the international debt markets face lower credit risk and enjoy greater 
access to finance (Baker and Riddick, 2012). 
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Financial openness provides various benefits. Accessing world capital markets helps 
to expand investors’ opportunities for portfolio diversification and helps countries to 
borrow for smooth consumption in the event of adverse shocks. The potential benefits 
from financial integration can be categorised as follows: the benefits of international risk 
sharing for consumption smoothing, significant impact of capital flows on domestic 
investment and growth, improvement in the efficiency and macroeconomic discipline and 
greater stability of the financial system of a country (Agénor, 2003). 
However, regardless of the potential benefits from financial openness it may also 
generate substantial costs. Some of the costs of open financial markets comprise of a high 
degree of capital flows concentration and lack of access to financing for small and 
developing countries, inadequate allocation of capital flows can result in distortion of 
growth effects and macroeconomic stability, high degree of volatility of capital flows 
resulting in contagion effects and risks of foreign bank penetration (Agénor, 2003; Baker 
and Riddick, 2012). A high degree of international financial integration may also be 
sensitive to high degree of volatility in capital movements, which can result in large 
reversals of short-term flows. According to Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), large 
capital inflows and excess liquidity can result in the development of bubbles in the real 
estate sector. 
Volatility of capital flows can also be caused by contagion effects. Financial 
contagion can occur when a country experiences massive capital outflows due to 
increased vulnerability of a country’s currency or a decline in investors’ confidence in a 
country’s economic performance. Changes in nominal exchange rates also played an 
important role in the transmission of the global financial crisis of 2008 from the United 
States to the developing countries (Baker and Riddick, 2012). 
Bordo (2013) indicated that the global financial market integration has followed a U-
shaped pattern, declining in the middle years of the twentieth century from the high levels 
attained before 1914 to the higher levels present today, and that financial crises were 
always a part of the scene. These crises are the product of information asymmetries which 
reflect shocks and unpredictable fundamentals. The U-shaped pattern has been explained 
by Obstfeld et al. (2005) in terms of the policy trilemma of open capital markets, pegged 
exchange rates and independent monetary policy. The golden age of financial market 
integration also consisted of the period of classical gold standard. Dependence on gold 
standard regime meant that short-term capital movements were stabilising. The gold-
standard period was characterised by free capital mobility and unrestricted movement of 
goods and labour. The golden age ended with the World War I. 
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After a period of extreme monetary instability in Europe the gold standard system 
was restored with full capital mobility. The capital flows resumed in the 1920s with the 
United States succeeding the United Kingdom as principal lender. The Great Depression, 
caused by the inappropriate US policies in the gold standard regime, also spread among 
other countries. As a result, some of the countries left the gold standard regime and 
allowed their currencies to float. By the end of the 1930s capital controls and exchange 
controls were reinforced during World War II. After the war, the Bretton Woods system 
of 1944 was introduced which was based on pegged exchange rates with an indirect link 
to gold, active stabilisation policies and capital controls. By the late 1960s private capital 
flows resumed which revived the trilemma and massive speculation attacks. The capital 
controls have been eliminated since then in advanced countries and have been reduced 
significantly in emerging countries. Floating exchange rate regime has been adopted 
which is compatible with monetary independence and open capital account (Bordo, 2013). 
The international flow of capital, goods and services are the main sources of supply 
and demand for currencies which are essential to our well-being. A strong currency boosts 
a country’s standard of living, helps citizens to buy more of imported goods and also buy 
domestically produced goods that are internationally traded. An improvement in the 
standard of living from a rising currency can be evident when compared between nations. 
International agencies rank the living standards across different nations which require 
converting of local currency into a common measure, usually US dollars. Efficient 
allocations of capital globally also help citizens of a country to enjoy higher returns on 
their invested capital (Levi, 2010). 
Due to increased degree of financial integration across economies in the world events 
in distant lands also reverberate around the world. Any variations in the price of oil and 
gold, events in the stock market, election results, outbreak of war, etc. have immediate 
effects around the globe, resulting in a contagion and highly interdependent financial 
environment. The close linkage between money and capital makes it futile to concentrate 
on any one particular part (Levi, 2010). 
Financial integration is also likely to affect the level of entrepreneurial activity in a 
country. The rapid growth of financial integration has a direct impact on the foreign direct 
investments in a country which can hamper the growth of domestic entrepreneurs. 
Grossman (1984) showed that international capital flows can result in crowding out of 
domestic firms from domestic capital markets if foreign firms borrow from the domestic 
15 
 
banks
1
. Further, Emran and Stiglitz (2009) argued that financial liberalisation and 
competition can have negative effects on the level of entrepreneurial activity. Many 
researchers have argued that in the presence of pre-existing distortions and weak 
institutional regulations financial openness result in financial crises and higher volatility, 
reducing entrepreneurship and innovative efforts in a country (Alfaro and Charlton, 2006). 
On the contrary, availability of foreign resources can help developing countries with 
less domestic capital to borrow for the purpose of investing and financially constrained 
entrepreneurs to start new firms. Studies such as Markusen and Venables (1999) and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1996) have stressed the positive role of knowledge spillovers and 
innovations on domestic firm activities from foreign firms. Whether financial openness is 
nurturing or destroying entrepreneurship is a critical question in academics for policy 
relevance (Alfaro and Charlton, 2006). 
Hence, knowledge of international finance can help fund managers to take right 
financial decisions for their firms by exploiting the positive developments and avoiding 
the harmful ones. Firms are affected by changes in exchange rates, interest rates, inflation 
rates and asset values. All these changes are inter-related to each other. Changes in 
exchange rate can also cause fluctuations in interest rates and firms’ asset values. The 
amount of international exposure and risk depends on the level of integration between 
exchange rates and other financial prices (Levi, 2010). 
This thesis examines the different aspects of international financial markets, firms’ 
capital structure and exporting behaviour of firms in both developed and emerging-market 
economies. Each empirical chapter is self-contained and aims to contribute to particular 
questions related to international financial markets with a special emphasis on country and 
firm-level studies. Chapter 2 examines the relation between different levels of education 
on home bias and international portfolio diversification. Chapter 3 analyses the impact of 
policy initiatives coordinated by Asian national governments on access to external finance 
of Asian firms. Finally, Chapter 4 focuses on how exporting decision of firms are affected 
by both macro and firm-level volatility with special emphasis to financial constraints and 
crisis events. 
The second chapter reviews the recent literature on equity home bias puzzle and 
highlights that people have a tendency to overinvest in domestic stocks relative to the 
theoretically optimal investment portfolio. Several explanations have been offered in the 
literature for the existence of the home bias puzzle which are mainly related to 
                                                          
1
 Also see Feldstein (2000), Harrison et al. (2004) and Harrison and McMillian (2003). 
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institutional, geographical, political and behavioural factors. However, the role of 
education and financial awareness in international portfolio diversification is less 
researched. This chapter uses a panel dataset of 38 economies over the period of 2001 to 
2010 to examine the direct role of education in explaining the equity home bias puzzle. In 
addition to various country-level and financial factors, this chapter also considers the 
impact of different levels of education. 
The results of Chapter 2 show that university-level graduation, mathematical 
numeracy and financial skills play an important role in explaining the equity home bias. 
The results highlight a significant impact of different facets of education in reducing the 
equity home bias. This chapter also examines the country-level heterogeneity as education 
is not likely to affect all the economies in a similar way, as every economy has different 
levels of education. The countries are divided into more and less financially developed 
countries on the basis of their financial market development. This allows for the fact that 
countries with different levels of financial market development might have different 
responses to education. The results show that less financially developed countries tend to 
benefit more from an increase in the level of education as compared to their more 
developed counterparts. Finally, this chapter studies how the relationship of education and 
home bias evolved over time for countries with more and less developed financial 
markets, focusing on the most recent global financial crisis of 2008. The results 
demonstrate that less financially developed countries are more sensitive to education 
during the global financial crisis than the more financially developed economies. 
The third chapter explores the pecking order theory of corporate finance and 
highlights that debt is always prioritised over equity in terms of external finance. This 
chapter bridges the gap between two relevant literatures of corporate external finance and 
bond market development in Asia. This chapter analyses the impact of Asian bond market 
policies such as the Asian Bond Funds (ABF and ABF-2) and the Asian Bond Market 
Initiative (ABMI) on firms’ access to external finance. To tease out the impact of the bond 
market policy initiatives the difference-in-differences approach is used. The empirical 
model in this chapter uses an unbalanced panel of 7,436 Asian listed firms for 1996-2012. 
The treated group includes seven Asian economies namely- Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. While, Taiwan is considered as the 
control group as it saw similar development in its national bond market and is comparable 
to the other Asian economies, but it did not participate in the ABF, ABF-2 or ABMI 
initiatives. 
The findings of Chapter 3 using the difference-in-differences method indicate that 
firms reduced their access to short-term debts and increased their access to long-term 
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debts after the introduction of the bond market policy initiatives. Next, this chapter 
exploits the firm-level heterogeneity by classifying firms into financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms using two main criteria such as firms' profitability and coverage ratio. 
These characteristics are important as they indicate the financial health of firms which 
affects the choice of external finance of firms. The results show that the policies helped 
unconstrained firms to reduce their access to short-term debt and increase their long-term 
debt financing as compared to the constrained firms. 
Further, Chapter 3 builds on the literature of external finance and investment spending 
of firms by considering the impact of policy initiatives on firms’ investment spending in 
the post-policy period. The results show that firms reduced their investment spending 
using short-term debt and increased their investment spending using long-term debt in the 
post-policy period. Finally, on taking into account the financial constraints of firms the 
results show that unconstrained firms increased their post-policy investment outlay using 
long-term debt much more as compared to the constrained firms. 
The fourth chapter provides a detailed background literature on exchange rate 
volatility and trade at the country-level, theoretical and empirical evidence on exchange 
rate exposure at micro-level and the relationship between firm-level uncertainty and trade 
openness. This chapter tries to empirically link two main literatures on exchange rate 
volatility and firm-level uncertainty by focusing on the impact of volatility on real export 
sales of firms. The enormous financial integration across countries has resulted in easy 
capital flows resulting in an increase in the degree of exchange rate movements, affecting 
the revenue and cost structures and valuation of firms. This chapter focuses on a unique 
dataset of UK manufacturing firms which majorly includes unlisted firms over the period 
of 1990-2009. This provides an interesting setup as these firms are more susceptible to 
any kind of uncertainty due to their poor financial condition. 
The outcomes of Chapter 4 confirm that firms face a negative and significant impact 
on their export sales from both exchange rate and firm-level volatility. Next, this chapter 
explores the impact of these volatility measures on real export sales for financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms. The results show that the adverse impact of 
exchange and firm volatility on real exports are higher for constrained firms as compared 
to their unconstrained counterparts. Further, two major crisis events, namely the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of early 1990s and the recent financial crisis of 
2008 are examined. The results point out that during the ERM crisis, constrained firms 
face a significant adverse impact of exchange rate volatility on exports, while the impact 
of firm-level volatility is mostly insignificant. On the other hand, during the global 
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financial crisis, constrained firms are affected by significant negative impacts of firm-
level volatility on exports and insignificant impacts of exchange rate volatility on exports. 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides the empirical 
study of the relation between different levels of education on home bias and international 
portfolio diversification. Chapter 3 gives the empirical analysis of the Asian bond market 
policy initiatives co-ordinated by Asian national governments on firms' access to external 
finance using difference-in-differences method. Chapter 4 empirically focuses on how 
exporting decision of firms are affected by both macro and firm-level volatility for 
constrained and unconstrained firms during two major financial crises, namely the ERM 
crisis of early 1990s and the recent global financial crisis of 2008. Finally, Chapter 5 
provides the concluding remarks of this thesis. 
In addition, I would like to highlight that most of the estimates presented in Chapter 2 
have been published in the Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money (see Bose, MacDonald and Tsoukas, 2015). Another working paper derived from 
Chapter 3 is available online in the discussion paper series of the Adam Smith Business 
School, University of Glasgow.  
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Chapter 2: The Role of Education in the Home Bias Puzzle 
of International Portfolios during Financial Crisis2 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite the gains from international portfolio diversification, the most striking feature 
of international portfolio theory is that investors tend to invest heavily in the stocks of 
their domestic country. This preference is commonly termed as the ‘Home bias puzzle’. 
French and Poterba (1991) in their seminal work provided surprising data on the domestic 
ownership of shares in the stock markets of the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and France. They showed that at the end of 1989, investors in Japan had only 
1.9% of their equity in foreign stocks, US investors held 6.2% of their equity portfolios 
abroad. Several justifications have been offered in the literature for the existence of the 
equity home bias puzzle such as institutional factors (foreign taxes, transactions costs), 
behavioural biases, information asymmetries, etc. What is less researched, however, is the 
role of education in determining international portfolio diversification. It is important to 
understand how education affects international portfolio holdings and can be used to 
inform policy makers and investors in a better way, particularly in the current economic 
climate. 
There has been a phenomenal growth of financial instruments and products as 
evidenced by a number of new assets that were developed based on subprime and other 
mortgages before the 2007-10 global financial crisis. Yet, the ability of investors to make 
sound financial decisions was challenged in the light of mounting losses observed during 
this period (see Klapper et al., 2013). This has underlined the need for knowledgeable, 
educated and more financially aware people for their financial security. There is, in fact, a 
large and growing set of studies on the determinants of household financial decision-
making. This literature considers the importance of formal education in affecting the 
process of financial decision-making (see Graham et al., 2009 and Cole et al., 2012) and 
financial participation (see Karlsson and Nordén, 2007; Van Rooij et al., 2011 and 
Christelis and Georgarakos, 2013). 
This chapter tries to fill this gap by bridging the literatures on international portfolio 
diversification and education. More specifically, the purpose of this chapter is to provide, 
for the first time, a systematic empirical analysis of the impact of education on equity 
holdings. This is done by exploring whether education is weighted differently for less and 
                                                          
2
 I am grateful to Lieven De Moor and Rosanne Vanpée for providing the market capitalisation data of 
equities. I also thank John Burger, Alessio Ciarlone, George Panos and Vikrant Vig for their useful 
comments. 
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more financially developed economies, paying special attention to the most recent 
financial crisis. The motivation for exploring the role of education in international 
portfolios stems from the fact that education influences financial awareness, knowledge, 
skills, attitude and the behaviour of investors to make sound financial decisions in order to 
achieve individual financial well-being. These effects are likely to be stronger for less 
developed economies as for them access to offshore financial markets may be difficult or 
prohibitively expensive (Mizen et al., 2012). In addition, the link between different levels 
of education and portfolio diversification should be more potent during extreme economic 
events such as the most recent financial crisis, which originated in the US in mid-2007, as 
it caused a sharp reduction in the asset prices. This, in turn, resulted in a decline in the 
assets invested abroad and thus an increase in the proportion of equity portfolios which 
are concentrated in the domestic market of the investor (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011). 
The value addition of this chapter is threefold. First, a direct role of education in 
influencing equity home bias is considered. In addition to the country-specific and 
financial indicators previously considered, this study also considers the impact of different 
measures of education. This approach adds to the existing empirical literature on 
international portfolio holdings (see Chan et al., 2005; Fidora et al., 2007; De Moor and 
Vanpée, 2013), which highlight the effect of different institutional factors, geographical, 
political and behavioural effects on home bias in international portfolios. 
Second, using comparable multi-country panel data, this chapter tries to identify 
which countries are more likely to benefit from a higher level of education. It is well 
accepted that economic literacy and education differs widely across countries and tends to 
be rather limited in poorer demographic groups (Jappelli, 2010). Countries with higher 
levels of education tend to benefit much more from financial liberalisation (Bekaert et al., 
2001) and also tend to experience higher growth (Barro and Sala-iMartin, 1995). This 
chapter tests whether there is a differential effect of education on international 
diversification for economies with more and less developed financial markets. 
Finally, this chapter examines whether education-home bias nexus has changed over 
time for both more and less financially developed economies. Gerardi et al. (2010) show 
that limited financial literacy (numerical ability) played an important role in the recent 
subprime mortgage crisis in the US. Klapper et al. (2013) make similar arguments for 
Russian households during the crisis. Thus, the link between education and equity home 
bias is likely to be more potent during the financial crisis as it might help in resolving 
information asymmetries in the economy and improve investors’ cognitive ability. 
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The chapter is divided into ten sections. Section two describes the merits of 
international portfolio diversification and section three explains the costs of international 
portfolio under-diversification. Section four analyses the theoretical framework explaining 
the concept of home bias puzzle. Section five provides an extensive literature review on 
home bias puzzle and education. Further, section six gives a detailed description of the 
empirical modelling implementation and section seven describes the data used in the 
empirical analysis along with the summary statistics. Section eight refers to the 
econometric results and section nine checks the robustness of these empirical results. 
Finally, section ten gives the concluding remarks of the chapter. 
2.2 Merits of international portfolio diversification 
International portfolio diversification can help to reduce the risk in terms of variability 
of returns. The total risk of the portfolio depends not only on the number of securities 
included in the portfolio, but also on the riskiness of each individual security in the 
portfolio. As diversification increases, the degree of riskiness of a portfolio decreases but 
not proportionally. By adding an extra security to the portfolio, marginal reduction in 
variability decreases substantially. Several authors such as Grubel (1968), Levy and 
Sarnat (1970) and Solnik (1973) showed that movements in stock prices are uncorrelated 
in different countries. Thus, the risk can be substantially reduced by diversification of 
portfolio internationally. 
To examine the advantages of international diversification for a US investor, Grubel 
(1968) used a simple macroeconomic model of government bonds traded between two 
countries over a period of January 1959 to December 1966. He concluded that the 
potential gains from international diversification are extensive. Levy and Sarnat (1970) 
used annual data from 1951 to 1967 to calculate the Markowitz efficient frontier for a set 
of 28 country indices. Their findings were similar to those of Grubel (1968). 
Agmon (1972) criticised Grubel’s approach, and proposed that country indices are an 
incomplete measure of potential benefits of international diversification. As each market 
has many assets and a composite market index does not measure all the possibilities of 
diversification within a local market. Solnik (1973) further pointed out the problems with 
Grubel (1968) and Levy and Sarnat (1970) and stated that the indices used in these studies 
were not representative and suffered from small sample bias. Solnik calculated Markowitz 
efficient frontier for a sample of market indices of nine European countries, Japan and the 
US and found results matching with the earlier studies. 
Thus, it is evident from the above that international portfolio diversification is a 
reasonable method to reduce risk in an investment portfolio. 
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2.3 Costs of international portfolio under-diversification 
The costs of under-diversification can be explained using different approaches 
namely: mean-variance approach, consumption-based approach and individual portfolio 
holdings data. 
Mean-variance approach: French and Poterba (1991), Glassman and Riddick (2001) and 
Jeske (2001) computed implied expected returns from the following equation: 
 (𝜇 − 1𝑟) = 𝛾Ω𝑥𝑎𝑐𝑡, 
where 𝑥𝑎𝑐𝑡  is the vector of actual portfolio shares, (𝜇 − 1𝑟) is the vector of expected 
excess returns, 𝛾 denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), and Ω is the 
covariance matrix of risky asset returns. 
Jeske (2001) calculated shadow costs of foreign investment for a sample of 11 
countries for the time period from 1991 to 2000 assuming the level of relative risk 
aversion of 3. However, measuring the cost of foreign investments by making a 
comparison between implied expected returns and historical mean returns was difficult for 
many reasons. First, results were dependent on a debatable value of the relative risk 
aversion. Second, methodology did not take into account omitted assets like long-term 
bonds, exchange rate risks, etc. 
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) gave an extension of the international CAPM model 
used by Adler and Dumas (1983) and Sercu (1980). Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) took into 
account both domestic inflation risk and deadweight costs of foreign investments. Cooper 
and Kaplanis (1994) calculated implicit costs of foreign investment using different levels 
of relative risk aversion but still the model had a few drawbacks. In particular, it did not 
take into account non-traded assets, the deadweight cost estimates were just point 
estimates and depended on hypothetical values of relative risk aversion and the model did 
not account for time-varying returns and variances. Further, Sercu and Vanpée (2007a) 
simplified the Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) model with new portfolio holdings data and 
tried to address the drawbacks of the original model. 
Sercu and Vanpée (2007a) applied a regression technique so that confidence intervals 
could be computed for average implicit investment costs and the risk aversion. The 
deadweight costs were also estimated and the instruments were divided into six categories 
of information asymmetries, explicit frictions, measures of financial development, 
measures of economic development, measures of political risk and corporate governance, 
and the skewness in equity returns. Finally, De Moor et al. (2010) applied the time-
varying model of Bekaert and Harvey (1997) to take into account time-varying and 
asymmetric volatilities. The final results reported by Sercu and Vanpée (2007a) were 
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lower and more reliable as compared to the results of Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), but 
still was imperfect for not considering non-traded assets like human capital. 
Errunza et al. (1999) showed empirically that the calculations of estimated costs of under-
diversification by traditional mean-variance approach were overstated. Their study was 
carried out mainly from the viewpoint of US investors and they found that though the 
average gains from foreign asset-based diversification were insignificant, there were some 
periods when international markets provided a meaningful diversification that could not 
be repeated at home. 
Consumption-based approach: Another approach that can be used to calculate the costs 
of under-diversification is consumption-based approach. It considers production process 
as exogenously given, and determines how optimal risk-sharing is likely to affect the 
consumption pattern of investors. Lewis (2000) calculated the gains of international 
diversification for a US investor using data from 1969 to 1993 and made a comparative 
analysis between mean-variance approach and consumption-based approach. Lewis 
(2000) compared the estimated welfare gains with the gains from diversification estimated 
under consumption-based approach. He clarified that the reason for the difference 
between the estimated costs of under-diversification from an equity-based mean-variance 
approach and consumption-based approach was due to the high variability of stock returns 
and low variability of consumption growth rates. The gains from international 
diversification are derived from the benefits of reducing variation in marginal utility over 
time. In equity-based approach, marginal utility depends on stock returns and in 
consumption-based approach, marginal utility is derived from consumption. According to 
Campbell and Cochrane (2000) and Gordon and Samson (2002), the main drawback of 
consumption-based approach is that in practice it works poorly, even worse than the 
CAPM. Another drawback with consumption-based approach is that data does not fit in 
well and it also leads to unbelievably high levels of risk aversion. 
Individual portfolio holdings data: Goetzmann and Kumar (2003) calculated the costs 
of under-diversification by dividing portfolios into groups based on the degree of 
diversification. They used a large sample of individual portfolio holdings over a period of 
1991 to 1996. They showed that the degree of diversification is affected by the factors 
related to specific investor characteristics and not due to the differences in transaction 
costs or turnover. 
Overall, it shows that international diversification can give substantial gains to 
investors, hence existence of the home bias in international portfolios in this context is 
puzzling. 
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2.4 Theoretical background of the home bias puzzle 
Following Chan et al. (2005), the theoretical framework of the model is taken from 
Cooper and Kaplanis (1986). Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) gave a theoretical framework 
which is useful in explaining the concept of home bias. The model assumes that for a 
given level of variance, each investor in country 𝒾 is likely to maximize the expected 
returns of the wealth. 
𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝒴𝒾
′ℛ −  𝒴𝒾
′𝒞𝒾)        (1) 
subject to     
𝒴𝒾
′𝑉𝒴𝒾 =  𝓋 
𝒴𝒾
′𝐼 = 1 
where 
𝒴𝒾 is a column vector of the portfolio weights, the jth element of which is 𝒴𝒾𝑗, 
𝒴𝒾𝑗 is the proportion of individual 𝒾′𝑠 total wealth invested in the risky securities of 
country J, 
ℛ is a column vector of pre-tax expected returns, 
𝒞𝒾 is a column vector, the jth element of which is 𝒞𝒾𝑗, 
𝒞𝒾𝑗 is the deadweight cost to investor 𝒾  of holding securities in country j, 
𝓋 is a constant variance, 
V is the variance/covariance matrix of the gross (pre-cost, pre-tax) returns of the risky 
securities, 
𝐼 is a unity column vector. 
The Lagrangean of the above maximization problem can be represented as follows: 
𝐿 =  (𝒴𝒾
′ℛ −  𝒴𝒾
′𝒞𝒾) − (
𝒽
2
) (𝒴𝒾
′𝑉𝒴𝒾 −  𝓋) −  𝑘𝒾(𝒴𝒾
′𝐼 − 1),     (2) 
where 𝒽 and 𝑘𝒾 are Langrange multipliers. Setting the derivative of the objective function 
with respect to 𝒴𝒾 to zero, it gives 
ℛ −  𝒞𝒾 −  𝒽𝑉𝒴𝒾  − 𝑘𝒾𝐼 = 0       (3) 
Therefore, the optimal portfolio for investor 𝒾 is 
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𝒴𝒾 = (
𝑉−1
𝒽
) (ℛ −  𝒞𝒾 −  𝑘𝒾𝐼),           (4) 
where    𝑘𝒾 =
[𝐼′𝑉−1ℛ− 𝐼′𝑉−1𝒞𝒾− 𝒽]
𝐼′𝑉−1𝐼
. 
Given the individual portfolio holdings, it can be aggregated to get the world capital 
market equilibrium. The market clearing condition is  
Σ𝒟𝒾𝒴𝒾 =  𝒴
∗     (5) 
where 
𝒟𝒾 is the proportion of wealth owned by country 𝒾, 
𝒴∗ is a column vector, the ith element of which is 𝒴𝑖
∗, 
𝒴𝑖
∗ is the proportion of world market capitalisation in country 𝒾′𝑠 market. 
Using equations (4) and (5) and defining 𝒵 which the global minimum-variance portfolio 
as 𝒵 =  𝑉−1𝐼/(𝐼′𝑉−1𝐼), the following can be obtained 
𝒽𝑉(𝒴𝒾 − 𝒴
∗) = (Σ𝒟𝒾𝒞𝒾 −  𝒞𝒾) −  𝒵
′(Σ𝒟𝒾𝒞𝒾 −  𝒞𝒾)𝐼. (6) 
The deadweight costs (𝒞𝒾𝒿) are equal to zero for all 𝒾 and 𝒿, if there is no barrier to access 
the domestic markets for an investor, and hence each investor holds the world market 
portfolio as the right-hand side of equation (6) is zero. 
However, if the deadweight costs are not equal to zero, the portfolio holdings of the 
investor will deviate from the world market portfolio. To examine the effect of this a 
simple case is considered where the covariance matrix V is diagonal with all the variances 
equal to 𝒮2. The deviations of the portfolio weight of investor 𝒾 in country 𝒿 from the 
world market portfolio are given by: 
𝒽𝒮2(𝒴𝒾𝒾 − 𝒴𝒾
∗) =  −𝒞𝒾𝒾 + 𝒷𝒾 + 𝒶𝒾 −  𝒹,    𝒾 = 𝒿  (7) 
𝒽𝒮2(𝒴𝒾𝒿 −  𝒴𝒿
∗) =  −𝒞𝒾𝒿 + 𝒷𝒿 + 𝒶𝒾 −  𝒹,    𝒾 ≠ 𝒿  (8) 
where 
𝒶𝒾 =  𝒵
′𝒞𝒾 , 
𝒷𝒿 =  Σ𝒟𝑘𝒞𝑘𝒿 , 
𝒹 =  𝒵′Σ𝒟𝒾𝒞𝒾 . 
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The value 𝒶𝒾 can be interpreted as the weighted average marginal deadweight cost for 
investor 𝒾, 𝒷𝒿 as the weighted average marginal deadweight cost for investors investing in 
country 𝒿, and 𝒹 as the world-weighted average marginal deadweight cost. Equation (7) 
measures the extent to which the equity portfolio holdings of investor 𝒾 in the domestic 
market would deviate from those of the world market portfolio. Whereas, equation (8) 
measures the extent to which the equity portfolio holdings of investor 𝒾 in foreign market 
𝒿 would deviate from those of the world market portfolio. 
Equation (7) gives the equity home bias in a country with respect to the world. If the 
deadweight cost of investor 𝒾 investing in his own country 𝒾 (𝒞𝒾𝒾) is significantly less than 
the weighted average deadweight cost for world investors (𝒷𝒾), he would overweight in 
domestic securities relative to the market. Investor 𝒾 would also like to overweight in his 
domestic country if the weighted average deadweight cost faced by him (𝒶𝒾) is large 
enough to discourage him from investing in foreign countries. Further, a country would 
not face any home bias if the deadweight costs for domestic (𝒞𝒾𝒾) and foreign investors 
(𝒷𝒾) investing in country 𝒾 are symmetric, that is, if transaction costs are symmetric to 
domestic and foreign investors in both markets, then the degree of home bias is not 
expected to differ between the two countries. 
2.5 Extensive empirical literature 
This section gives an extensive literature on home bias puzzle using recent and earlier 
portfolio holdings data. It also provides various explanations for the existence of home 
bias in international portfolios. 
2.5.1 Home bias puzzle 
For a number of years after World War II most countries had strong barriers to 
foreign investments as most currencies could not be converted, and thus investing abroad 
required access to scanty foreign currencies. Many countries also had restrictions to 
foreign investments by their own citizens or ownership of domestic stocks by foreign 
investors. Due to the existence of these restrictions on international investments, one is 
expected to hold more of domestic stocks than predicted by the world CAPM. 
Over the last thirty years there has been a huge decline in the international barriers to 
investments. However, among the emerging markets, sovereign risk still remains a 
significant barrier for international investments. Warnock (2002) illustrated that though 
the US holdings of domestic equities had declined over the past two decades, it still 
remains high. According to Thomas et al. (2004), by the end of 2003 US investors held 
only 14% of foreign stocks in their equity portfolios, while such stocks accounted for 54% 
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of world market capitalisation. Other surprising observations include that larger home bias 
results are found in small and medium sized countries, while they are supposed to be 
gaining the most from international diversification. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) 
concluded that domestic equity investment as a fraction of total portfolio equity ranged 
from 65% in France to 100% in Sweden. According to Baele et al. (2007), the home bias 
had reduced over the years especially in European Union member states since the 
European integration. Such results have further motivated other studies to find 
explanations for the existence of the home bias phenomenon. 
There has always been a challenge for the economists to explain the behaviour of the 
home bias puzzle in international portfolios. The various explanations given for the home 
bias puzzle includes barriers to international investment and higher transaction costs, 
information asymmetries, hedging demand for stocks which have smaller positive 
correlation with domestic variables like inflation risk and sovereign risk (Campbell and 
Kraussl, 2005). The factors can be broadly categorised into five main groups: 
Hedging domestic risk: The first possible explanation for the home bias is that domestic 
assets help in hedging risks that are specific to the home-country such as inflation risk, 
domestic consumption risk, real exchange rate risk and risk from non-tradable wealth 
components (i.e., human capital and non-financial income), as the performance of 
domestic assets depend on the overall performance of the domestic market. 
Returns on the equities are different for both domestic and foreign investors if 
purchasing power parity (PPP) does not hold. It is possible to hedge inflation risk if there 
is a positive correlation between the domestic stock returns and inflation rates. According 
to Adler and Dumas (1983), because of this uncertainty about the future inflation rates 
investors hold portfolios which differ by a component designed to hedge inflation risk. 
However, Adler and Dumas (1983) and Sercu and Vanpée (2007a) empirically show that 
a positive correlation between stock returns and inflation rates is weak. 
Further, Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) tested whether the home bias in equity 
portfolios is due to the investors’ tendency to hedge purchasing power parity (PPP) 
deviations. They developed a model of international portfolio choice and equity market 
equilibrium that integrated PPP deviation and deadweight costs. This model is used to 
estimate the costs required to generate the home bias in portfolios. These costs are 
consistent with other costs such as withholding taxes only if investors have low levels of 
risk aversion. They concluded that the home bias could be explained by either inflation 
hedging or costs of international investment. They found that in order to explain the 
equity home bias in favour of hedging domestic inflation risk, there must be a positive 
correlation between the equity returns and inflation. 
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Sorensen et al. (2005) showed that the home bias in international bonds and equities 
have declined during the late 1990s, while the international risk sharing has increased. 
Hence, countries holding larger share of foreign asset holdings experience better 
consumption smoothing. 
Chue (2007) suggested an Euler equation to measure the extent to which foreign 
securities could help in hedging domestic consumption risks. Chue (2007) concluded that 
foreign equities had a weak ability in hedging domestic consumption risk and thus the 
study did not provide any substantial result which could show that hedging domestic 
consumption risk can explain the home bias in equity portfolios. 
Fidora et al. (2007) focused on the role of real exchange rate risk in explaining the 
home bias in equities and bonds. They presented Markowitz-type international capital 
assets pricing model (CAPM) in which real exchange rate volatility induced a bias 
towards domestic financial assets and towards assets with low local currency volatility. 
The rationale was that the home bias should be higher for bonds than for equities as 
returns on equities were more volatile than bonds. They tested the hypothesis for 40 
investor countries including industrialised and emerging market economies and concluded 
that a reduction in monthly real exchange rate volatility can help in reducing the bond 
home bias by 60 percent while the equity home bias by only 20 percent. 
Further, Mishra (2011) contributed to the literature by investigating Australia’s equity 
home bias. Mishra (2011) used a Markowitz type mean variance portfolio model and 
empirically established that the home bias increased with an increase in exchange rate 
volatility. If the change in real exchange rate volatility equalled the inflation differential, 
i.e., if the relative purchasing power parity is true, the home bias is zero. Conversely, the 
home bias is equal to one, if exchange rate volatility increases to infinity. 
De Moor and Vanpée (2013) discovered differences between the equity and bond 
home bias for a large sample of data on OECD countries for the period of 2001-2010. 
They found that exchange rate volatility played an important role for the bond home bias 
rather than the equity home bias. Also, they explored that the level of financial 
development of a country plays an important role in attracting foreign bond and equity 
investors. Further, corporate governance matters more for international equity portfolios 
than for bond portfolios. 
More recent literature also focuses on relative price of tradable and hedging risk from 
non-tradable wealth such as non-financial wealth. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) argued that 
trade cost helped to solve the equity home bias puzzle. However, the model presented by 
Coeurdacier (2009) and Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) showed the opposite results for most 
of the parameter values. 
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Eldor and Pines (1988) explored the issue of the home bias in a general equilibrium 
framework. The model integrated non-traded goods, non-unitary income and price 
elasticities and return on securities which were not perfectly positively correlated with the 
price of consumption good. The results showed that hedging motive was neither sufficient 
nor necessary for home asset preference, but was an outcome of a desire to gamble in real 
income which surpassed the relative measure of risk aversion and price-elastic demand for 
non-traded goods. 
While comparing the developed and developing countries, Driessen and Laeven 
(2004) investigated a sample of 52 countries which included 23 developed and 29 
developing markets to show how the benefits of international portfolio diversification 
differed across different countries. The results showed that the benefits of international 
portfolio diversification are larger for the developing countries as compared to the 
developed economies. Country risk is a good factor for diversification benefits and hence 
countries with higher risk are likely to gain more from global diversification. 
Massa and Simonov (2006) demonstrated that non-financial income was uncorrelated 
with market portfolio of financial assets. They concluded that investors deliberately 
decided not to hedge these risks by tilting their investments in such a way that there is a 
positive correlation with non-financial income. Thus, hedging risk of non-financial 
income failed to explain the home bias in equity portfolios. Baxter and Jermann (1997) 
found a positive correlation between returns on human capital and domestic equities and 
thereby suggesting that investors should reduce their investments in domestic assets to 
hedge their non-financial income risks. While on the contrary, Bottazzi et al. (1996) and 
Julliard (2003) found a negative correlation between returns on human capital and 
domestic equities. Julliard (2003) argued that the results of Baxter and Jermann (1997) 
were due to some econometric misspecifications as the correlation between returns to 
human capital and local equity were overstated. This was because they assumed that 
improvement in capital and labour incomes are independent across countries. 
Hnatkovska (2010) presented a two-country, two-sector general equilibrium model. 
This shows that low diversification occurred as disparities in relative prices increased the 
riskiness of holding foreign assets and facilitated risk-sharing across countries. Hence, 
volatile capital flows occurred in response to international risk-premia differentials which 
arose due to movements in terms of trade. Overall, the studies are not so useful in 
explaining the home bias puzzle in international portfolios. 
Higher costs and barriers to international investments: Many studies focused on 
transaction costs and barriers to international investments as the main explanations for the 
home bias. Some of the earlier studies include Stulz (1981) and Errunza and Losq (1985). 
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At that time for many investors investing abroad was very difficult due to restrictions 
imposed by their countries on foreign investments and on access to foreign currency. 
However, since early nineties the restrictions started to decline as the financial markets in 
many countries liberalised and thus in the present scenario almost all the countries are 
open to trade in foreign investments. Hence, barriers to international investments fail to 
explain the home bias in today’s scenario. 
Another set of explanations include the explicit market frictions such as transaction 
costs. Mann and Meade (2002) concentrated on the equity markets and global portfolio 
behaviour of US and European investors and found that transaction costs helped in 
explaining the actual US portfolio allocations. Using the 1997 US Survey Benchmark data 
they proved that European firms had a home bias towards their holdings of European 
equities. However, with the start of EMU convergence period in 1997 the home bias of 
European firms reduced as their holding of US equities started rising. Martin and Rey 
(2004) developed a two-country model with incomplete asset markets. Demand for 
foreign assets decreased with transaction costs which included banking commissions and 
variable fees, exchange rate transaction costs and information gathering costs. They 
proved, theoretically, that transaction costs could affect the equity home bias severely. 
Chan et al. (2009) empirically examined the effects of the home bias on the cost of 
capital and firm valuation, via Tobin’s Q at both country and firm-levels. They used 31 
countries across the world including both developed and 10 emerging market economies 
over a period of 1999 to 2004. Results claimed that the divergences of home and foreign 
equity allocations from the standard international asset allocation models had an impact 
on the market value of a company or aggregate market value of a country. 
However, empirically transaction costs did not seem to play a greater role in 
explaining the home bias in equity portfolios. Tesar and Werner (1995) used long-term 
international investment models with respect to Canada, Germany, Japan, the UK and the 
USA during the period of 1970-1990. The study included data on investment in corporate 
equities, government and corporate bonds. Their results showed a strong evidence of the 
home bias in domestic portfolios of countries and also concluded that high transaction 
costs associated with trading of foreign securities could not be the only reason for the 
equity and bond home bias. Ahearne et al. (2004) also proved that transaction costs failed 
to explain the home bias puzzle. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) showed that under-
diversification of portfolios in US exists among investors who are young, less educated 
and have low income. They proved that transaction costs have a little role to play in 
explaining this under-diversification as most investors under-diversify due to information 
disadvantage. Thus, direct costs fail to explain the equity and bond home biases. 
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Information asymmetries: Another popular explanation for the home bias puzzle is the 
existence of information asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors. There are 
explanations that deal with the fact that investors are better informed about their domestic 
stocks as compared to foreign stocks. Kang and Stulz (1997) showed that foreign 
investors in Japan held more stocks of large companies as compared to small companies 
as information advantage of foreign investors was higher for large stocks. Dahlquist and 
Robertson (2001) also got same results as Kang and Stulz (1997) for Swedish stocks. 
Ahearne et al. (2004) provided a picture of the home bias phenomena by analysing 
the determinants of US holdings of equity across different countries. They analysed the 
role of information asymmetries that arose from differences in accounting standards, 
disclosure requirements and regulatory environment across countries. They suggested 
cross-listing of securities on US stock exchanges. The regression framework used was: 
𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 
where 𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆 was the degree of U.S. investors’ home bias against country 𝑖 and 𝑋 was a 
vector of independent variables that included information costs, trade, transactions costs, 
capital controls and historical risk-adjusted returns. They concluded that to be listed on 
US exchanges the companies should follow strict rules of reconciling their financial 
statements compiled with SEC disclosure requirements. This helped in reducing the 
information cost to US investors. 
Brennan et al. (2005) developed a noisy expectations model where investors received 
public and private information signals. They confirmed the results of Brennan and Cao 
(1997) that foreign purchases by US investors were positively correlated to lagged returns 
from the foreign market. They further proved that there was a link between information 
disadvantages and expectations for market. 
Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007) used data of investments by 78,000 US retail 
investors made through a discount broker from 1991 to 1996 and found that households 
had a strong preference for domestic investments. They found that the average household 
generated an additional annual income of 3.2% from its local holdings compared to non-
local holdings. This implies that local investors had the ability to exploit local knowledge 
or asymmetric information. 
Guidolin (2005) developed a two-country overlapping generations (OLG) model with 
Bayesian learning to study the effects of asymmetries in the initial informational 
endowment of investors located in different countries. Guidolin (2005) concluded that it 
was difficult to explain the home bias using quantitative data for information asymmetry. 
Hence, it would be helpful to study dynamic equilibrium model involving learning and 
differential estimation risk and also to concentrate on quality of informational flows. 
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Barron and Ni (2008) tried to analyse the effect of asymmetric information on the 
equity home bias puzzle using a rational expectations model in a two-country framework 
where the portfolio managers had different levels of portfolio size and information 
attainment was endogenous. They showed that there was a direct linkage between the 
portfolio size, the acquisition of information cost and degree of home bias in portfolios 
across each country. Their finding was in line with Gehrig (1993) that well informed 
portfolio managers demand more foreign assets. Gehrig (1993) derived an optimal 
portfolio where foreign investors had less information and this led to overweighting of 
domestic assets. 
Many studies like Chan et al. (2005), Berkel (2004), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004, 
2005) and Faruqee et al. (2004) regressed actual portfolio holdings on variables that proxy 
informational asymmetries such as regional and cultural factors. Proximity of foreign 
market is an important proxy to capture the effects of information asymmetries. Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999) analysed that investors had a preference for geographically proximate 
investments and found that the US fund managers invested in companies that were 9-11% 
closer to them. Also, local equity preference was related to firm size, leverage and output 
tradability as small, highly levered firms whose products were consumed would expect 
local investors to have easy access to information. They concluded that geographic 
proximity played an important role in determining investor portfolio choice from the point 
of view of domestic scenario. 
Kilka and Weber (2000) provided evidence that investors felt more secured and 
optimistic about their home equity market and thus, invested in familiar companies. 
Familiarity with one’s own domestic companies led to a simple way of understanding the 
sub-optimal international asset allocation. However, Pastor (2000) concluded that 
uncertainty did not provide a good explanation for the puzzle. While analysing the 
geographic distribution of shareholders of US Regional Bell Operating Companies, 
Huberman (2001) showed that investors were more likely to hold shares with their local 
providers. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) analysed that investors in Finland were keener 
to invest in the companies which were geographically located closer to them. These 
explanations indicated that people favoured stocks to which they were more familiar as it 
provided an informational advantage to the investors. However, there could be a 
possibility of a myth that the investors had superior information about the companies 
which were situated closer to their home. 
Chan et al. (2005) studied as to how mutual funds are allocated between the markets 
of domestic and foreign equity and the factors that affect asset allocations in the world. 
They used a dataset of 26 countries which included both developed and developing 
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countries and found that a larger proportion of investments were made in the domestic 
stocks. The results showed that stock market development and familiarity variables play 
an important role in explaining the domestic bias. Lane (2006) found out that EMU had an 
important role to play in global bond portfolios. Cross-investment among Euro-members 
has been substantially higher compared to any other country pairs. Giofre (2008) found 
that in terms of equity portfolios there has been a shift from the equity home bias to the 
equity Euro-bias due to informational advantage. 
Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) used the gravity equations framework to cross-border 
equity flows and found that distance, which is a proxy for information asymmetries, was a 
big barrier to cross-border asset trade. They provided different endogenous variables for 
both the variables namely bilateral trade in goods and bilateral asset holdings. They found 
out that if the bilateral trade increased by 10%, then it increased the bilateral asset 
holdings by 6% to 7%. The reverse causality was also true and on controlling for trade, 
the impact of distance on asset holdings reduced substantially. 
Further, Rose and Spiegel (2009) explained the fact that countries which were farther 
from the major international financial centres were likely to be more volatile. This was in 
connection with the joint hypothesis that firstly, countries which were closer to major 
financial centres were more financially united and secondly, financial integration helped 
in reducing macroeconomic volatility. They found that financial remoteness which was 
measured by the distance from major international financial centres increased volatility in 
macroeconomic activities. By constructing different alternative measures for both 
financial remoteness and volatility, they showed a positive correlation. They concluded 
that costs of intermediation increased with distance and hence with the increase in the cost 
of risk-sharing, the macroeconomic volatility also increased. 
Hamberg et al. (2013) examined the effect of mandatory European adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on foreign ownership of Swedish 
firms. IFRS is likely to make financial reporting more uniform which would help 
investors’ to judge and correctly compare the performances of the firms across different 
countries. This should help in reducing the home bias as investors can easily find foreign 
investment opportunities in foreign equity markets. 
Earlier papers like Bushman and Piotroski (2006) and Covrig et al. (2007) examined 
that the adoption of IFRS was related to economic consequences like stock liquidity, 
quality of earnings, and investor ownership. Hamberg et al. (2013) tried to focus on 
Sweden which was known for its strict legal enforcement as described by La Porta et al. 
(1998) and identified a setting in which accounting quality remained constant. On an 
aggregate level the results showed that in Sweden adoption of IFRS did not affect the total 
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foreign ownership, measured as capital rights and percentage of foreign owners. However, 
when the foreign owners were decomposed into different groups the results showed that 
European Union investors increased their foreign ownership. But foreign ownership in the 
countries which did not adopt IFRS were not affected. Overall, it showed that there was a 
decline in the home bias of foreign investors in European Union countries, thus raising 
greater risk. These results were consistent with Brochet et al. (2012) and Eichler (2012) 
who showed that investors had less equity home bias with widespread financial statement 
disclosure. The results showed that investors had less equity home bias towards firms 
adopting IFRS. 
Also, cultural differences such as speaking different languages or having different 
religions can also affect international portfolio holdings. According to Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001), information costs occurred in the form of translations and adaption to 
different religious habits. Faruqee et al. (2004) applied the Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS) dataset to test the validity of the explanations of the literature 
of cross-border equity holdings. They used consumption based asset pricing model to 
accommodate transaction costs and found that the factors like market-size, information 
costs and transaction efficiency variables explained about 80 percent of the disparity in 
cross-border equity holdings. Chan et al. (2005) and Sercu and Vanpée (2007a) also 
showed that size bias played an important role in explaining the equity home bias as (log) 
GDP or number of publicly listed companies influenced decisions related to international 
portfolios. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) highlighted that industrial (economic) proximity 
was also an important factor as overseas decisions of listing firms reflected investment 
decisions of investors. 
However, there are certain drawbacks of having information asymmetry as an 
explanation for the home bias. If investors have more information about their domestic 
assets they face a lower variance of returns from domestic equity and also their expected 
returns differ from foreign investors. Another problem is that there are many index 
vehicles which help in reducing information disadvantage relative to foreign investors. 
Errunza et al. (1999) empirically showed that the benefits from international 
diversification could be obtained fully by combining domestically traded multinational, 
ADRs and closed-end country funds together. Further, Brealey et al. (1999) explained that 
holding country index funds or index futures combined with cash helped to avoid 
institutional disadvantages of holding foreign equities. Another drawback is related to the 
assumption of information immobility, while asymmetric information usually exists when 
information is mobile. 
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Hau (2001) with German data, Dvorak (2005) with Indonesian data, and Choe et al. 
(2005) with Korean data concluded that foreign investors had an informational 
disadvantage compared to domestic investors as domestic investors enjoyed higher profits 
than foreign investors. On the contrary, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) used Finnish data 
and Huang and Shiu (2006) showed that foreign investors outperform domestic investors. 
Corporate governance and transparency: Recent studies have brought corporate 
governance and transparency at the firm-level and political risk at the country level into 
limelight as important explanations for the home bias puzzle. La Porta et al. (1999) 
showed that company ownership was more internationally dispersed in countries with 
good legal protection of minority shareholders. Dahlquist et al. (2003) illustrated that the 
home bias could be explained by taking into consideration the differences between 
corporate governance across countries. Further, Gelos and Wei (2005) showed a positive 
relation between both government and corporate governance and international 
investments in a country. Also, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) showed that foreign 
investors preferred to invest in companies with good corporate governance. Thus, quality 
of corporate governance played an important role in attracting foreign investments. 
Pinkowitz et al. (2001) showed that the home bias is linked to corporate governance. 
The results showed that controlling for barriers to international trade did not help in 
removing the home bias. However, the home bias declined significantly when the extent 
to which shares held by shareholders across the world was taken into consideration. 
Hence, to reduce the home bias it is important to improve the investor rights across 
countries, especially where large shareholders control the major part of the firms. 
Further, Stulz (2005) highlighted that the home bias was caused by twin agency 
problem, that is, agency problem of corporate-insider discretion and agency problem of 
state-owner discretion. Agency problem of corporate-insider discretion meant that inside 
investors could extract substantial private benefits at the cost of outside investors. Agency 
problem of state ruler discretion meant that state rulers could expropriate investors by 
regulations and taxes which were meant for the benefit of the state rulers. 
Stulz (2005) showed, both empirically and theoretically, that in countries with poor 
investor protection and high risk of state expropriation the concentration of share 
ownership was more. He gave three main ways by which agency problems affected 
international portfolio decisions. First, foreign investors invested less in countries with 
poor governance as insiders had a larger ownership share in such countries. Second, 
foreign investors owned larger fraction of wealth in smaller countries while portfolio 
investors living in small countries with smaller share of world market portfolio invested 
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more abroad. Third, foreign investors owned a lower fraction of wealth in countries with 
high risk of state expropriation. Therefore, to reduce the home bias it was important to 
develop institutions that supported decentralised ownership in the countries with poor 
public governance. 
Behavioural-based explanations: All possible explanations of the home bias puzzle are 
generally based on institutional factors. However, psychologists and experimental 
economists have found that people tend to suffer from wishful-thinking bias and self-
control problems. To understand this researchers made behavioural models in which 
domestic investors are risk-averse and consider foreign markets as more risky. 
Fellner and Maciejovsky (2003) considered behavioural explanations to shed some 
light on the home bias as focusing on institutional explanations alone was insufficient in 
explaining the home bias puzzle. These behavioural explanations included familiarity 
towards one’s domestic companies, optimism about domestic equity market, asymmetric 
expectations due to individual probability judgements and social identity. In this 
experiment pairs of subjects were randomly assigned to firms where three firms were a 
subset of one out of two diverse production groups. While in the social identity treatment 
group affiliation was implemented by labelling two groups separately. Results showed 
that social identity factor explained the home bias equally well as asymmetric information 
and thus social factors played an important role in explaining the home bias along with 
institutional factors. 
Strong and Xu (2003) contributed to the investor behaviour description of the home 
bias by analysing monthly fund manager surveys of 4 main geographical domains i.e. the 
US, the UK, Europe and Japan covering 61 month period from October 1995 to October 
2000. The results of their study proved that the managers had confidence in their domestic 
equity market. This implied a bias towards domestic equities and relative bias against 
foreign equities. Lutje and Menkhoff (2007) examined the home bias puzzle using data in 
the form of questionnaire survey conducted in 2003 amongst 234 German equity and bond 
managers. Results showed that fund manager showed a preference towards their domestic 
assets due to information advantage and expectation of higher returns. 
Kilka and Weber (2000) showed that German investors felt more confident in judging 
their domestic stocks compared to the US stocks. This influenced peoples’ expectations as 
expressed by subjective probability distribution. They concluded that investors were more 
optimistic about the domestic stocks as compared to the foreign stocks. On the contrary, 
Dorn and Huberman (2005) examined questionnaire data of Germany from January 1995 
to May 2000 and did not find any convincing evidence for overconfidence towards 
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domestic stocks. Morse and Shive (2011) studied a sample of 53 countries and highlighted 
that patriotism towards one’s own country also leads the equity home bias, even after 
controlling for capital controls, diversification benefits, information advantages and 
familiarity. 
Also, numerous investor characteristics affect international investment decisions. 
According to Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Goetzmann and Kumar (2003) and Karlsson 
and Norden (2007), investors with less experience were more home biased as compared to 
sophisticated investors. Also, Goetzmann and Kumar (2003) underlined that there was a 
positive relation between age and diversification and income and diversification. 
Gender and age are also considered as substantial factors which affect the attitude of 
investors. It has been verified that female investors are more conventional and do not like 
to take risk when compared to male investors. Barber and Odean (2001) found that young 
male investors are inclined to trade more as compared to older female investors. Also, 
they argued that male investors tend to trade more than female investors as male investors 
are over-confident. On the contrary, Graham et al. (2009) concluded that more trading by 
male investors are due to their high competence. Glaser and Weber (2003) demonstrated 
that overconfidence in the form of miscalibration, illusion of control scores, etc. was not 
affected by investor demographics like age, gender and portfolio size. Also, Biais et al. 
(2005) and Deaves et al. (2004) proved that miscalibration was not associated with 
gender. 
The main problem with the behavioural explanations is that psychological constructs 
are difficult to measure and distinguish. Unobservable psychological attribute, such as 
overconfidence, are difficult to measure and is, therefore, proxied by age and gender. 
Another method to deal with behavioural explanations is by conducting questionnaires or 
experiments. However, two problems can arise: first, if multiple proxies are suggested to 
measure the same proxy then sometimes individuals’ responses are poorly correlated 
across proxies. Second, it is difficult to extend the questionnaire-based studies to other 
populations as explained by Dorn and Huberman (2005). 
Nowadays as other explanations seem to fail in clarifying the home bias puzzle 
empirically, information asymmetries, governance issues and behavioural biases are the 
most popular explanations. However, there is still a debate going on regarding 
institutional explanations and behavioural explanations. Ke et al. (2010) tried to explain 
foreign investment decisions based on information-based explanation and familiarity. As 
they did not find any evidence in favour of information-based explanation, they concluded 
that foreign investments were affected by familiarity issues. Bekaert and Wang (2009) 
also concluded that information and familiarity variables and degree of capital market 
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openness played an important role in explaining both home and foreign biases. On the 
other hand, DeMarzo et al. (2004) concluded that foreign investment was driven by 
availability of information and familiarity was just a substitute for better information. 
Some other explanations: Prices of consumption good and human capital play an 
important role as these can lead to differences in portfolio choice. Krugman (1981) and 
Stulz (1983) proved that investors preferred to hold bonds rather than stocks to hedge 
against relative good prices as the price of foreign bonds in domestic currency was 
correlated with relative price of foreign goods. 
Campbell et al. (2001) developed a model which was able to optimise investor’s 
portfolio of risky assets by maximising mean-downside risk portfolio. Campbell and 
Kraussl (2005) focused on downside risk as an explanation in resolving the puzzle as risk 
in foreign investment had increased resulting in a decline in benefit from international 
diversification. They used a downside risk portfolio model and data on international 
equity markets to determine the extent of risk-return trade-off in international financial 
markets. They showed that due to greater downside risk there was a higher risk-return 
trade-off in international equity portfolios. The model included additional risk involved in 
investing in foreign equity and helped to understand the bias for home equity. 
Salehizadeh (2003) empirically analysed the return relationships between the US and 
other international indices, using daily data from January 31, 1995, through May 31, 2001. 
To examine the behaviour of global stock market indices and its relationship with a 
portfolio of the US MNCs, tests were conducted based on correlation measures. The 
empirical results showed that the US investors expanded their domestic stock portfolios 
by including foreign-traded stocks from both developed and emerging market economies. 
However, the equity home bias still persists as the US MNCs fail to substitute for 
international returns. 
Michaelides (2003) gave an explanation for the home bias in domestic equity by 
certain investors by using basic ingredients of undiversifiable labour income risk and 
liquidity constraints in his model. He extended the approach of Heaton and Lucas (1997) 
to solve models regarding domestic portfolio choice from international perspective and 
found that investors held very small amount of internationally diversified portfolio even 
when the investment amount was very small. Positive correlation between domestic and 
foreign stock markets reduced foreign market participation but portfolio remained 
balanced internationally. The model predicted that as long as the equity wealth was held 
largely by small savers, chances of the equity home bias were more. 
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Hurst and Stafford (2004) demonstrated that in a permanent income model with 
exogenous liquidity constraints and mortgage behaviour, the households were likely to 
refinance. Households found their home as a financial buffer. Households facing 
unemployment shocks and low levels of liquid assets were 25% more likely to refinance 
than other households. Hence, households refinance in periods of low interest rates to 
receive a lower stream of mortgage payments and thus increased the financial wealth. 
Also, they would refinance to access accumulated home equity for the purpose of 
consumption smoothing. 
Berkel (2004) observed that despite large potential gains, international equity 
investment was less diversified across countries than predicted by the traditional capital 
asset pricing model (ICAPM). Using a sample of 38 countries over a time period of 1997 
and 2001 the results showed a very strong effect of indirect capital market frictions on 
international equity holdings. Thus, explained the equity home bias. 
Zalewska (2005) analysed the role of the home bias in stock market development and 
used the Polish experience as the case study. Zalewska (2005) concluded that in emerging 
markets domestic-biased investments had a negative impact on the investors and the local 
stock market development. Since, the portfolios of pension funds were not diversified, 
they were more risky, and hence suffered from low returns. 
Brown et al. (2007) provided evidence that causal relationship exists between the 
average stock market participation decisions of one’s own community and an individual’s 
decision of owning the stock. They instrumented for average ownership of an individual’s 
community with lagged average ownership of the states in which one’s non-native 
neighbours were born.  The results were stronger in more sociable communities and 
suggested that a 10 percentage-point increase in stock ownership of one’s community 
increased the probability of individual’s owning that stock by 4 percentage-points. 
Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2007) studied the relation between households’ stock 
purchases and the stock purchases by their neighbours. They covered the investments by 
36,000 households over a six-year period of 1991 to 1996 including common stocks, 
mutual funds and other securities. They found that there was a very strong evidence of 
information diffusion which suggested that a 10 percentage-point increase in purchase of 
stocks from an industry made by a household’s neighbour resulted in 2 percentage-point 
increase in the household’s own purchase of stocks from that industry. The effect was 
significantly larger for local stocks and among households in more social states. 
Controlling for area sociability, households’ and neighbours’ investment style preferences 
and the industry composition of local firms, they suggested that word-of-mouth 
communication attributed 21-56% of the overall information diffusion. 
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Foad (2008) examined the impact of the introduction of a monetary union like Euro in 
1999 on the equity home bias puzzle. The results showed that the equity home bias has 
reduced in the entire world for this period and the sharpest fall has been for intra-EA 
equity holdings with the home bias reducing from 68% to 29% between pre- and post-
Euro periods. The most important reason for this drop was the reduction of information 
asymmetries. Further, Schoenmaker and Bosch (2008) showed that the decline in the 
equity and bond home bias in Europe due to the arrival of Euro is a permanent 
phenomenon and this decline is stronger in EMU countries than in non-EMU countries. 
Hanushek and Woessman (2008) reviewed the role of cognitive skills in promoting 
economic well-being and concluded that cognitive skills of population rather than school 
attainment played a more important role in individual earnings, distribution of income and 
economic growth. Empirical results showed the important relevance of both minimal and 
high-level skills, complementarity of skills and also quality of economic institutions. 
Further, international comparisons of cognitive skills revealed that there were larger skill 
deficits in developing countries than resulting from school attainment and enrolment. 
Foad (2008a) evaluated the relationship between immigration and the equity home 
bias and found that inward migration was positively correlated to increased foreign equity 
home bias and reduced equity home bias. Outward migration reduced the home bias in 
rich countries while it increased the home bias if migration happened from or to 
developing countries. Hence, migration leads to the benefit of increased information flows 
for developed countries, but not for developing countries. 
Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011) described short positions in domestic currency 
bonds for G7 countries and also showed significant levels of home bias for the US, Japan 
and Canada. Their findings had crucial empirical implications. First, they confirmed the 
results of VanWincoop and Warnock (2006) and also highlighted the limitatio that equity 
positions are not driven by exchange rate risk. Further, domestic equities help in providing 
a good hedge against non-financial income risk, conditional on bond returns. 
Further, Coeurdacier et al. (2010) showed that regardless of liberalisation of capital 
flows, there is a big amount of the equity home bias that still exists among the OECD 
countries. The model took domestic stocks in order to hedge fluctuations in local wage 
income and the terms of trade risk was hedged using bonds. They used a two good/two 
country RBC model with smooth international trade in equities and bonds. 
Mondria and Wu (2010) presented a rational expectations model of asset prices with 
rationally inattentive investors. They tested the model on a panel data set of 19 developed 
countries in the time period of 1988 to 2004 using degree of information capacity, degree 
of information advantage and financial openness of each country. Information capacity 
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was measured by the average circulation of number of newspapers published at least 4 
times in a week, number of mobile telephone subscribers to a public mobile telephone 
service using cellular technology and the number of people using internet. Financial 
openness was calculated using both de facto and de jure measures. The estimation results 
proved that at least 46.8% of the home bias could be explained by the model. Also, they 
showed that the home bias decreased with an increase in financial openness and 
information capacity. 
Coeurdacier and Guibaud (2011) used aggregate data on bilateral cross country equity 
holdings and found that there was a strong impact of diversification motive on source 
countries with a higher level of home bias. Investors like to increase investment in foreign 
equity holdings within countries which offer superior diversification opportunities. 
2.5.2 Education and portfolio diversification 
An increase in the number of financial instruments and products has augmented the 
need for education and financial awareness among citizens, educators, community groups, 
businesses, policymakers and government agencies for their own financial security. 
Knowledgeable, educated and more financially aware people are able to manage their 
finances well by making good and profitable decisions for their economic security and 
well-being. Financially secure individuals are able to contribute to the economic 
development of their communities and nations. Thus, education and financial awareness 
play an important role in influencing investment decisions (Hilgert et al., 2003). 
Bernheim (1995, 1998) was the first to point out that most individuals lack basic 
financial knowledge and numeracy. Numerous surveys have emphasised that US 
population or specific sub-groups steadily have very low levels of economic and financial 
literacy. Mandell (2004) also confirmed, using the JumpStart coalition for personal 
financial literacy survey, that US high school students have very low levels of basic 
literacy. Hilgert et al. (2003) examined data from 2001 survey of consumers, covering 
knowledge about credit, savings patterns and mortgages and found that there is a 
widespread illiteracy among the whole population. Similar results were also found by 
other authors like Agnew and Szykman (2005) and Moore (2003) using smaller samples 
or specific groups of population. 
Some studies confirm the positive relation between financial knowledge and financial 
decision-making among households. Hilgert et al. (2003) confirmed a positive link 
between financial knowledge and financial behaviour. Van Rooij et al. (2011) argued that 
financially aware households are more likely to participate in stock market investments. 
Further, Stango and Zinman (2007) indicated that individuals, who are not able to 
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calculate the interest rates correctly out of a stream of payments, are likely to borrow more 
and collect lower amounts of wealth. Agarwal et al. (2009) showed that financial errors in 
investments are more dominant among the young and elderly people who have less 
financial knowledge and cognitive ability. 
Campbell (2006) pointed out that educated households in Sweden diversify their 
portfolios more proficiently. Bucks and Pence (2006) stressed that households with 
adjustable rate mortgages, which are more complex than the fixed-rate mortgages, are 
unaware about the terms and conditions of their contracts. Individuals with less 
knowledge of mortgages have low levels of education and low income. These results are 
similar to the results found by Campbell (2006) in which he showed that many households 
fail to refinance their mortgages during the period of declining interest rates as they have 
low education and low income levels. Further, Moore (2003) showed that households 
engaged in difficult mortgages are less probable to be knowledgeable and financially 
skilled. 
Van Rooij et al. (2011) designed two modules of measuring the relationship between 
financial literacy and stock market participation for De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) 
household survey. They found that most of the respondents had basic financial knowledge 
and were familiar with the concepts of inflation, interest compounding and time value of 
money. However, very few people knew the basic concepts about bonds and stocks and 
the relation between bond prices and interest rates. Thus, they concluded that lack of 
literacy along with lack of understanding of economics and finance prevent households 
from participating in the stock market. Gollwitzer (1996, 1999) argued that people who 
are able to develop concrete plans are more likely to invest in profitable channels and 
achieve their goals. Even a little bit of planning generates higher wealth. 
Cole et al. (2011) examined the theory of low demand for financial services in 
emerging market economies along with survey evidence from Indonesia and India in a 
field experiment. They found a strong correlation between financial literacy and financial 
behaviour among emerging market economies. Also, the results showed that the demand 
for financial education is quite high. However, experimental results showed that 
programme on financial education is not an effective method for the promotion of use of 
bank accounts. Their final results indicated that reducing the price of financial services is 
a better option for financial deepening, for example, by encouraging low-cost 
technological solutions like mobile banking, etc. 
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Cole et al. (2012) explored why education affects financial behaviour. They estimated 
results using the following equation: 
𝓎𝒾𝓉 =  𝛼1𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝒾 +  𝛼2𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝒾 +  𝛽𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝒾𝓉 +  𝛿𝒳𝒾𝓉 +  𝒮𝒢𝒾 +  ℯ𝒾𝓉 
where 𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝒾 is a measure of innate ability, 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝒾 is a measure of acquired 
knowledge, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝒾𝓉 is the highest grade obtained by individual 𝒾 by year 𝓉. 𝒳𝒾𝓉 
includes age, gender, race and survey year effects and finally, 𝒮𝒢𝒾 are sibling-group fixed 
effects. 
Cole et al. (2012) found that education affects confidence, borrowing decisions, the 
probability of a person having pension, occupational choices, financial market 
participation and decision-making. Following Lochner and Moretti (2004), they also 
considered the changes in schooling requirements between 1914 and 1978 to measure the 
effect of education on confined rates. The results showed that an additional year of 
education can increase financial market participation by 3.54%. They also showed that 
one standard deviation increase in knowledge and education increased the market 
participation margin by 3.4 or 1.8 percentage points. Thus, education has significant and 
positive effects on market participation. They argued that education, knowledge and 
ability achieved at the school level can increase financial market participation. 
Education also affects financial behaviour through beliefs and attitudes. Puri and 
Robinson (2007) showed that individuals, who are optimistic, invest a larger part of their 
portfolios in equities as compared to other financial instruments. Graham et al. (2009) 
found that educated investors show higher levels of confidence and invest more in foreign 
portfolios as stronger educational background and other demographics help investors to 
feel more competent in understanding the financial information. A more competent 
investor is keen to invest in foreign securities. Since he is knowledgeable, he understands 
the benefits and risks involved in financial assets. The empirical results showed that 
education increases investor’s competence and investor’s with better education are more 
likely to invest in foreign assets. Heath and Tversky (1991) highlighted that competence 
helps a person to invest in foreign stocks. An US investor may be unfamiliar with 
different foreign languages but at the same time may feel competent to invest in foreign 
markets. 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) introduced the Rand American Life Panel (ALP) which 
offered several features for analysing financial literacy and retirement planning. The 
dataset helps in evaluating financial knowledge of the workers when they are in their 
prime earning years and are making crucial financial decisions like buying a home and 
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other savings. The results are similar to the analysis of Lusardi and Mitchell (2006, 
2007a). They concluded that financial literacy is an important determinant in retirement 
planning and respondent’s literacy is higher when they are exposed to subjects like 
economics in schools and to other company-based financial education programmes. 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a) explained that individuals with higher income and more 
education such as in ALP sample are better planners. It further confirms that older, 
educated and male respondents are better planners due to higher levels of financial 
knowledge. 
Christelis and Georgarakos (2013) constructed a flexible multivariate probit model 
which helped investors to understand different participation hurdles in order to invest in 
domestic and foreign markets. The results showed that households face trouble in 
investing in foreign markets which are different from the obstacles of investing in 
domestic markets and hence requires financial sophistication and economic resources to 
overcome these hurdles. These results point towards the significance of financial literacy 
as awareness can help in improving the portfolio performance of households who 
participate in stock markets. 
Further, Magi (2009) tried to numerically solve a simple model of international 
portfolio choice using different behavioural patterns and preferences of economic agents. 
The results show that only investors, who are correctly able to analyse information 
derived from the stock markets, are able to gain from diversification opportunities. In case 
of Italy the results show that people with a higher degree of education like graduates are 
likely to invest more in foreign equities as compared to people with a lower level of 
education. 
Lusardi and Tufano (2009) examined a national sample of Americans with respect to 
their debt literacy and financial experiences about their indebtedness. They measured debt 
literacy through a set of questions related to respondents’ knowledge of fundamental 
concepts related to debt. It showed that debt literacy was low and that about a third of the 
credit card fees and charges are paid by the individuals with low literacy and lack of 
knowledge, even after controlling for disparities in income, wealth, family status, etc. 
Bernheim et al. (2001) and Bernheim and Garrett (2003) proved that people who are 
exposed to financial education at the school level are able to make better decisions 
regarding savings. Calvet et al. (2009) created an index for measuring financial 
sophistication using the data from Sweden based on the actions of investors. The results 
showed that poor, less educated and immigrant households lack financial knowledge and 
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hence are likely to make maximum mistakes regarding financial decision-making. Moore 
(2003) further explained that respondents with lower financial literacy are likely to run 
into costly mortgages. 
Jappelli (2010) used panel data of 55 countries from 1995 to 2008 to show extensive 
heterogeneity of financial and economic competence between countries and tried to relate 
economic literacy to human capital indicators, technological infrastructure, financial and 
economic development. He merged the indicators of financial literacy with a large group 
of macroeconomic and institutional variables. The results showed that literacy rate varies 
drastically across countries and improves with human capital and financial sector reforms. 
While literacy variability factor depends on educational attainment, social interactions and 
savings in the form of social security. 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2010) tried to find out if there were people with economic 
decision-making skills. They created a questionnaire on financial literacy and retirement 
planning for the respondents in American Life Panel (ALP). This helped in measuring 
financial literacy in a better way. They identified the causal relation between financial 
literacy and retirement planning through information about financial knowledge acquired 
at the school level. They established that people who have a higher level of knowledge in 
economics are likely to make better financial decisions. Moreover, they found that 
financially literate adults are likely to do better planning for their retirement. 
Further, Kimball and Shumway (2010) developed an index of investor sophistication 
using the data from April 2005 Survey of Consumers based on a questionnaire of 14 
questions. They correlated the measure of sophistication with the holdings of international 
investments, measures of diversification and holding of employer’s stock. They tried to 
correlate three different puzzles, that is, home bias puzzle, employer stock puzzle and 
participation puzzle with investor sophistication and finally, correlated sophistication with 
financial education. The results showed that financial education variable has significant 
explanatory power for the home bias and market participation variable, while income and 
pension variables have explanatory power for participation variables. Thus, participation, 
home bias, diversification and employer stock puzzles are significantly related to each 
other and to investor sophistication. 
According to Atkinson and Messy (2011), OECD International Network on Financial 
Education developed a questionnaire to compare the levels of financial literacy at the 
international level. The questionnaire takes into account different attributes like education, 
behaviour and attitude related to personal finances. This facilitates in finding out 
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similarities and differences in the level of financial literacy among different countries of 
the world. 
Abreu et al. (2011) examined that investors initially invest in their country securities 
and then after sometime enter the foreign market. Analysing the time period they 
concluded that investors who invest more frequently in the domestic market are likely to 
be the first to invest in the foreign market as compared to others. The experience they gain 
from trading in the domestic market helps them to make better investment decisions in the 
foreign market. However, investors who are educated and have financial knowledge can 
enter the foreign investment market without prior experience of trading in the domestic 
market. 
Giofre (2012) explored the role of financial education and investor protection in 
explaining the lack of international diversification of portfolios. Giofre (2012) showed 
that investor’s financial education helps in increasing international investment and 
stronger minority investor protection attracts inward investment. 
Klapper et al. (2013) used a panel dataset of consumer loans of Russia from 2003 to 
2008 to examine the effect of financial literacy on human behaviour. They found that only 
41 percent of the respondents could answer questions related to interest compounding. So, 
they concluded that financial literacy has a positive relation with financial market 
participation and a negative relation with informal sources of borrowing. 
Education helps people to take proper decisions regarding borrowing and investing 
wealth which induces growth and stability in the overall economy. From the asset side, 
education and financial literacy are important because of the increasing complicacy of 
financial products. Since the end of 1980s there has been more deregulation and financial 
innovation resulting in more availability of financial investment options in equities and 
bonds. Many researchers have found that lack of knowledge leads to poor risk 
diversification, inefficient portfolio allocations and low savings rate. Banks and Oldfield 
(2007) analysed the numerical ability and other scopes of cognitive ability using a sample 
of older adults in England. They found that numeracy levels are strongly correlated with 
understanding of pension arrangements, perceived financial security, retirement saving 
measures and investment portfolios. Further, Christelis et al. (2010) considered the 
relation between cognitive abilities and stockholding based on the Survey of Health, 
Assets, Retirement, and Expectations (SHARE) and concluded that the propensity to 
invest is associated with numerical ability, verbal fluency and recall skills. 
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Guiso and Jappelli (2005) documented that a significant proportion of households 
were not even aware of the existence of many financial instruments, as per the 1995 and 
1998 Bank of Italy Surveys of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). They found that 
the probability of survey respondents being aware of the existence of stocks, mutual 
funds, and investment accounts is positively correlated to education, household resources, 
long-term banking relations, and proxies for social interaction. 
Guiso and Jappelli (2008) linked financial literacy to portfolio diversification in the 
case of Italian investors. They used 2007 Unicredit Customer Survey (UCS) which had 
detailed information about investors’ portfolio choice, financial literacy and demographic 
features. They found that even after controlling for socioeconomic factors and proxies for 
risk aversion, financial literacy is strongly correlated with the degree of portfolio 
diversification. Christiansen et al. (2008) used panel-data set containing detailed 
information about Danish investors’ educational attainment along with other financial and 
socioeconomic variables. The results showed that investors’ stock holdings increased if 
individuals completed a degree related to economics and also if an economist moved to 
the neighbourhood. 
From the macro point of view economic literacy is essential for good and efficient 
working of the markets and policies as lack of financial knowledge can lead to deceitful 
financial practices and unfair competition in financial markets. Mishkin (2008) stressed 
that households with better knowledge and information are able to discipline policy 
makers to make better economic-policy decisions. 
2.6 Econometric background of OLS and Instrumental Variable (IV) methods 
2.6.1 Asymptotic Properties of OLS 
This section provides various asymptotic properties of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation technique. The population equation in vector form can be written as the 
following: 
𝑦 = 𝑥𝛽 + 𝑢 
where 𝑥 is a 1 x K vector of regressions and 𝛽 ≡ (𝛽1, 𝛽2 … … 𝛽𝑘)′ is a K x 1 vector. 
It is assumed that a random sample of size N from the population to estimate 𝛽; thus, 
{(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖): 𝑖 = 1, 2 … . . , 𝑁} are treated as independent, identically distributed random 
variables, 𝑥𝑖 is 1 x K and 𝑦𝑖 is a scalar. For each observation 𝑖 there is 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 
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which is convenient for deriving statistical properties of estimators (Wooldridge, 2002). 
I. Consistency 
The key assumption for OLS to consistently estimate 𝛽 is the population 
orthogonality condition: 
Assumption 1: 𝐸(𝑥′𝑢) = 0. 
Since 𝑥 contains a constant, the Assumption 1 is equivalent to saying that 𝑢 has mean zero 
and is uncorrelated with each regressor. The other assumption required for consistency of 
OLS is that the expected outer product matrix of 𝑥 has full rank, so as to there are no exact 
linear relationships among the regressors in the population. This is stated in the following 
assumption: 
Assumption 2: rank E(𝑥′𝑥) = K. 
As E(𝑥′𝑥) is a symmetric K x K matrix, Assumption 2 is equivalent to assuming that 
E(𝑥′𝑥) is positive definite. Thus, under Assumptions 1 and 2, the parameter vector 𝛽 is 
identified. To check that 𝛽 is identified, it is multiplied by 𝑥′ and then expectations are 
taken to get: 
𝛽 = [𝐸(𝑥′𝑥)]−1𝐸(𝑥′𝑦) 
As (𝑥, 𝑦) are observed, 𝛽 is identified. In the method of moments, the population moments 
𝐸(𝑥′𝑥) and 𝐸(𝑥′𝑥) are replaced with the corresponding sample averages. 
The theorem for ‘Consistency of OLS’ states that under Assumptions 1 and 2, the OLS 
estimator ?̂? obtained from a random sample following the population model is consistent 
for 𝛽 (Wooldridge, 2002). 
II. Asymptotic Inference using OLS 
The asymptotic distribution of the OLS estimator is represented as: 
√𝑁(?̂? − 𝛽) = (𝑁−1 ∑ 𝑥′𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑥𝑖)
−1
(𝑁−
1
2 ∑ 𝑥′𝑖𝑢𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
A homoskedasticity assumption makes the OLS asymptotic variance simpler: 
Assumption 3: 𝐸[𝑢2𝑥′𝑥] = 𝜎2𝐸(𝑥′𝑥), where 𝜎2 ≡ 𝐸(𝑢2). As 𝐸(𝑢) = 0, 𝜎2 is equal to 
Var(𝑢). 
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The theorem for ‘Asymptotic Normality of OLS’ shows that under assumptions 1-3, 
√𝑁(?̂? − 𝛽)~ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0, 𝜎2𝐴−1) 
where the above equation treats ?̂? as approximately normal with mean 𝛽 and variance 
𝜎2[𝐸(𝑥′𝑥)]
−1
𝑁
. The usual estimator of 𝜎2, ?̂?2 ≡ 𝑆𝑆𝑅/(𝑁 − 𝐾), where SSR=∑ 𝑢?̂?
𝑁
𝑖=1  is the 
OLS sum of squared residuals, is shown to be consistent. When 𝐸(𝑥′𝑥) is replaced with 
sample averages (X’X/N), it becomes 
Avâr (?̂?) = ?̂?2(𝑋′𝑋)−1 
The right hand side of the above equation is the usual OLS variance matrix estimator 
under the classical linear model assumptions. As per the theorem of ‘Asymptotic 
Normality of OLS’, under assumptions 1-3, the usual OLS standard errors, t statistics and 
F statistics are asymptotically valid (Wooldridge, 2002). 
2.6.2 Importance of Instrumental Variables Estimation 
Consider a linear population model 
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 +  … … . . + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝑢 
𝐸(𝑢) = 0, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑗 , 𝑢) = 0, 𝑗 = 1,2, … . . , 𝐾 − 1 
but where 𝑥𝑘 might be correlated with 𝑢. This implies that the explanatory variables 
𝑥1,  𝑥2, … . , 𝑥𝑘 are exogenous but 𝑥𝑘 is endogenous. Endogeneity can arise mainly for 
three reasons: Omitted variables, Measurement Error and Simultaneity Problem. Omitted 
variables appear when we try to control for one or more explanatory variables but due to 
data unavailability are not able to include all variables in the model. Measurement error 
arises when we aim to measure the partial effect of a variable but we are able to observe 
only an imperfect measure of that variable. Finally, simultaneity problem arises if one of 
the variables is simultaneously determined along with 𝑦. 
OLS estimations in the case of endogenity generally results in inconsistent estimators 
of all the 𝛽𝑗 if Cov (𝑥𝑘, 𝑢)≠ 0. Thus, the method of instrumental variables (IV) provides a 
general solution to the problem of endogeneity. To use the IV estimation with 𝑥𝑘 
endogenous variables, an observable variable 𝑧1 is required that satisfies two main 
conditions: 
1. Cov (𝑧1, 𝑢) = 0, which implies like 𝑥1,  𝑥2, … . , 𝑥𝑘−1, 𝑧1 is also exogenous. 
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2. The relationship between 𝑧1 and the endogenous variable, 𝑥𝑘 requires linear projection 
of 𝑥𝑘 onto all exogenous variables: 
𝑥𝑘 = 𝛿0 +  𝛿1𝑥1 + 𝛿2𝑥2 +  … … +  𝛿𝑘−1𝑥𝑘−1 + 𝜃1𝑧1 + 𝑟𝑘 
where, by definition E(𝑟𝑘)=0 and 𝑟𝑘 is uncorrelated with 𝑥1,  𝑥2, … . , 𝑥𝑘−1 and 𝑧1. The 
main assumption of this linear projection is that the coefficient on 𝑧1 is nonzero: 
𝜃1 ≠ 0 
When 𝑧1 satisfies the two conditions, then it is said to be an instrumental variable 
(IV) candidate for 𝑥𝑘. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator is considered to be the 
most efficient IV estimator (Wooldridge, 2002). 
2.7 Empirical implementation 
2.7.1 Baseline model 
To establish the impact of different levels of education on international diversification 
in equity markets this chapter models the determinants of equity home bias and checks 
whether education has a significant effect. Following the recent literature on international 
diversification (see Chan et al., 2005 and Mondria and Wu, 2013) the empirical models 
are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods
3
. A dummy variable is 
included to capture financial development (Fin.Dev) which takes the value one if a 
country’s stock market capitalisation is greater than the mean and zero otherwise. The 
Fin.Dev dummy enters on its own in order to measure the direct impact of financial 
development on equity home bias. The following baseline model is considered: 
   𝐸ℋℬ𝒾𝓉 =  𝒶0 +  𝒶1𝐸𝑑𝑢𝒾𝓉 + 𝒶2𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝒶3𝒳𝒾𝓉 +  ℯ𝒾𝓉,      (9) 
where 𝒾 = 1, 2, …., N refers to the cross-section of units (countries in this case), 𝓉 = 1, 2, 
…., T refers to the time period, 𝐸ℋℬ𝒾𝓉 is the equity home bias for country 𝒾 and year 𝓉. 
Edu denotes education in country 𝒾 and year 𝓉 measured in three different ways using 
country averages of tertiary education, mathematical numeracy taken from OECD-PISA 
test scores and the degree of managers’ financial skills. The vector 𝒳 is of country-
specific factors which includes macro-economic conditions, information related-variables, 
financial liberalisation, financial market development, diversification benefits and finally, 
foreign exchange risk. ℯ𝒾𝓉 is a disturbance term which varies with time and across 
different countries. In order to control for cyclical factors originating from the business 
                                                          
3
 To ensure that the results are not driven by potential endogeneity in the regressors this chapter also uses an 
instrumental variables (IV) method. 
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cycle time dummies are included in the regressions. Country dummies that take into 
account cross-country differences are also included. Finally, standard errors are clustered 
at the country level to control for serial correlation across countries. 
The dependent variable is the equity home bias in international portfolios. Following 
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Brealey at al. (1999), Sercu and Vanpée (2007, 2012) and 
De Moor and Vanpée (2013) the equity home bias is calculated by subtracting 
proportional market capitalisation from proportion of domestic equities in a country’s 
portfolio. Thus, 
     𝐸ℋℬ𝒾𝑡 =  
ℰ𝒬𝒾𝑡
𝒯ℰ𝒬𝒾𝑡
−
ℳℰ𝒬𝒾𝑡
𝒲ℰ𝒬𝒾𝑡
   (10) 
where ℰ𝒬𝒾𝑡 is domestic equity holdings of investors in country 𝒾 at time 𝑡, 𝒯ℰ𝒬𝒾𝑡 is the 
total equity portfolio held by the investors in country 𝒾 at time 𝑡, ℳℰ𝒬𝒾𝑡 is equity market 
capitalisation of country 𝒾 for time 𝑡 and 𝒲ℰ𝒬𝒾𝑡 is the total world equity market 
capitalisation. 
The effects of education on various aspects of financial behaviour have been 
examined in previous studies (Kennickell et al., 1996; Karlsson and Nordén, 2007; 
Kyrychenko and Shum, 2009; and Stango and Zinman, 2009). Taking this literature 
ahead, three main measures of education are employed to capture the effects of changes in 
education on international portfolio diversification
4
. First, tertiary school enrolment rates 
are used to capture the effects of formal education (Jappelli, 2010)
5
. Further, in the spirit 
of Jappelli (2010) education is measured by a broader definition of education measured by 
OECD-PISA test scores which indicate mathematical numeracy. Finally, education is 
measured by the availability of financial skills from managers’ surveys. The finance skills 
question is laid out as follows: “Finance skills are readily available”. Then respondents 
should evaluate this statement on a 0-10 scale
6
. Both financial skills and mathematical 
numeracy are good measures of financial literacy since they are related to three concepts 
of financial knowledge, as identified by Lusardi and Mitchell (2014). These are numeracy 
and capacity to perform calculations related to interest rates and understanding the 
concepts of inflation and risk diversification. Higher levels of education imply higher 
levels of financial sophistication and investor competence, therefore, increasing financial 
market participation (Cole et al., 2012). In turn, higher levels of financial education are 
expected to be associated with lower levels of home bias in equity markets. 
                                                          
4
  Table A2.1 in the appendix provides precise definitions of the measures of education and other variables. 
5
 The World Bank defines tertiary education as university-level education that includes undergraduate or 
postgraduate education (e.g universities, colleges, technical training institutes, community colleges, nursing 
schools, research laboratories, centres of excellence and distance learning centres). 
6
 Note that education in Finance, which was an alternative variable of financial education used in Jappelli 
(2010) and Giofre (2012), was not available to us. The data-set in the present study was downloaded in 
August 2013 and this particular data item was removed from the database.  
52 
 
In addition to different measures of education, which is the core explanatory variable, 
a set of other control variables are included in Vector X which explains portfolio 
diversification in previous studies. These variables are categorised into six groups
7
: 
Macro-economic conditions: Economic development of a country is measured by the 
growth in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
8
. GDP growth can have both positive and 
negative impact on home bias. Countries with fast growing GDP can attract more foreign 
investments resulting in a decline in the home bias. While on the other hand, countries 
growing faster are mostly the emerging market economies that face higher risk and thus 
discouraging foreign investments resulting in an increase in home bias. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) was used by Chan et al. (2005) as a measure of 
economic development. It is measured by foreign direct stock investment inward, scaled 
by GDP. This indicator is important as a country’s level of economic development is 
likely to affect the flow of foreign investments. 
Information-related variables: Following De Moor and Vanpée (2013), trade, the 
English legal origin and labour force size are employed as proxies for information 
asymmetries and familiarity. Trade is calculated as the average of exports and imports 
scaled by GDP. The English legal origin is a dummy variable that takes the value as one if 
the country has English as the legal origin, and zero otherwise. La Porta et al. (2008) 
showed that a country’s legal origins have a statistically large impact on investor 
protection which is related with improved levels of financial development. Thus, both 
trade and English legal origin are anticipated to affect home bias negatively. 
Labour force size is likely to influence individuals’ investment decisions by affecting 
their risk preferences. It is measured by the total population in the age group of 15 and 
older who are economically active. Several researchers concluded that older investors are 
more experienced, practiced and are more likely to diversify their investment portfolios. 
Hence, labour force size and home bias should be negatively correlated. This means that 
as individuals are economically more active, their levels of income and diversification 
increase (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2003). 
Financial liberalisation: Following Mondria and Wu (2010), financial liberalisation and 
financial openness in a country is measured by the Chinn-Ito Index of financial openness. 
Financial openness of a country is likely to affect home bias negatively. This measure is a 
combination of four binary dummy variables mentioned in IMF’s Annual Report on 
                                                          
7
 Another control variable, namely the corruption index, was also included to deal with the concept of 
governance. This variable, however, proved to be highly co-linear with both financial skills, Pisa scores and 
tertiary education as well as with financial openness. Therefore, it has not been included in the 
specifications. 
8
 The log of GDP per capita is also used as a measure of economic development and the results are broadly 
similar. However, the variable has high correlation with PISA scores, tertiary education and financial 
openness. Thus, this variable is not included in the main models. 
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Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). These variables are the 
presence of multiple exchange rates, the existence of restrictions on current account 
transactions, the existence of restrictions on capital account transactions and the 
requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. Hence, by structure the Chinn-ito index 
is a de-jure measure of financial openness
9
.  
Financial market development: The financial market development is measured by 
turnover ratio, domestic credit and market capitalisation. These variables are expected to 
have a negative relationship with equity home bias. Market turnover is measured by 
turnover ratio, an asset’s ability to be sold without causing much movement in price and 
value. Following Levine and Zervos (1996), the turnover ratio helps in measuring market 
liquidity and transaction costs
10
. According to Bekaert et al. (2007), the effect of liquidity 
is more distinct in emerging markets where executing transactions are time-consuming. 
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP was used by 
Rose and Spiegel (2009) and De Moor and Vanpée (2013) to measure the domestic 
financial depth. This variable includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis with 
the exception of credit to the central government which is net
11
. 
Market capitalisation, as a percentage of GDP, measures the share price multiplied by 
the number of shares outstanding. This is an efficient measure of stock market size. 
According to Chan et al. (2005), larger stock markets are more visible, more recognised 
and more developed, and, therefore, are able to attract more foreign equity portfolio 
investments. Thus, home bias in a country is likely to decrease with an improvement in a 
country’s financial depth and liquidity. 
Diversification benefits: Following Edison and Warnock (2004), the current ratio is used 
which signals the ability of the firms to meet short-term obligations. This ratio is 
calculated as current assets over current liabilities. Thus, an increase in current ratio 
should have a negative impact on home bias as firms which are more liquid are able to 
attract higher levels of foreign investments, thus reducing the home bias. 
In addition, Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets. More 
indebted companies face a higher degree of information asymmetries and maintain weak 
financial position. These companies are less likely to attract foreign investors and, 
therefore, as the leverage increases, the home bias decreases. 
                                                          
9
 One potential drawback of this index is that investors may find loopholes and thus may escape the capital 
account restrictions, invalidating the effect of capital account restrictions. 
10
 Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Datar et al. (1998) show that 
assets with lower liquidity trade at a lower price relative to their expected cash flows. Thus, illiquid assets 
command a higher risk premium and therefore higher expected returns. 
11
 The banking sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks as well as other banking 
institutions where data are available. 
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Foreign exchange risk: Following De Moor and Vanpée (2013), foreign exchange rate 
risk is taken into account by creating a dummy (Euro) which takes value one if the 
country is a member of the Euro-area, and zero otherwise. Baele et al. (2007) established 
that home bias was lower for those countries which were part of the European monetary 
union as compared to other countries. 
2.7.2 Accounting for financial development across countries 
This section tries to explore the extent to which an increase in the level of education 
may have a different impact on the home bias of countries by characterising countries 
according to different degrees of financial development. To do so the degree of stock 
market capitalization is used as a sorting device. Stock market capitalisation to gross 
domestic product (GDP) ratio is an efficient measure of stock market size. Larger stock 
markets are likely to have higher mobility of capital, less volatility and risk, and are more 
internationally integrated (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1996). Further, investors are 
attracted more towards developed stock markets due to the fact that they are characterised 
by lower transaction costs and higher liquidity (Chan et al., 2005). The countries in the 
sample are classified into more and less financially developed on the basis of the average 
stock market capitalization using the dummy Fin.Dev
12
. Due to higher degree of home 
bias in international portfolios among less developed economies, the impact of education 
on equity home bias is expected to be more crucial for less financially developed 
economies as compared to their more developed counterparts. With the purpose of testing 
this hypothesis, the equation (9) is modified by including interactions between education 
(𝐸𝑑𝑢) and the financial development dummy (Fin.Dev). 
𝐸ℋℬ𝒾𝓉 =  𝒶0 + 𝒶1𝐸𝑑𝑢𝒾𝓉 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝒾𝓉 + 𝒶2𝐸𝑑𝑢𝒾𝓉 ∗ (1 − 𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝒾𝓉) + 𝒶3𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 +  𝒶4𝒳𝒾𝓉 +  ℯ𝒾𝓉 ,       (11) 
The specifications above capture the impact of education on more and less financially 
developed economies. If the interacted coefficients are statistically different from each 
other it can be concluded that there is a difference of impact of education on the home 
bias between more and less financially developed economies. 
2.7.3 Accounting for differences between crisis and non-crisis periods 
Having identified a relationship between education and home bias for more and less 
financially developed economies, an attempt is made to explore if this linkage has evolved 
over time. The sample covers the most recent global financial crisis and this provides an 
interesting setup to investigate the extent to which, controlling for other factors, home bias 
                                                          
12
 The robustness of the findings is checked by using an alternative classification scheme of the mean of 
stock value traded (as a percentage of GDP). In addition, the mean of stock market capitalisation and 
outstanding domestic private debt securities to gross domestic product (GDP) is also used as a measure to 
classify countries. 
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differs in crisis years as compared to more tranquil periods. Therefore, equations (11) is 
expanded with a financial crisis dummy (Crisis) which takes value one over the period 
2007-10, and zero otherwise. Interaction of the education variable with the Crisis and the 
Fin.Dev dummies are used to examine whether the sensitivity of countries’ home bias to 
changes in the level of education differs between crisis and non-crisis periods for more 
and less developed economies. There is evidence that the most recent financial crisis 
adversely influenced equity markets in the world. Countries with poor credit market 
regulations and larger pre-crisis current account deficits were hit the hardest (Giannone et 
al., 2010 and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011). The estimated model is described as 
follows: 
𝐸ℋℬ𝒾𝓉 =  𝒶0 + 𝒶1𝐸𝑑𝑢𝒾𝓉 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝒾𝓉 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝓉 + 𝒶2𝐸𝑑𝑢𝒾𝓉 ∗ (1 − 𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝒾𝓉) ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  𝒶3𝐸𝑑𝑢𝒾𝓉 ∗  𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝒾𝓉 ∗
                    (1 − 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡) + 𝒶4𝐸𝑑𝑢𝒾𝓉 ∗ (1 − 𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝒾𝓉) ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡) + 𝒶5𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 +  𝒶6𝒳𝒾𝓉 +  ℯ𝒾𝓉      (12)  
If the interacted terms during the crisis are significantly different from the same terms 
outside of the crisis, then the additional response of the home bias to education during the 
crisis is noticeable as compared to tranquil periods. 
2.8 Data and summary statistics 
2.8.1 Data 
The data for this chapter are taken from different sources including the Coordinated 
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY), 
World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), the Datastream and the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. These are combined in a new way to throw light on 
the effect of education on international diversification in equity markets. The data covers 
38 countries over the period 2001 to 2010
13
. 
Home bias measure 
Portfolio holdings data for constructing the equity home bias measure are taken from 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) held by the IMF. This survey contains 
comparable multi-country data at the security level from end-investors, custodians and a 
combination of the above. Portfolio investment is broken down into instrument (equity) 
                                                          
13
 Due to missing data in CPIS dataset for India and Mexico the home bias data for these countries begin 
from 2003. This data-set is comparable to De Moor and Vanpée (2013) with the exception of Canada, 
Germany, Singapore and South Africa that suffer from missing data on education variables. In line with the 
literature outliers are not removed from the chosen variables, but in regressions, after dropping outliers from 
the equity home bias term and the regression variables, the results remain unchanged. These results are not 
reported but are available upon request. 
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and residence of issuer
14
. The equity market capitalisation data are drawn from World 
Federation of Exchanges (WFE). 
Education 
The main indicator of education is measured using tertiary school enrolment rates, 
mathematical numeracy and financial skills. The data for tertiary school enrolment rates 
are drawn from WDI of the World Bank. As a measure of mathematical numeracy OECD 
PISA test scores for 15 year old individuals are used. These are taken from the IMD 
World Competiveness Yearbook (WCY). This is a good proxy for economic literacy as it 
provides an assessment of financial knowledge and skills (Jappelli, 2010). This variable 
also captures the numerical ability as the propensity to invest is related with numerical 
ability and verbal fluency (Christelis et al., 2010). Finally, an indicator for financial skills 
across managers is used which is drawn from IMD WCY database. This indicator is based 
on a survey conducted on senior business managers who represent a cross-section of the 
business community in the countries examined. The survey tries to answer questions 
related to efficiency and ability of managers to adapt towards changing enterprise 
competitiveness. WCY also reports questions related to value added activities in business, 
since skilled labour force is able to enhance a country’s competitiveness. The distribution 
and ranking of economies in the survey carried out by WCY is very likely to those 
provided by the Survey of Health, Assets, Retirement and Expectations (SHARE), which 
gives information on the cognitive ability at the individual level in 11 European countries 
(see Jappelli, 2010 and Jappelli and Padula, 2013). Thus, WCY can provide a 
representative base for conducting our empirical analysis. 
Other influences 
Data on GDP growth, foreign direct investment (FDI), trade and labour force size are 
extracted from the WDI of the World Bank. Turnover ratio and domestic credit data and 
stock market capitalisation data are also sourced from the WDI of the World Bank. 
Finally, data on Leverage and Current ratio are from Datastream Global Index. 
Datastream is a global financial and macroeconomic database for equities, stock market 
indices, currencies, company fundamentals and fixed income securities. This database is 
maintained by Thomson Reuters Limited which provides time series information for over 
two million financial instruments, securities and indicators for over 175 countries and 60 
markets worldwide. It provides a historical dataset of 50 years over 8,000 different fields. 
                                                          
14
 The CPIS provides the most comprehensive survey of international portfolio investment holdings and has 
been employed by a number of recent studies (e.g Fidora et al., 2007; Bekaert and Wang, 2009 and Gianetti 
and Koskinen, 2010). However, it is still subject to a number of important caveats. See 
http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm#financial 
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2.8.2 Summary statistics 
By way of preliminary analysis descriptive statistics for equity home bias and other 
control variables are presented in Table 2.1. Table 2.1 provides values for the whole 
sample (column 1); for more and less financially developed economies (columns 2 and 3); 
and a p-value for the test of equality of means with unequal variances (column 4). It can 
be observed that the average equity home bias for the whole sample, as shown in column 
1, takes the value 77.12% which reveals that all the countries are home biased towards 
equity with the highest average home bias existing in Turkey during the period of 2001-
2010. On the other hand, the lowest average equity home bias exists in the United States.
15
 
Further, columns 2 and 3 show that home bias is more prevalent in the less financially 
developed economies. It is shown that the average equity home bias in the more 
financially developed economies is 68.70%, while that for the less developed economies 
is 82.13%. This implies that investors in the less financially developed economies hold 
less than 1/5
th 
of the required foreign equities according to the basic international CAPM 
model.  This supports the notion put forward by Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) that home 
bias in equities is likely to be more prevalent in economies with less developed financial 
markets.
16
 In addition, Sercu and Vanpée (2007) point out that emerging market 
economies have more volatile stock markets and hence display higher equity home bias. 
They argue that international investors are reluctant to invest in these economies due to 
higher risk. According to Eichengreen et al. (2006), during adverse economic events 
foreign investors tend to escape the emerging markets because these are characterised by 
lower liquidity, higher volatility and domestic risk. This can be another reason for lower 
level of foreign investments and the higher degree of home bias in emerging markets. 
As expected, with respect to other control variables education measures are 
significantly higher in more financially developed economies. This statistic lends support 
to Jappelli (2010) who argues that economic literacy is generally lower in poorer 
demographic groups. Variables which reflect economic health such as GDP growth and 
FDI display significantly different values for the two groups of countries
17
. Specifically, 
less financially developed economies are growing faster as compared to their developed 
counterparts. While the level of FDI is higher for the more financially developed group as 
opposed to the less developed market group. With respect to information-related variables 
trade, labour force size and the English origin have significant differences across the two 
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 See Table A2.2 in the Appendix for home bias statistics across the countries used in this chapter.  
16
 Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) show that emerging markets have less diversification in their equity 
portfolios than developed economies and do not display any downward trend in home bias. 
17
 Table A2.2 also provides the average of different measures of education for 2001-2010 across countries. 
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groups of countries. The labour force size is larger for less financially developed countries 
as compared to more developed countries. This statistic is mainly influenced by India 
which has the largest labour force amongst the less developed countries. Financial 
openness is significantly higher for more financially developed economies than less 
developed economies. Moving to financial market indicators, turnover ratio, domestic 
credit and market capitalisation are on the higher side for the more developed countries 
and are also significantly different from the less developed group. For current ratios and 
leverage, less developed economies display a higher value but the differences are not 
statistically significant. Finally, the coefficient of the Euro dummy is higher for more 
financially developed economies and also significantly different from the less developed 
group. 
Overall, two points can be highlighted from these preliminary statistics. First, equity 
portfolios are significantly home biased in this sample. Second, more financially 
developed economies relish an advantageous position in attracting foreign investments 
due to higher levels of education, stronger economic and financial market factors, 
financial market liberalisation and lower exchange rate risk than less developed 
economies. Though it remains to be seen, whether these preliminary findings continue to 
hold when controlling for a number of factors which are play an important role in 
international diversification studies. In the sections that follow a formal regression 
analysis framework is tested to find out whether education has a statistically significant 
influence on equity home bias. 
2.9 Empirical results 
2.9.1 Baseline model 
In this section specifications are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 
The empirical tables report simple OLS method and instrumental variables (IV) 
regressions
18
. The identification of the impact of education requires the availability of 
exogenous instruments that are correlated with education, but are uncorrelated with the 
error term. For this purpose, primary education enrolment rates and unemployment rates 
(percentage of total labour force) are used as instruments which can provide plausible 
exogenous source of variations in the level of education
19
. In addition, both instruments 
are expected to affect education and financial literacy but they do not impact the degree of 
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 The first stage IV estimates and statistics are reported in Table A2.3. 
19
 Scatter plots with best-fitting regression lines are presented in Figure A2.1 to document the strong 
relationship between equity home bias and tertiary education, mathematical numeracy and financial skills. 
On the other hand, the scatter plot shows a weak relationship between equity home bias and primary 
education with a very low correlation coefficient (0.13). 
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diversification directly. It is also assumed that all the other control variables used in the 
model are possibly endogenous. Thus, these variables are instrumented using their own 
values lagged twice. Lags of the variables are legitimate candidates since they contain 
information about the current values of the potentially endogenous variables and remain 
uncorrelated with the current value of the measurement error (see Almeida et al., 2010).
20
 
To check the relevance and validity of the instruments used for education as well as for 
our control variables a number of diagnostics are employed. P-values for these tests are 
reported at the foot of the tables. 
Table 2.2 reports the OLS estimates of equity home bias for different measures of 
education in columns 1-3 and IV estimates in columns 4-6
21
. Table reports tertiary 
education in column 1 and then PISA math scores and financial skills in subsequent 
columns. The point estimates on education suggest a robust relationship between the 
different measures of education and the home bias for equity portfolios. Education attracts 
a negative and highly significant coefficient in the equity home bias regressions which 
help in assessing the impact of a ceteris paribus increase in different levels of education 
on the degree of equity home bias. This finding is both statistically and economically 
important and percentage point effects are calculated by dividing the coefficient value 
(marginal effect) with the predicted probability of the model. Therefore, a 10% increase in 
tertiary education leads to a 3.39% reduction in home bias. An identical increase in PISA 
scores and financial skills will drop equity home bias by 1.24% and 7.22% respectively. 
The IV results show similar magnitudes for tertiary education and PISA scores. A 10% 
increase in tertiary education and PISA scores reduce home bias by 6.09% and 2.57% 
respectively. These results show that increasing the percentage of university graduates or 
the level of mathematical numeracy is likely to reduce the level of equity home bias. On 
the other hand, financial skills do not exert a significant impact on equity home bias 
indicating that the previous finding might be subject to endogeneity bias not controlled for 
in the OLS estimates. Overall, these results are in line with Cole et al. (2012) and Graham 
et al. (2009) who show that financial market participation increases if the education 
attained at the school level improves. Importantly, these results also confirm the findings 
of Karlsson and Nordén (2007) and Giofre (2012) that higher levels of education 
encourages international investments which imply lower equity home bias. 
                                                          
20
 Following the bulk of the literature on firm-level behaviour, financial variables such as turnover ratio, 
trade, market capitalisation, current ratio, domestic credit and leverage are instrumented using their own 
values lagged two times.  
21
 Results obtained by Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method are quantitatively similar to the OLS 
results implying that the error terms are uncorrelated. 
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Focusing on the country-specific control variables
22
, countries which are fast growing 
display a higher level of equity home bias, while countries with higher FDI levels are 
likely to reduce the degree of equity home bias. Moving to information-related variables, 
trade enters with a negative but insignificant coefficient in the equity home bias 
regression. Both labour force size and the English legal origin dummy, when significant, 
enter with the expected negative coefficients. The former finding implies that greater 
participation in labour force is likely to have a positive impact on foreign portfolio 
diversification. The latter finding shows that countries that have English as their legal 
origin display lower levels of home bias as it has a strong impact on their financial market 
development (La porta et al., 2008). 
Financial openness enters with the expected negative sign and is significant in all 
OLS models. This result highlights that an increase in a country’s financial openness is 
likely to reduce the equity home bias. This finding is in line with Bekaert and Wang 
(2009) and Mondria and Wu (2013). While turnover ratio is insignificant, a negative and 
highly statistically significant coefficient for domestic credit is observed which is a 
measure of financial depth. This suggests that an improvement in a country’s liquidity and 
expansion of financial markets help to attract more foreign investment, resulting in a 
negative relation with equity home bias. Both the financial development dummy and stock 
market capitalisation are generally insignificant. 
Current ratio coefficient has the expected negative sign, while leverage is 
quantitatively unimportant. Firms with a higher current ratio are in better financial shape 
and can attract more foreign investments (Edison and Warnock, 2004). Thus, an increase 
in foreign investments tends to reduce equity home bias.  Finally, the coefficient on the 
Euro dummy is consistently negative and highly significant. The point estimates indicate 
that countries within Euro-area have lower home bias in equity portfolios as shown by De 
Moor and Vanpée (2013). This result implies that countries with a common currency such 
as the Eurozone countries experience lower home bias in terms of equities (Baele et al., 
2007). 
Regarding the IV diagnostics, the Kleibergen-Paap statistics reject the null hypothesis 
that the equation is underidentified. The Anderson-Rubin and Stock-Wright statistics 
which are the weak instrument-robust inference tests, do not reject the null hypothesis that 
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 Table A2.4 provides the correlation matrix between all the explanatory variables which show that the 
variables do not suffer from high correlation. 
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the coefficients of the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero. Finally, the Hansen J 
statistic of the overidentifying restriction also shows that the instruments are valid
23
. 
2.9.2 Accounting for differences between developed and emerging economies 
On identifying a direct relationship between education and home bias this section 
tries to explore whether this link differs for countries with different levels of financial 
market development. Table 2.3 presents estimates for the interaction terms between 
education and Fin.Dev and (1-Fin.Dev) dummies. The results reveal the heterogeneity 
between countries that is hidden in the estimates for the full sample. 
The parameter estimates are reported in Table 2.3. The coefficients associated with 
the interaction terms are negative and significant for the less financially developed 
countries, while they are quantitatively irrelevant for their developed counterparts. To put 
it differently, improving education is likely to decrease the level of home bias for less 
financially developed economies. The magnitude of the interacted coefficients suggests an 
economically meaningful result. Specifically, a 10% increase in tertiary education and 
PISA scores will reduce home bias in less developed economies by 6.39% and 1.99% 
respectively. The IV results show that a 10% increase in tertiary education and PISA 
scores will reduce home bias in less developed economies by 5.52% and 3.97% 
respectively
24
. 
In other words, countries which are characterised by less developed financial markets 
exhibit a higher sensitivity of equity home bias to education. Tests of equality for the 
education coefficients between the two groups of countries indicate that the null 
hypothesis of equality can be rejected in all regression models. This is a novel finding 
which highlights that education plays a more important role in less developed financial 
markets which are more home biased. Hence, it suggests that an increase in the percentage 
of University graduates and an improvement in mathematical numeracy can be a crucial 
factor in reducing equity home bias in economies that display a lower level of equity 
market development. 
Moreover, this finding echoes the argument made by Klapper et al. (2013) that 
financial literacy should not be necessarily prevalent in economies with developing 
financial markets. Hence, an increase in the level of education helps in strengthening 
investor’s competence and financial sophistication which in turn encourages the investor 
to diversify their portfolio in terms of foreign investments. Lastly, with respect to the 
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 In addition to the statistics reported in the tables of the results, the Anderson Rubin chi-square test was 
also implemented and obtained identical p-values with the Anderson Rubin F-test. 
24
 The estimated coefficients on financial skills do not show any statistically significant impact on equity 
home bias when the countries are split on the basis of their financial development. One potential explanation 
for this finding might be the fact that financial skills are widespread across both developed and developing 
economies and it is difficult to detect any heterogeneity. 
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other control variables in the model, they retain their significance in most cases and 
behave as conjectured. 
2.9.3 Accounting for differences between crisis and non-crisis periods 
This section addresses the response to the crisis by examining the sensitivity of home 
bias to education in the 2007–2010 financial crisis. The coefficients on variables 
interacted with the dummy variable Crisis and ( 1 - C r i s i s )  along with the dummies 
(Fin.Dev) and (1-Fin.Dev) are reported. 
The results reported in Table 2.4 show the impact of the equity home bias in more and 
less financially developed economies during the crisis and non-crisis periods. To begin 
with the coefficients on the interaction terms are negative and highly significant for less 
financially developed economies in both crisis and non-crisis periods. The results reveal 
that education plays a more important role in reducing the equity home bias in economies 
with lower levels of equity market development during the crisis and non-crisis periods as 
compared to more financially advanced economies. In terms of economic significance, 
during the crisis period a 10% increase in tertiary education and PISA scores will lead to a 
reduction in the equity home bias of less financially developed economies by 6.36% and 
3.09% respectively. In tranquil periods, an identical increase in tertiary education and 
PISA scores will drop the equity home bias in less developed economies by 6.32% and 
2.66% respectively. 
The IV estimates show comparable magnitudes. During the crisis period a 10% 
increase in tertiary education and PISA scores will lead to a reduction in the equity home 
bias of less financially developed economies by 6.88% and 3.78% respectively. In non-
crisis periods an identical increase in tertiary education and PISA scores will drop the 
equity home bias in less developed economies by 6.47% and 3.31% respectively. The test 
of equality of the coefficients, which is reported at the foot of the table, shows a 
statistically significant difference between the above mentioned coefficients. Finally, the 
results show that there is no significant impact of financial skills on the equity home bias 
during crisis and non-crisis periods for both more and less financially developed 
economies. 
To summarise, the greater sensitivities of equity home bias to changes in the level of 
education are recognised for less financially developed economies during the crisis than 
tranquil periods. According to Eichengreen et al. (2006), during adverse economic events 
foreign investors tend to escape emerging markets because these are characterised by 
lower liquidity, higher volatility and domestic risk. This finding was also noted in Mizen 
and Tsoukas (2012), who documented a substantial increase in the bond market external 
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finance premium for the emerging Asian markets. This results in lower levels of foreign 
investments and higher degree of home bias in emerging markets. 
Thus, these findings suggest that having more university graduates, or a higher level 
of mathematical numeracy reduce the extent of local equity home bias during the crisis, 
especially in less developed economies. This could be one important factor in improving 
the adverse effects of financial crises with respect to international diversification. 
2.10 Robustness check 
2.10.1 Alternative estimation methods 
Given the panel dimension of the data-set used in this chapter, and to ensure that the 
main results do not suffer from unobserved country-specific heterogeneity, both random 
and fixed effects models are employed. The estimates obtained from random and fixed 
effects are reported in columns 1-3 and 4-5 respectively of Table 2.5. It is apparent that 
the main results are upheld. The estimates of the random effects model include both the 
within-entity and the between-entity effects which represent the average effect of 
education over equity home bias when education changes across time and between 
countries. More specifically, the results show a reduction in equity home bias by 3.51% 
and 1.02% when tertiary education and mathematical numeracy increase by 10% 
respectively across time and between countries. On splitting the countries on the basis of 
financial development, the estimates show that a 10% increase in tertiary education and 
PISA scores reduces home bias by 5.58% and 1.98% respectively in the less developed 
countries. Finally, the estimates during the crisis period show that a 10% increase in 
tertiary education and PISA scores in less developed countries leads to a reduction in the 
equity home bias by 5.53% and 2.36% respectively across time and between countries. In 
tranquil periods, an identical increase in tertiary education and PISA scores in less 
developed countries will drop the equity home bias by 5.24% and 1.67% respectively 
across time and between countries. 
The fixed-effects model is aimed at examining the robustness of our findings within 
countries. The results show that for a given country, as tertiary education and 
mathematical numeracy increase by 10% across time, equity home bias drops by 1.97% 
and 1.69% respectively. Further, it can be observed that a 10% increase in tertiary 
education reduces home bias in less developed countries by 2.95%. Finally, the estimates 
during the crisis period show that a 10% increase in tertiary education and PISA scores 
leads to a reduction in the equity home bias across less developed countries by 2.90% and 
2.32% respectively. In tranquil periods, an identical increase in tertiary education and 
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PISA scores will drop the equity home bias in less developed countries by 2.14% and 
1.87% respectively
25
. Taking these results into consideration, it can concluded that 
employing both random and fixed effects methods do not make a substantial difference, 
suggesting that the main results are robust to alternative estimation techniques. 
2.10.2 An alternative measure of home bias and financial development 
The robustness of the results is checked by modifying the measure of equity home 
bias proposed by Bekaert and Wang (2009). Bekaert and Wang (2009) indicated that there 
is a size bias in the older measure of home bias mentioned in equation (10) and hence 
large markets might show lower home bias. To solve this problem of size bias, Bekaert 
and Wang (2009) scaled the home bias measure in equation (10) by the maximum home 
bias: 
ℋℬ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝒾 =  
ℋℬ𝒾
(1 −
ℳ𝒾
𝒲
)
 
where ℋℬ𝒾 is the home bias measure in equation (10), ℳ𝒾 is the market capitalisation of 
country 𝒾, 𝒲 is the world market capitalisation. 
Columns 1-3 of Table 2.6 present the results using the scaled equity home bias 
measure. The results in panel 1 are again both quantitatively and qualitatively similar to 
the main baseline results, which demonstrate the robustness of the empirical results. 
Taking into account the differences across more and less financially developed economies 
in panel 2 the results indicate that education reduces scaled equity home bias in less 
financially developed economies significantly more than the more developed economies. 
Finally in panel 3 education is more sensitive in reducing scaled equity home bias in less 
financially developed economies as compared to more developed economies during the 
crisis period. Other explanatory variables retain their significance and expected signs. To 
sum up, it can be concluded that the main results are robust to an alternative measure of 
home bias. 
The results are also re-estimated using an alternative measure of financial 
development of countries and the results are reported in columns 4-6 of Table 2.6. In 
order to ensure that the main results are not driven by the way the sample is divided, a 
robust framework is used in order to achieve a good measure of financial development. In 
particular, countries are classified into more and less financially developed using the mean 
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 The estimates of both random and fixed effects models show that the impact of financial skills on equity 
home bias remains largely insignificant. 
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of total value of stock traded to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio
26
. A dummy variable 
(Fin.Dev2) is constructed which takes the value one for more developed economies and 
zero otherwise. 
Thus, the main findings are broadly confirmed that increasing tertiary education and 
mathematical numeracy are likely to lead to a reduction in the equity home bias. In 
addition, that this outcome is stronger in the less developed economies as compared to 
their more developed counterparts during the crisis periods. Overall, it is found that the 
main results are robust to alternative classification of financial development. 
2.10.3 Tobit regressions 
A Tobit model is employed to account for the fact that the dependent variable, equity 
home bias, is censored from above and below. Columns 1-3 of Table 2.7 report results of 
equity home bias with an upper limit of 90 and lower limit of 10, while columns 4-6 refer 
to an upper limit of 80 and a lower limit of 20 for the equity home bias. 
The results confirm a negative and significant impact of tertiary education and 
mathematical numeracy on equity home bias. Further, the results show that this negative 
effect is stronger for less financially developed countries as compared to their more 
developed counterparts. Finally, during both the crisis and non-crisis periods education 
reduces equity home bias in less financially developed countries. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the results are robust even while using Tobit models which account for the 
fact that the equity home bias is bounded from above and below. 
2.10.4 Regressions for different sub-samples 
To confirm that the results are not affected by any outliers i.e. countries which have 
extreme values of equity home bias, the regressions are run separately for the two groups 
of economies
27
. Columns 1-3 of Table 2.8 present results for less financially developed 
countries and columns 4-6 show the results for more financially developed countries. The 
baseline results in Panel 1 are similar qualitatively and quantitatively to the main results. 
The estimates show a significant and negative impact of tertiary education and 
mathematical numeracy on equity home bias for the less financially developed countries, 
while education has an insignificant impact for more financially developed countries. 
                                                          
26
 This variable has been employed in a number of recent studies such as Chinn and Ito (2006), Aizenman 
and Pasricha (2012) and Čihák et al. (2013) as a measure of financial development. The data for total value 
of stock traded to GDP are drawn from the World Bank. 
27 In the main results instead of estimating the models for different sub-samples, the education variable was 
interacted in all our specifications with dummy variables indicating different time periods or groups of 
economies. This approach helped to avoid problems of endogenous sample selection; gain degrees of 
freedom; and to take into consideration the fact that economies can transit between groups. 
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Panel 2 takes into account the crisis and non-crisis periods and the results show that 
education helps to reduce equity home bias for less developed countries in both crisis and 
non-crisis periods, while education has an insignificant impact for more developed 
countries. The test of equality for education also shows a significant difference between 
the coefficient values in crisis and non-crisis periods for less developed countries. Overall, 
it can be confirmed that the results are similar qualitatively and quantitatively to the main 
results. 
2.11 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the impact of education on the home bias in international 
portfolios. These results, based on a panel of both more and less developed countries 
during the period 2001–2010, suggest that education plays a crucial role in reducing the 
equity home bias. After dividing countries into more and less financially developed 
groups, using the average stock market capitalization, it is found that less financially 
developed countries tend to benefit more from an improvement in the level of education 
as compared to their more developed counterparts. It can be concluded that Klapper et al. 
(2013) were right to point out the importance of difference between developed and 
emerging market economies in the context of financial literacy, since the results in this 
chapter document a differential effect of financial education in terms of international 
portfolio diversification. To conclude, this chapter also highlights that less financially 
developed economies are more sensitive to the level of education during the global 
financial crisis than the more developed economies. 
The above results are relevant for policy initiatives towards reducing home bias and 
improving international portfolio diversification. With an increase in education and 
financial literacy of the investors in a country, equity home bias gets reduced substantially 
and it enhances the international portfolio diversification. International portfolio 
diversification is advantageous in helping to spread risks across different countries and 
stock markets, increase the gain and returns from stock diversification and in reducing the 
risk from exchange rate volatility. These measures can further enhance the growth, 
development, social and economic welfare of a country and its citizens.  
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Tables 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for the explanatory variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Whole sample Fin.Dev (1-Fin.Dev) p-value 
Average equity home 
bias (%) 
77.12 
(21.10) 
68.70 
(18.44) 
82.13 
(21.03) 
0.000 
Tertiary education 55.38 
(20.96) 
60.87 
(16.55) 
52.05 
(22.63) 
0.000 
PISA  480.34 
(51.25) 
506.55 
(34.60) 
464.17 
(52.81) 
0.000 
Financial skills 65.51 
(10.35) 
71.82 
(7.85) 
61.67 
(9.80) 
0.000 
GDP growth 2.91 
(3.43) 
2.37 
(2.71) 
3.22 
(3.76) 
0.011 
FDI 3.96 
(6.18) 
4.97 
(6.09) 
3.37 
(6.17) 
0.014 
Trade 82.30 
(60.43) 
 
96.62 
(86.36) 
73.94 
(35.55) 
0.004 
Labour force size 36.90 
(76.02) 
25.47 
(39.42) 
43.57 
(90.22) 
0.007 
English legal origin  0.24 
(0.43) 
0.43 
(0.50) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.000 
Financial openness 1.42 
(1.31) 
2.12 
(0.74) 
1.01 
(1.40) 
0.000 
Turnover ratio 82.18 
(61.27) 
106.50 
(62.60) 
67.82 
(55.81) 
0.000 
Domestic credit 107.43 
(62.80) 
151.10 
(64.01) 
81.72 
(45.58) 
0.000 
Market capitalisation 77.65 
(75.35) 
135.03 
(95.08) 
43.91 
(25.30) 
0.000 
Current ratio 4.23 
(16.73) 
 
4.12 
(15.41) 
4.30 
(17.53) 
0.919 
Leverage 36.43 
(8.64) 
 
35.55 
(8.20) 
36.96 
(8.88) 
0.122 
Euro  0.24 
(0.46) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.097 
No. of observations 375 140 235  
 
Notes: The Table presents sample means with standard deviations in parentheses. The p-value of a test of 
equality of means with unequal variances is reported. Fin.Dev is a dummy which takes the value one if a 
country’s stock market capitalisation is higher than the average, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 2.2: Baseline model for the equity home bias  
 Dependent variable = Equity home bias 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Main measure Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
Education -0.260** -0.091** -0.554** -0.470** -0.186* 0.340 
 (-2.45) (-2.05) (-2.63) (-2.22) (-1.79) (0.92) 
GDP growth 0.562* 0.085 0.586 -0.642 -0.283 -0.287 
 (1.72) (0.34) (1.38) (-1.49) (-0.99) (-1.04) 
FDI -0.288 -0.145 -0.172 -0.232 -0.231 0.001 
 (-1.22) (-0.90) (-1.24) (-0.84) (-1.11) (0.00) 
Trade -0.015 -0.033 -0.023 -0.164 -0.056 0.050 
 (-0.38) (-0.42) (-0.35) (-1.59) (-0.46) (0.59) 
Labour force size -0.021 -0.033 -0.007 -0.135*** -0.197*** -0.137 
 (-0.92) (-0.49) (-0.14) (-2.60) (-2.77) (-1.34) 
English legal origin  -11.277** 1.499 -2.396 1.281 24.135 8.562 
 (-2.08) (0.34) (-0.52) (0.13) (1.52) (0.61) 
Financial openness -4.341** -7.420** -8.477*** 0.966 6.390 -3.971 
 (-2.46) (-2.68) (-4.34) (0.35) (1.28) (-1.62) 
Turnover ratio 0.004 0.017 -0.009 0.068 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.13) (0.53) (-0.37) (1.59) (0.23) (-0.05) 
Domestic credit -0.089** -0.154*** -0.122** -0.211*** -0.194*** -0.207*** 
 (-2.11) (-2.96) (-2.39) (-3.98) (-4.01) (-4.61) 
Market capitalisation 0.037 0.021 0.020 0.092 -0.005 -0.052 
 (0.93) (0.68) (0.80) (1.55) (-0.08) (-0.84) 
Fin.Dev  4.946 2.899 7.497 -7.241 -8.919 5.120 
 (0.81) (0.40) (1.08) (-0.60) (-0.56) (0.36) 
Current ratio -0.038 -0.056** -0.033 -0.221 -0.200* -0.094 
 (-1.54) (-2.24) (-0.91) (-1.39) (-1.80) (-0.94) 
Leverage -0.015 0.213 0.268 -0.044 -0.076 0.048 
 (-0.07) (0.69) (1.07) (-0.26) (-0.30) (0.23) 
Euro  -16.704** -3.842 -6.705 -16.147*** -15.952*** -29.129*** 
 (-2.40) (-0.47) (-1.04) (-3.39) (-4.61) (-2.97) 
Constant 112.797*** 136.313*** 126.294*** 133.848*** 181.252*** 78.735*** 
 (11.36) (5.64) (8.24) (15.43) (4.49) (3.77) 
Predicted probability 76.81 73.24 76.78 77.12 72.47 76.30 
N 345 244 349 320 222 316 
R2 0.79 0.78 0.81 0.91 0.91 0.91 
Kleibergen-Paap - - - 0.031 0.060 0.032 
Anderson-Rubin  - - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Stock-Wright  - - - 0.000 0.004 0.000 
Hansen J  - - - 0.551 0.621 0.854 
Notes: Columns 1-3 report OLS regression results, while columns 4-6 report IV (2SLS) regression results. 
Robust t-statistics (OLS) and z-statistics (IV) are reported in the parentheses. Statistical significance is 
denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Time dummies and country dummies are included in the 
specifications. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. In the IV regressions the 
main measures of education are instrumented using the percentage of individuals with primary education 
and unemployment rates, while the other control variables are instrumented using their lagged levels at t-2. 
The Kleibergen-Paap is a test of under-identification, distributed as chi-square under the null of under-
identification. The Anderson Rubin and Stock-Wright LM S statistic are weak-instrument-robust inference 
tests, which are distributed as F-test and chi-square respectively, under the null that coefficients of the 
endogenous regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero, and the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid. Hansen J statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-
square under the null of instrument validity.  
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Table 2.3: Accounting for different levels of financial development 
 Dependent variable = Equity home bias 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Main measure Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
Edu*(Fin.Dev) 0.164 -0.002 -0.054 0.297 -0.006 0.664 
 (1.23) (-0.04) (-0.27) (1.11) (-0.07) (1.06) 
Edu*(1-Fin.Dev) -0.491*** -0.146*** -0.135 -0.424** -0.287* -0.612 
 (-4.96) (-2.99) (-0.89) (-2.15) (-1.81) (-1.62) 
GDP growth 0.073 -0.049 0.063 0.803 -0.291 -0.115 
 (0.46) (-0.22) (0.41) (1.16) (-0.68) (-0.38) 
FDI -0.095 -0.070 -0.115 0.062 0.180 0.160 
 (-1.03) (-0.81) (-1.09) (0.41) (1.51) (1.10) 
Trade 0.002 0.010 0.025 -0.105 -0.161** -0.184*** 
 (0.03) (0.18) (0.45) (-0.76) (-2.01) (-2.79) 
Labour force size -0.116*** -0.088* -0.024 -0.121** -0.455 0.061 
 (-3.23) (-1.81) (-0.45) (-2.20) (-1.10) (0.17) 
English legal origin  7.587 10.640** 4.530 -4.797 8.373 -0.910 
 (1.67) (2.31) (1.13) (-0.76) (1.35) (-0.14) 
Financial openness -2.187 -0.762 -5.434*** 3.629 0.014 1.340 
 (-1.23) (-0.34) (-3.88) (1.41) (0.50) (0.51) 
Turnover ratio -0.017 0.021 -0.004 -0.019 -0.153** 0.022 
 (-1.28) (1.01) (-0.22) (-0.92) (-2.46) (1.16) 
Domestic credit -0.151*** -0.191*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -142.671** -0.138** 
 (-4.78) (-5.92) (-6.60) (-3.84) (-2.02) (-2.48) 
Market 0.021 0.019 0.009 0.052 0.006 -0.002 
capitalisation (0.67) (0.79) (0.33) (1.62) (0.23) (-0.03) 
Fin.Dev  -44.986*** -78.045** -6.863 -47.950** -0.013 -96.912* 
 (-2.81) (-2.69) (-0.47) (-2.26) (-0.51) (-1.74) 
Current ratio -0.047** -0.053*** -0.047* 0.007 0.082 -0.030 
 (-2.61) (-3.13) (-1.85) (0.15) (0.26) (-1.33) 
Leverage 0.063 0.240 0.181 -0.004 -15.134 0.197 
 (0.41) (0.82) (0.93) (-0.03) (-1.58) (1.36) 
Euro  -23.910*** -21.157*** -20.057*** -30.889*** 13.635 -12.480*** 
 (-5.53) (-5.33) (-5.44) (-2.91) (1.04) (-4.10) 
Constant 123.960*** 157.847*** 105.284*** 121.926*** 229.238*** 137.907*** 
 (13.65) (6.80) (8.13) (12.15) (3.56) (5.73) 
Predicted 
probability 
76.89 73.24 76.83 76.85 72.21 77.02 
N 345 244 349 321 230 315 
R2 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.904 0.87 
Test of equality 
(p. value): Edu 
0.002 0.020 0.682 0.043 0.062 0.095 
Kleibergen-Paap - - - 0.095 0.011 0.075 
Anderson-Rubin  - - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Stock-Wright  - - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J  - - - 0.348 0.163 0.118 
 
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).The p-value refers to the 
test of equality between Edu*Fin.Dev and Edu*(1-Fin.Dev). Also, see notes to Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.4: The role of the recent financial crisis 
 Dependent variable = Equity home bias 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Main measure Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
Edu*Crisis* 0.162 -0.015 -0.004 0.004 0.010 0.940 
Fin.Dev (1.20) (-0.17) (-0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (1.33) 
Edu*Crisis* -0.489*** -0.226** -0.198 -0.530*** -0.276*** -0.702 
(1-Fin.Dev) (-4.87) (-2.36) (-1.19) (-3.11) (-2.83) (-1.57) 
Edu*(1-Crisis)* 0.156 0.003 -0.002 0.022 0.028 0.873 
Fin.Dev (1.03) (0.04) (-0.01) (0.09) (0.24) (1.25) 
Edu*(1-Crisis)* -0.486*** -0.195** -0.154 -0.498** -0.242*** -0.608 
(1-Fin.Dev) (-4.50) (-2.22) (-0.99) (-2.31) (-2.65) (-1.44) 
GDP growth 0.073 -0.043 0.052 0.162 0.026 -0.094 
 (0.44) (-0.24) (0.34) (0.77) (0.11) (-0.28) 
FDI -0.096 -0.091 -0.115 0.173 0.033 0.157 
 (-1.06) (-0.78) (-1.12) (1.53) (0.28) (1.15) 
Trade 0.001 -0.059 0.018 -0.303*** -0.066 -0.191*** 
 (0.02) (-1.02) (0.32) (-4.20) (-1.24) (-3.06) 
Labour force size -0.115*** -0.114* -0.027 -0.287*** -0.203** -0.009 
 (-3.13) (-1.81) (-0.51) (-2.97) (-2.22) (-0.02) 
English legal origin  7.709 6.333 4.713 -7.176 -7.016 -0.143 
 (1.66) (0.82) (1.15) (-1.21) (-0.51) (-0.02) 
Financial openness -2.167 3.074 -5.324*** 4.783** 6.503** 1.816 
 (-1.20) (0.82) (-3.71) (2.14) (2.10) (0.69) 
Turnover ratio -0.017 0.007 -0.004 0.004 0.003 0.015 
 (-1.27) (0.22) (-0.26) (0.14) (0.09) (0.64) 
Domestic credit -0.153*** -0.187*** -0.181*** -0.103** -0.138*** -0.164** 
 (-5.10) (-4.49) (-6.61) (-2.13) (-2.82) (-2.54) 
Market 0.022 0.065 0.011 0.053 0.057 -0.010 
capitalisation (0.70) (1.37) (0.38) (1.53) (1.25) (-0.13) 
Fin.Dev  -44.490*** -108.207** -13.825 -38.460** -136.078** -115.796* 
 (-2.73) (-2.20) (-0.90) (-2.24) (-2.45) (-1.90) 
Current ratio -0.047** -0.039** -0.044* -0.016 -0.034 -0.012 
 (-2.55) (-2.68) (-1.92) (-0.53) (-1.49) (-0.52) 
Leverage 0.063 0.082 0.156 -0.213 0.378 0.122 
 (0.37) (0.34) (0.76) (-0.90) (1.46) (0.69) 
Euro  -23.805*** -14.827** -19.623*** -23.810*** -27.476*** -11.273*** 
 (-5.62) (-2.39) (-5.05) (-2.85) (-2.98) (-3.56) 
Constant 123.881*** 198.252*** 109.061*** 143.080*** 203.834*** 146.172*** 
 (13.62) (4.61) (7.69) (10.84) (5.07) (5.60) 
Predicted probability 76.89 73.24 76.85 76.99 73.01 76.97 
N 345 244 349 300 225 316 
R2 0.92 0.87 0.91 0.92 0.87 0.87 
Test of equality (p. 
value): 
      
Edu*Crisis 0.003 0.048 0.344 0.027 0.013 0.045 
Edu*(1-Crisis) 0.005 0.059 0.433 0.051 0.018 0.065 
Edu*Fin.Dev 0.899 0.488 0.953 0.717 0.807 0.343 
Edu*(1-Fin.Dev) 0.953 0.246 0.381 0.614 0.668 0.205 
Kleibergen-Paap - - - 0.021 0.018 0.078 
Anderson-Rubin  - - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Stock-Wright  - - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J - - - 0.354 0.130 0.224 
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). With reference to the test of equality, Edu*Crisis gives the test of equality 
between Edu*Crisis*Fin.Dev and Edu*Crisis*(1-Fin.Dev), Edu*(1-Crisis) for Edu*(1-Crisis)*Fin.Dev and Edu*(1-Crisis)*(1-Fin.Dev), Edu*Fin.Dev for 
Edu*Crisis*Fin.Dev and Edu*(1-Crisis)*Fin.Dev. Finally, Edu*(1-Fin.Dev) refers to the test of equality between Edu*Crisis*(1-Fin.Dev) and Edu*(1-
Crisis)*(1-Fin.Dev). Also, see notes to Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.5: Robustness: Random-effects and fixed-effects regressions 
Dependent variable = Equity home bias 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RE RE RE FE FE FE 
Main measure Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
 
Panel 1: 
Education 
 
 
-0.271*** 
 
 
-0.075** 
 
 
-0.567*** 
 
 
-0.155** 
 
 
-0.124* 
 
 
0.098 
 (-3.67) (-2.13) (-3.02) (-2.34) (-1.95) (1.44) 
Predicted 
probability 
76.89 73.24 76.85 78.83 73.24 78.60 
N 345 244 349 345 244 349 
R2 0.31 0.26 0.16 0.38 0.36 0.38 
Panel 2:       
Edu*(Fin.Dev) 0.093 -0.008 -0.092 -0.009 -0.165 -0.006 
 (0.84) (-0.18) (-0.43) (-0.10) (-1.08) (-0.05) 
Edu*(1-Fin.Dev) -0.429*** -0.145*** -0.084 -0.232*** -0.114 0.150* 
 (-6.39) (-3.02) (-0.65) (-3.08) (-1.57) (1.83) 
Predicted 
probability 
76.90 73.24 76.83 78.70 73.24 78.69 
N 345 244 349 345 244 349 
R2 0.33 0.25 0.28 0.39 0.36 0.38 
Test of equality (p. 
value): Edu 
0.000 0.010 0.973 0.038 0.770 0.255 
Panel 3:       
Edu*Crisis*Fin.Dev 0.087 -0.003 -0.017 -0.024 0.104 -0.037 
 (0.87) (-0.06) (-0.09) (-0.23) (0.74) (-0.31) 
Edu*Crisis* -0.425*** -0.173*** -0.211 -0.228*** -0.170** 0.057 
1-Fin.Dev) (-6.40) (-3.19) (-1.46) (-2.96) (-2.26) (0.67) 
Edu*(1-Crisis)* 0.081 0.034 -0.004 -0.009 0.124 -0.019 
Fin.Dev (0.82) (0.63) (-0.02) (-0.08) (0.88) (-0.17) 
Edu*(1-Crisis)* -0.403*** -0.122** -0.131 -0.168** -0.137* 0.126 
(1-Fin.Dev) (-4.77) (-2.47) (-1.00) (-2.05) (-1.97) (1.53) 
Predicted 
probability 
76.90 73.24 76.86 78.63 73.24 79.13 
N 345 244 349 345 244 349 
R2 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.48 0.39 
Test of equality (p. 
value): 
      
Edu*Crisis 0.000 0.004 0.396 0.087 0.088 0.517 
Edu*(1-Crisis) 0.000 0.007 0.555 0.223 0.105 0.302 
Edu*Fin.Dev 0.887 0.053 0.743 0.462 0.261 0.327 
Edu*(1-Fin.Dev) 0.629 0.013 0.135 0.002 0.064 0.000 
 
Notes: The Table reports random-effects regression results in columns 1-3 and fixed-effects regression 
results in columns 4-6. The remaining specifications, which are not reported for brevity, are identical to 
those in Tables 2.2 to 2.4. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see 
notes to Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.6: Robustness: Using alternative measures of equity home bias and financial 
development 
Dependent variable = Scaled equity home bias Dependent variable = Equity home bias 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
Main measure Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
Panel 1:       
Education -0.205*** -0.164** -0.594** -0.328*** -0.221** -0.647** 
 (-2.92) (-2.23) (-2.28) (-3.73) (-2.17) (-2.43) 
Fin.Dev2 - - - 9.502* 1.646 -3.274 
 - - - (2.02) (0.19) (-0.55) 
Predicted probability 78.59 75.08 78.59 76.88 73.24 76.87 
N 345 244 349 345 244 349 
R2 0.93 0.85 0.85 0.93 0.84 0.85 
Panel: 2       
Edu*(Fin.Dev) 0.169 -0.014 0.095 - - - 
 (1.26) (-0.17) (0.50) - - - 
Edu* -0.411*** -0.258** -0.019 - - - 
(1-Fin.Dev) (-4.54) (-2.44) (-0.16) - - - 
Edu*(Fin.Dev2) - - - 0.004 0.208 -0.957** 
 - - - (0.02) (1.34) (-2.19) 
Edu* - - - -0.445*** -0.340*** -0.414* 
(1-Fin.Dev2) - - - (-4.21) (-4.25) (-1.86) 
Predicted probability 78.60 75.08 78.59 76.95 73.24 76.86 
N 345 244 349 345 244 349 
R2 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.85 0.91 0.85 
Test of equality (p. 
value): Edu 
0.004 0.027 0.554 0.051 0.005 0.239 
Panel: 3       
Edu*Crisis* 0.171 -0.001 0.105 - - - 
Fin.Dev (1.27) (-0.01) (0.57) - - - 
Edu*Crisis* -0.428*** -0.265** -0.104 - - - 
(1-Fin.Dev) (-4.67) (-2.41) (-0.74) - - - 
Edu*(1-Crisis)* 0.211 -0.000 0.132 - - - 
Fin.Dev (1.47) (-0.01) (0.72) - - - 
Edu*(1-Crisis)* -0.396*** -0.253** -0.044 - - - 
(1-Fin.Dev) (-3.97) (-2.31) (-0.35) - - - 
Edu*Crisis* - - - -0.021 0.216 -0.932** 
Fin.Dev2 - - - (-0.11) (1.25) (-2.04) 
Edu*Crisis*  - - - -0.465*** -0.420*** -0.487** 
(1-Fin.Dev2) - - - (-4.42) (-4.62) (-2.10) 
Edu*(1-Crisis)* - - - -0.003 0.298* -0.900** 
Fin.Dev2 - - - (-0.02) (1.80) (-2.03) 
Edu*(1-Crisis)* - - - -0.420*** -0.320*** -0.424* 
(1-Fin.Dev2) - - - (-3.85) (-4.01) (-1.91) 
Predicted probability 78.60 75.08 78.60 76.94 73.24 76.88 
N 345 244 349 345 244 349 
R2 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.85 0.92 0.85 
Test of equality (p. 
value): 
      
Edu*Crisis 0.004 0.023 0.316 0.051 0.003 0.355 
Edu*(1-Crisis) 0.004 0.026 0.364 0.072 0.004 0.313 
Edu*Fin.Dev 0.258 0.938 0.376 0.561 0.002 0.374 
Edu*(1-Fin.Dev) 0.468 0.043 0.221 0.127 0.001 0.007 
Notes: The Table reports OLS regression results for scaled equity home bias in columns 1-3 and equity home bias in 
columns 4-6. The remaining specifications, which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2.2 to 2.4. 
Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.7: Robustness: Tobit models 
Dependent variable = Equity home bias 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT 
Main measure Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
Panel 1:       
Education -0.405*** -0.167** -0.729*** -0.308*** -0.196** -0.884*** 
 (-3.32) (-2.06) (-3.21) (-2.60) (-2.37) (-3.11) 
Predicted probability 88.33 78.02 85.17 90.84 88.32 96.61 
Uncensored 
Observations 
211 170 216 163 133 165 
Left Censored 
Observations 
0 0 0 1 1 1 
Right Censored 
Observations 
134 74 133 181 110 183 
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.19 0.25 0.28 0.24 0.30 
Panel 2:       
Edu*(Fin.Dev) 0.061 -0.016 -0.085 0.040 -0.018 -0.032 
 (0.42) (-0.32) (-0.46) (0.39) (-0.87) (-0.18) 
Edu*(1-Fin.Dev) -0.559*** -0.181** -0.058 -0.480*** -0.363* 0.020 
 (-3.68) (-2.15) (-0.33) (-2.93) (-1.69) (0.14) 
Predicted probability 85.91 78.17 85.76 86.99 86.89 88.88 
Uncensored 
Observations 
211 170 216 163 133 165 
Left Censored 
Observations 
0 0 0 1 1 1 
Right Censored 
Observations 
134 74 133 181 110 183 
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.33 0.32 0.41 0.42 0.40 
Test of equality (p. 
value): Edu 
0.011 0.043 0.899 0.022 0.092 0.812 
Panel 3:       
Edu*Crisis* Fin.Dev 0.172 -0.001 -0.021 0.097 -0.024 0.041 
 (1.64) (-0.01) (-0.15) (1.29) (-0.29) (0.28) 
Edu*Crisis* -0.722*** -0.314** -0.229 -0.423*** -0.521*** -0.184 
(1-Fin.Dev) (-4.47) (-2.46) (-1.12) (-3.88) (-3.26) (-0.70) 
Edu*(1-Crisis)* 0.206* -0.007 0.009 0.143 0.021 0.053 
Fin.Dev (1.72) (-0.08) (0.06) (2.75) (0.25) (0.32) 
Edu*(1-Crisis)* -0.656*** -0.302** -0.096 -0.327*** -0.461*** -0.077 
(1-Fin.Dev) (-4.41) (-2.43) (-0.52) (-3.31) (-3.24) (-0.38) 
Predicted probability 85.40 80.51 86.10 88.02 85.71 88.35 
Uncensored 
Observations 
211 170 216 163 133 165 
Left Censored 
Observations 
0 0 0 1 1 1 
Right Censored 
Observations 
134 74 133 181 110 183 
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.28 0.33 0.42 0.34 0.41 
Test of equality (p. 
value): 
      
Edu*Crisis 0.000 0.014 0.286 0.001 0.002 0.452 
Edu*(1-Crisis) 0.000 0.018 0.570 0.000 0.003 0.617 
Edu*Fin.Dev 0.527 0.858 0.492 0.396 0.516 0.807 
Edu*(1-Fin.Dev) 0.327 0.703 0.076 0.167 0.380 0.230 
Notes: The Table reports Tobit regressions with an upper bound of 90 and lower bound of 10 in columns 1-3 
and Tobit regressions with an upper bound of 80 and lower bound of 20 in columns 4-6. The remaining 
specifications, which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2.2 to 2.4. Statistical 
significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.8: Robustness: Regressions for different sub-samples 
Dependent variable = Equity home bias 
 Less Financially Developed 
Countries 
More Financially Developed 
Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Main measure Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
Tertiary 
education 
PISA Financial 
skills 
Panel 1:       
Education -0.226*** -0.108* -0.358* 0.172 0.176 -0.369 
 (-3.24) (-1.89) (-1.78) (1.09) (1.72) (-1.64) 
Predicted probability 106.56 78.46 74.96 83.46 71.75 75.42 
N 209 150 210 136 94 139 
R2 0.96 0.88 0.86 0.97 0.98 0.90 
Panel 2:       
Edu*Crisis -0.281*** -0.096* -0.335 0.344 0.266 -0.537* 
 (-3.42) (-1.85) (-1.47) (1.53) (1.64) (-1.82) 
Edu*(1-Crisis) -0.190** -0.042 -0.366* 0.306** 0.270 -0.344 
 (-2.21) (-1.15) (-1.81) (2.37) (1.66) (-1.49) 
Predicted probability 84.97 74.79 74.96 72.34 60.07 75.90 
N 209 150 210 136 94 139 
R2 0.95 0.92 0.86 0.96 0.97 0.90 
Test of equality (p. 
value): 
      
Edu 0.002 0.061 0.805 0.787 0.005 0.336 
 
Notes: The Table reports OLS regression results for less financially developed countries in columns 1-3 and 
more financially developed countries in columns 4-6. The remaining specifications, which are not reported 
for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2.2 to 2.4. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% 
(**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 2.2.  
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Chapter 2- Appendix 
Figure A2.1: Scatter plots for different measures of education and equity home bias 
(EHB) 
 
Notes: The graph shows best fitting regression lines for education and equity home bias. The dotted fitted 
line is generated from regressions after dropping outliers in the 5% upper and lower tails of the distribution 
of the equity home bias variable. Country codes: 1- Argentina, 2- Australia,, 3- Austria, 4- Brazil, 5- 
Belgium, 6- Chile, 7- Colombia, 8- Czech. Republic, 9- Denmark, 10- Egypt, 11- Finland, 12- France, 13- 
Greece, 14- Hungary, 15- Hong Kong, 16-. India, 17- Indonesia, 18- Israel, 19- Italy, 20- Japan, 21- Korea, 
22- Malaysia, 23- Mexico, 24- New Zealand, 25- Norway, 26- Netherlands, 27- Philippines, 28- Poland, 29- 
Portugal, 30- Russia, 31- Spain, 32- Sweden, 33- Switzerland, 34- Thailand, 35- Turkey, 36-United 
Kingdom, 37- United States, 38- Venezuela. 
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Table A2.1: Definitions of the variables 
Variables Description Source 
Tertiary education This is measured as school enrolments to tertiary education. Tertiary school enrolment is the total 
enrolment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the 
total population of the five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving. 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank 
Financial skills 
 
PISA  
Primary education 
‘Financial skills’ question reads as ‘finance skills readily available’ and this statement is evaluated 
on a scale of 0-10. 
 Evaluates the knowledge and skills of 15-year-olds in mathematics. 
Total enrolment in primary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population 
of official primary education age. 
IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) 
 
IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) 
IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) 
Fin.Dev  This is a dummy equal to one if a country’s stock market capitalisation is greater than the average 
than the mean and zero otherwise. 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank 
GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank 
Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) 
Net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign 
investors, and is divided by GDP. 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank 
Trade Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross 
domestic product. 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank 
Labour force size Total labour force comprises people ages 15 and older who supply labour for the production of 
goods and services during a specified period. 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank 
English legal origin This is a dummy equal to one if a country has English as the legal origin and zero otherwise. La porta et al., 2008 
Financial openness This variable includes the presence of multiple exchange rates, the existence of restrictions on 
current account transactions, the existence of restrictions on capital account transactions and the 
requirement of the surrender of export proceeds.  
Chinn-Ito Index of financial openness 
Market turnover It is the total value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market capitalisation 
for the period. 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank 
Domestic credit It refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by financial corporations, such as 
through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, 
that establish a claim for repayment. 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank 
Stock market 
capitalisation 
Market capitalisation is the share price times the number of shares outstanding of listed companies 
as a percentage of GDP. 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank 
Current ratio It is the ratio of total current assets to total current liabilities. DataStream 
Leverage It is the ratio of total debt to total assets. DataStream 
Euro Euro is a dummy equal to one if a country is a member of the Euro-area and zero otherwise. Eurozone website 
Unemployment rate The share of the labour force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank 
Notes: The Table reports the exact definition of the variables used in the models.
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Table  A2.2: Distribution of the equity home bias and measures of education over 2001-
2010 
Country Average equity 
home bias (%) 
Tertiary 
education 
PISA score Financial skills 
Argentina 86.53 66.33 385.34 63.65 
Australia 79.40 72.75 518.84 75.45 
Austria 50.60 52.72 502.02 74.31 
Brazil 97.40 21.91 372.35 60.54 
Belgium 45.87 62.64 520.61 70.55 
Chile 82.63 50.36 417.18 75.67 
Colombia 96.89 30.89 376.50 65.23 
Czech Republic 82.35 47.63 505.00 53.83 
Denmark 57.22 72.64 509.61 77.14 
Egypt 98.39 30.98 - - 
Finland 59.03 90.56 544.32 75.82 
France 66.18 54.65 499.87 70.00 
Greece 90.51 78.18 458.24 60.66 
Hong Kong 77.60 42.99 550.75 76.69 
Hungary 82.43 58.15 490.42 63.33 
India 97.92 12.65 - 73.73 
Indonesia 99.43 17.64 375.87 47.35 
Israel 90.10 57.81 444.86 76.84 
Italy 54.57 61.89 470.73 53.11 
Japan 78.65 55.53 528.03 56.33 
Malaysia 96.38 30.63 - 67.93 
Mexico 98.10 24.60 405.31 49.74 
Netherlands 33.47  59.15 530.68 73.32 
New Zealand 57.24 76.81 521.23 64.23 
Norway 45.35 75.50 494.18 70.05 
Philippines 99.52 28.70 - 72.66 
Poland 96.57 64.46 493.84 50.56 
Portugal 57.67 56.99 473.89 56.58 
Russia 98.51 70.32 470.81 60.91 
South Korea 92.82 94.99 545.63 54.50 
Spain 85.39 67.85 482.54 60.00 
Sweden 56.46 76.22 500.96 76.37 
Switzerland 57.30 46.54 530.61 79.07 
Thailand 98.33 43.33 417.62 57.54 
Turkey 99.57 35.49 431.77 68.51 
UK 56.48 59.35 493.62 64.90 
USA 42.77 82.90 481.41 77.05 
Venezuela 95.28 55.22 - 49.64 
 
Notes: The Table reports the average equity home bias and different measures of education.  
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Table  A2.3: Diagnostic and identification statistics from first-stage IV regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Main measure Tertiary education PISA Financial skills 
Panel 1:    
Unemployment rate -0.790** 
(-2.07) 
-0.083 
(-0.08) 
-0.170 
(-0.92) 
Primary education -0.973*** 
(-4.17) 
-2.219*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.299** 
(-2.39) 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Angrist-Pischke chi-square test 0.037 0.000 0.002 
N 320 222 316 
R2 0.78 0.97 0.78 
Panel 2:    
Edu*(Fin.Dev):    
Unemployment rate 0.595*** 
(3.69) 
1.288 
(1.07) 
0.102 
(0.87) 
Primary education 0.228* 
(1.77) 
2.735*** 
(4.60) 
0.436*** 
(6.75) 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Angrist-Pischke chi-square test 0.019 0.065 0.373 
N 321 230 315 
R2 0.96 0.99 0.99 
Edu*(1-Fin.Dev):    
Unemployment rate -1.318*** 
(-4.32) 
-1.034 
(-1.21) 
-0.438** 
(-2.29) 
Primary education -0.650*** 
(-3.76) 
-5.188*** 
(-11.47) 
-0.520*** 
(-4.30) 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Angrist-Pischke chi-square test  0.000 0.003 0.000 
N 321 230 315 
R2 0.95 0.99 0.98 
Panel 3:    
Edu*Crisis*Fin.Dev:    
Unemployment rate 2.147*** -1.171 0.234 
 (4.22) (-0.85) (0.29) 
Primary education 0.162 1.778*** 0.358 
 (0.95) (3.91) (1.49) 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Angrist-Pischke chi-square test  0.002 0.009 0.999 
N 300 225 316 
R2 0.91 0.99 0.76 
Edu*Crisis*(1-Fin.Dev):    
Unemployment rate -1.108** 
(-2.51) 
-3.950* 
(-1.70) 
0.167 
(0.38) 
Primary education -0.060 
(-0.34) 
-2.799*** 
(-3.88) 
-0.482*** 
(-2.99) 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Angrist-Pischke chi-square test  0.012 0.292 0.645 
N 300 225 316 
R2 0.91 0.99 0.90 
Edu*(1-Crisis)*Fin.Dev:    
Unemployment rate -1.260*** 
(-2.58) 
1.898 
(1.21) 
-0.033 
(-0.04) 
Primary education -0.180 
(-0.95) 
1.949*** 
(3.50) 
0.074 
(0.29) 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Angrist-Pischke chi-square test  0.015 0.011 0.999 
N 300 225 316 
R2 0.93 0.99 0.82 
Edu*(1-Crisis)*(1-Fin.Dev):    
Unemployment rate 0.083 
(0.26) 
1.089 
(0.39) 
-0.812* 
(-1.75) 
Primary education -0.324 
(-1.62) 
-4.181*** 
(-4.79) 
-0.078 
(-0.42) 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Angrist-Pischke chi-square test  0.092 0.681 0.710 
N 300 225 316 
R2 0.92 0.98 0.91 
Notes: The Table reports first-stage regressions for the two instruments of education- unemployment rate (%) and primary education 
(%). The F statistic provides a test of excluded instruments and Angrist-Pischke chi-square test is a test of under-identification under 
the null that the particular endogenous regressor in question is unidentified. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) 
and 10% (*). 
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Table A2.4: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
 EHB Scaled 
EHB 
Fin. 
skills 
PISA Ter.edu. Pri. 
edu. 
GDP FDI Trade Labou
r size 
English Fin. 
open. 
Turnove
r ratio 
Dom. 
credit 
Current 
ratio 
Lev. Euro Marke
t cap. 
Stock 
traded 
Une
m 
EHB 1.00                    
Scaled 
EHB 
0.97
a
 1.00                   
Fin. 
skills 
-
0.38
a
 
-0.35
a
 1.00                  
PISA -0.55
a
 -0.54
a
 0.40
a
 1.00                 
Ter. 
edu 
-0.49
a
 -0.46
a
 0.11
b 
0.57
a
 1.00                
Pri. 
edu. 
0.13b 0.10c -0.15
a
 -0.45
a
 -0.30
a
 1.00               
GDP  0.37
a
 0.37
a
 -0.00 -0.25
a
 -0.22
a
 0.39 1.00              
FDI -0.14
a
 -0.15
a
 0.15
b 0.20
a
 -0.01 -0.13
b 0.05 1.00             
Trade -0.10 -0.14
a
 0.21
a
 0.39
a
 -0.07 -0.31
b 0.06 0.58
a
 1.00            
Labour 
size 
0.19
a
 0.28
a
 0.03 -0.42
a
 -0.37
a
 0.14
b 
0.23
a
 -0.14
a
 -0.25
a
 1.00           
Englis
h 
-0.01 0.06 0.27
a
 0.12
c -0.05 -0.24a 0.11b 0.09c 0.26
a
 0.30
a
 1.00          
Fin. 
open. 
-0.68
a
 -0.66
a
 0.26
a
 0.54
a
 0.39
a
 -0.21
a
 -0.33
a
 0.21
a
 0.17
a
 -0.37
a
 -0.06 1.00         
Turnov
er ratio 
-0.35
a
 -0.27
a
 0.10
c 0.37
a
 0.40
a
 -0.21
a
 -0.11
b 0.02 -0.05 0.17
a
 0.13
b 0.19
a
 1.00        
Dom. 
credit 
-0.56
a
 -0.48
a
 0.23
a
 0.46
a
 0.30
a
 -0.16
a
 -0.33
a
 0.02 0.09
c -0.06 0.23
a
 0.55
a
 0.42
a
 1.00       
Curren
t ratio 
-0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.13b -0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.00 1.00      
Lev. -0.12b -0.12b -0.02 -0.12c 0.11b 0.04 -0.24
a
 -0.14
a
 -0.22
a
 0.03 -0.02 0.11
b 0.08 0.14
a
 -0.09
c 1.00     
Euro -0.45
a
 -0.49
a
 0.03 0.22
a
 0.25
a
 0.10
c 
-0.25
a
 0.05 0.01 -0.19
a
 -0.31
a
 0.43
a
 0.13
b 0.21
a
 -0.06 0.27
a
 1.00    
Market 
cap. 
-0.15
a
 -0.11
b 0.43
a
 0.38
a
 0.06 -0.23
a 0.08 0.45
a
 0.65
a
 -0.05 0.40
a
 0.25
a
 0.17
a
 0.34
a
 -0.05 -0.14
a
 -0.10
c 1.00   
Stock 
traded 
-0.32
a
 -0.24
a
 0.30
a
 0.43
a
 0.26
a
 -0.21
a -0.05 0.37
a
 0.40
a
 0.03 0.31
a
 0.30
a
 0.61
a
 0.46
a
 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.77
a
 1.00  
Unem 0.32
a
 0.30
a
 -0.17
a
 -0.28
a
 -0.06 0.29
a -0.05 -0.09c -0.27
a
 -0.13
b -0.036
a
 -0.17
a
 -0.28
a
 -0.35
a
 0.03 0.14
a
 0.09
c -0.26
a
 -0.29
a
 1.00 
Notes: The Table reports the pairwise correlation matrix between different explanatory variables used in the models. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% ( a), 5% (  b ) and 10% (  c). Abbreviations: Fin. Skills: Financial skills. Ter. 
edu: Tertiary education. Pri.edu: Primary education. GDP: GDP growth. English: English legal origin dummy. Fin. Open.: Financial openness. Dom. Credit: Domestic credit. Lev.: Leverage. Euro: Euro dummy. Market cap.: Stock 
market capitalisation. Unem: Unemployment rate. 
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Chapter 3: Bond Market Initiatives and Firms’ Access to 
External Finance: Evidence from a Panel of Emerging 
Asian Economies28 
3.1 Introduction 
In corporate finance literature the pecking order theory explains that firms have three 
main sources of finance, that is, internal funds, debt and new equity. Internal funds are 
easily accessible and are the preferred option for financing. Second source is debt 
issuance and final source is raising equity which is used as a ‘last resort’. From the 
viewpoint of an outside investor, equity is riskier than debt and so an investor would 
demand a higher rate of return for equity. While for those inside the firm, retained 
earnings are preferable over debts and equity. In terms of external finance, debt is 
prioritised over equity as issuing of equity would mean involvement of external 
ownership into the company. Debt issues are also associated with lower information costs. 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) were the first to highlight the pecking order 
theory of financing. In their seminal work Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that in 
perfect capital and credit markets, firms’ financing decisions are irrelevant to maximising 
firm value. However, in case of imperfect markets, financial constraints like information 
asymmetries affect firms’ investment decisions. An increase in information asymmetries 
raises the cost of financing, which is reflected on firms’ financing decisions. 
An extensive theoretical literature in corporate finance reflects that the ideal choice of 
securities depends upon information availability and the ability to monitor compliance and 
legal regulations. The availability of information to investors depends on financial 
institutions and firms’ financial structure which differs across countries. Recent literature 
shows that most firms operate in imperfect and incomplete markets, where they have 
limited access to external finance, and internal funds are cheaper as compared to external 
funds. Asymmetric information (Greenwald et al., 1984; Meyers and Majluf, 1984), 
higher agency costs (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Gertler, 1992), legal and financial 
environment of a country (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998), institutional differences across countries (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Fan et al., 2012) are the main country 
level factors affecting access to external finance. At the firm level, the pricing of loans is 
                                                          
28
 I am grateful to Serafeim Tsoukas for providing the balance sheet data of Asian firms. I also thank Igor 
Cunha, Sai Ding, Alexandros Kontonikas, Costas Labrinoudakis, Frank Liu, Georgios Panos and Sandra 
Poncet for their useful comments and suggestions. 
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based on the risks observed in the balance sheets of the firms. This creates a wedge 
between the relative price of lending and other sources of external funds. The price is 
based on the firm level factors like profitability of firms, financial health, outstanding debt 
and loan payment history (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Fama, 1984). 
This chapter focuses on two relevant literatures of corporate external finance and bond 
market development in Asia. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 opened the gates for 
new developments and improvements in the financial markets of Asian economies. After 
the crisis the need for developed local financial markets was realised in order to prevent 
further financial crises. It has been widely accepted that the main reason behind the Asian 
financial crisis was greater dependence on bank-dominated financial system and under-
developed bond markets. Under-developed bond markets forced Asians to borrow money 
in foreign currencies which exposed these countries to foreign exchange risk. This 
resulted in currency mismatch as huge amounts of foreign currency were entering into 
domestic market and were getting converted into domestic currency to finance domestic 
investments in 1990. Adding to this currency mismatch was maturity mismatch, which is 
a common feature in the banking sector due to long-term lending and short-term deposits. 
Currency mismatch and maturity mismatch led to worsening of domestic financial 
institutions and thereby leading to a collapse. 
Since the financial crisis Asian countries had huge amount of foreign exchange 
reserves which reflected a flow in exports and higher personal savings. A major portion of 
these savings were invested in developed markets like the United States and Europe which 
later recycled back in the region as risky assets like equities and foreign direct 
investments. The main drawback in channelling Asian savings back into the region was 
currency risk which was a part of cross-border flows of capital quality gap between 
issuers’ low credit ratings and investors’ minimum credit requirements (Park and Oh, 
2006). Thus, the need to develop sound and more liquid bond markets to prevent further 
capital account crises was realised. In order to eliminate the problem of ‘original sin’, 
domestic policies and institutions are important (Bordo et al., 2003). The term ‘original 
sin’ was introduced by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) which means the inability of 
countries to borrow from abroad in their local currencies. It is a key factor of financial 
instability and possibility of default in a country. 
At least three major government sponsored organisations are contributing towards the 
development of local bond markets in Asia (Battellino, 2004). First, the Asia Pacific 
82 
 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum
29
 which forms a part of the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council (PECC) brings together initiatives of government, business and 
academia. Such initiatives include development of credit guarantees and securitisation. 
Second, the Association of South East Asian Nations plus Three (ASEAN+3) 
framework
30
 focuses on the issues of securitised debt instruments, mechanism of credit 
guarantee, settlement of foreign exchange transactions, issuance in local currency by 
multinational corporations, local and regional credit rating agencies and coordinated 
technical assistance. Third, the Executive Meeting of East Asia and the Pacific (EMEAP) 
central banks
31
 introduced the initiative of Asian Bond Funds (Ma and Remolona, 2006). 
Further, the ASEAN countries with the support of the Asian Development Bank started 
the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) to improve the infrastructure of the bond 
markets. 
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. First, this chapter analyses the role of the 
Asian Bond Funds (ABF and ABF-2) and the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) in the 
composition of external finance. While previous studies identified that the regional 
initiatives in Asia had a greater and positive impact on firms' decisions to issue bonds in 
Asia (see Mizen and Tsoukas, 2014), this chapter goes one step further by examining the 
impact of these initiatives on firms' external finance using the difference-in-differences 
method. This chapter adds value to the existing empirical literature on difference-in-
differences method (Card and Krueger, 1994; Angrist and Lavy, 2001; Bentolila et al., 
2013), bond market development (Braun and Briones, 2006; Eichengreen et al., 2006; 
Gochoco-Bautista and Remolona, 2012) and access to external finance (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, 2002; Bougheas et al., 2006). 
Second, this chapter exploits firm-level heterogeneity by considering whether firms 
that face financial constraints are more or less likely to alter their composition of external 
finance. In doing so, characteristics such as firms' profitability and coverage ratio as 
measures of financial constraints are employed. These characteristics are likely to be 
critically important in influencing firms' access to financial markets. These characteristics 
also help to explore how the interplay between deteriorations in financial health and the 
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 APEC includes 21 members, namely, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong 
SAR,Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, 
Russia, Singapore, Taiwan (China), Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. 
30
 ASEAN members include countries which are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Japan, and Korea. 
31
 EMEAP central banks include the Reserve Bank of Australia, People’s Bank of China, Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority, Bank Indonesia, Bank of Japan, Bank of Korea, Bank Negara Malaysia, Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Authority of Singapore and Bank of Thailand. 
83 
 
introduction of policy initiatives affect the choice of external finance for more and less 
constrained firms. 
Finally, this chapter builds on the extant literature of firms' investment spending 
(Fazzari et al., 1988; Almeida and Campello, 2007) by considering whether the policy 
intervention by the Asian regional governments has impacted firms' investment spending. 
It also allows for the fact that firms of different riskiness with varying levels of profits, 
liquidity, debt and collateral might respond to the policy initiative disproportionately. 
Hence, the relationship between external finance and firm's investment spending before 
and after the policy initiative is explored. 
This chapter explores the financial health of the firm reflected in the quality of its 
balance sheet. Then different types of external finance, such as short-term or long-term 
debt, are considered and ratios that measure firms' choice of external finance are 
constructed. Finally, this chapter observes a unique policy experiment, namely the ABF 
initiative, which will be used to identify the effects of the policy change on firms' 
composition of external finance. This empirical work is based on an assessment of the 
policy initiative on firms' access to external finance using an unbalanced panel of 7,436 
Asian listed firms for 1996-2012. Data from different sources including Bondware, 
Bloomberg, Standard and Poor's Compustat Global database, Global Financial database 
and IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook are merged together. Difference-in-
differences model will tease out the influences of regional bond development and policy 
initiatives. The treated group includes seven Asian economies namely- Hong Kong SAR, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. In order to separate the 
effects of this regional development from the effect of regional policy initiatives, Taiwan 
is referred to as a control. Taiwan saw similar development in its national bond market 
and is comparable to the other Asian economies, but it did not participate in the ABF, 
ABF-2 or ABMI initiatives. 
The motivation of this chapter stems from the fact that the initiative of Asian Bond 
Funds (ABF and ABF-2) encouraged expansion and liquidity in the Asian domestic bond 
markets by minimising restrictions for foreign investors. The measures implemented in 
market reforms include liberalising foreign exchange administration rules, tax reforms to 
exempt withholding tax of non-resident investors, improving regulatory framework for 
exchange traded funds (ETF), strengthening domestic market infrastructure and 
decreasing cross-border settlement risk, and creating transparent and credible bond indices 
(Packer and Remolona, 2012). The share of local currency bond market has increased 
substantially from 42.8% since the launch of the ABMI in 2003 to 54.5 % in Q3 2008, 
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thus improving market liquidity in the Asian markets (Spiegel, 2012). Levinger et al. 
(2014) highlighted that the corporate bond market capitalisation in Asia has reached to 
24.2% of the region’s GDP by 2012 from 16.7% in 2008. In terms of value, the amount of 
corporate bonds outstanding has almost tripled since 2008, thus amounting to USD 3.2 
trillion by Q3 2013. The rapid growth of Asian corporate bond markets has been partly 
triggered by the regional initiatives aimed at establishing domestic government bond 
markets in the region. 
The identifying assumption for the research design is that economies which 
participated in the policy initiative and those economies that did not participate would 
have trended similarly in the absence of the policy change. The parallel trends assumption 
is supported by the institutional background of the Asian bond initiatives as well as 
graphical evidence
32
. Figure 3-1 graphs the evolution of bond market size in Asian 
markets over the sample period of 1996-2012. Panel A displays similar growth patterns of 
bond market size for both the control and treated groups until the end of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1999. However, from 1999 there is an upward trend in bond market size 
for the treated group and the gap between the control and treated group further widens 
after the introduction of ABF-2 at the end of 2004 (see the solid vertical line which 
indicates the introduction of the policy initiative). Panel B shows the evolution of 
corporate bond market, thus displaying a similar pattern. It shows a widening gap between 
the control and treated groups after the introduction of the policy initiatives. While, panel 
C shows that the control group (Taiwan) showed similar growth patterns over the years 
with majority of East Asian economies in terms of bond market development
33
. Figure 3-2 
graphs the development of the banking sector in the treated and control groups over the 
same period. The graph displays the growing trend of the banking sector in the treated 
group after the Asian financial crisis, while the growth in the control group almost 
remains constant throughout the period. The graphs described above confirm the parallel 
trends assumption in the data which suggests that in the absence of the policy the two 
groups would have continued to track each other. 
This chapter is divided into ten sections. Section two summarises the trends in Asian 
financial markets. Section three highlights the objectives of the ABF-2 initiative, while 
section four provides a detailed literature on access to external finance, bond market 
                                                          
32
 In the robustness section of the paper a placebo test is presented to show that there are no underlying 
trends in the pre-policy period which can influence the treatment effect. 
33
 Amongst the countries in the treated group, Korea has the largest bond market. Hence, in order to confirm 
that the results are not driven by Korea, Korea is excluded from the treated sample and the results are given 
in section 9.6. The results are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the main results including 
Korea. 
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developments across the world and relation between external finance and corporate 
investment spending. Section five gives the theoretical framework of the difference-in-
differences approach and empirical application of this method, while section six provides 
the empirical methodology of the chapter. Further, section seven describes the data used 
in the empirical analysis along with the summary statistics. Section eight analyses the 
empirical results and section nine deals with the robustness checks of the main results. 
Finally, section ten concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Trends in Asian financial markets 
In the past Asian bond markets have been identified as under-developed and illiquid. 
Minimum efficient scale, corruption and low level of bureaucracy, poor accounting 
standards (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2006), capital controls, taxation, limited 
availability of hedging instruments (Takeuchi, 2006) were some of the obstacles in 
developing the bond markets in Asia. Bae et al. (2006) stressed that it is important to build 
investment friendly institutions to encourage foreign participation in order to develop the 
local bond markets. Further, a need for multiple interventions to strengthen creditor rights, 
improving regulatory design and removing tax measures and other capital controls were 
identified (Eichengreen, 2006). 
Since the 1990s many emerging countries in Asia tried to enhance their financial 
markets. Some of the benefits of the development of financial markets are faster growth 
and greater welfare of the economies (King and Levine, 1993a,b; Levine and Zervos, 
1996; Levine, 1997, 2005; Luintel and Khan, 1999), alleviating growth constraints and 
increasing access to finance for small and medium enterprises (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 
2006; Beck et al., 2008; De la Torre et al., 2010) and lower volatility to shocks and less 
susceptibility to financial crises (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997; Aghion et al., 1999; 
Easterly et al., 2000). Overall, there has been a significant financial development in Asian 
countries, especially in India and China, over the past two decades. Regardless of this 
financial development, Asian economies are still lagging behind other developed 
countries. 
Didier and Schmukler (2014) highlighted the trends in the Asian financial sector 
focusing on the banking sector, bond and equity markets. The banking system in the East 
Asian economies increased by 47% between 1980-89 and 2000-2009, while in Eastern 
Europe, G-7 economies and Latin America increased by 25%, 20% and 5% respectively 
during the same period. On the other hand, the bond markets expanded by almost 57% in 
East Asia, 345% in China and 66% in India during the 2000s relative to the 1990s. Even 
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with higher growth rates in Asian bond markets they are still smaller as compared to G-7 
economies. In contrast, the developments in the Asian bond market are still the highest 
among other developing countries. For instance, the bond markets in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America grew at 28% and 32% of GDP respectively, exceptionally lower than 56% 
in East Asia. 
A more detailed review of the financial systems in Asian countries is presented by 
Didier and Schmukler (2014). With respect to the banking system they show that the 
structure of private credit and public credit has changed considerably across the world 
over the past two decades. In East Asian economies private sector lending has increased 
from 44% to 72% of GDP as compared to 50% in the 1980s to 98% in the 2000s in other 
advanced economies. While public sector lending accounts 10% and 13% of total claims 
by the banking sector in G-7 and East Asian economies during the 2000s. 
Despite substantial growth between 2000 and 2009, private bond markets including 
corporate and financial institutions in Asian economies remain relatively small as 
compared to the developed countries and public bond markets. For instance, during the 
2000s private bond market capitalisation constituted around 40% of the GDP in developed 
countries as compared to 23%, 13% and 2% of GDP in East Asian countries, China and 
India respectively. However, across Asian economies private bond markets have grown 
less as a percentage of GDP as compared to government bonds. In East Asian economies 
during the 2000s the capitalisation of private bonds is 42% on average of total bond 
market capitalisation, which is less than 45% in the 1990s (Didier and Schmukler, 2014). 
Trading volumes have increased in East Asian economies from 27% during 2000-
2003 to 45% in 2008-2009 as compared to around 60% in G-7 economies and on average 
146% in other developed countries. Firm financing in Asian economies are more 
restricted in terms of private bond markets when compared to the G-7 economies. For 
instance, during the 2000s the number of firms that issued bonds in East Asia, Latin 
America and other developed economies are 21, 19 and 27 respectively as compared to 
432 firms in G-7 countries (Didier and Schmukler, 2014). 
Evidence from the East Asian markets shows an expansion of equity markets by 4% 
each year on an average between 2000 and 2009. In terms of equity market capitalisation 
as a percentage of GDP Asian economies have smaller share as compared to G-7 
countries. There has been an increase in equity market capitalisation in China and India 
between the 1990s and 2000s, while it is stagnant in East Asian economies. The value of 
new capital raised in equity markets dropped in East Asia over the periods of the 1990s 
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and 2000s, whereas in India there was a significant rise. The new capital raised in equity 
markets by developed economies accounted 26% to 31% on average (Didier and 
Schmukler, 2014). 
Overall, the financial trends highlight the fact that Asian economies are more 
developed as compared to Eastern Europe and Latin America due to rapid financial 
improvements in India and China during the 2000s. However, they still need to catch up 
with other developed economies in order to have more liquid and developed financial 
system. 
3.3 Objectives of the Asian Bond Fund-2 (ABF-2) initiative 
The first phase of the ABF initiative, namely ABF-1, was introduced in June 2003 and 
USD 1 billion were fully invested in dollar denominated bonds in the EMEAP central 
bank economies. The second phase of this initiative, called ABF-2, was launched in 
December 2004. ABF-2 invested USD 2 billion in domestic bonds issued by sovereign 
and quasi-sovereign issuers in eight local currency markets of the region where the eight 
EMEAP central banks operate. These markets include China, Hong Kong SAR, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
The ABF-2 initiative was planned to improve size and liquidity in the Asian bond 
markets along with enhancing investor awareness and interest in Asian bonds. A large 
investor base is crucial for a diversified domestic bond market. In order to achieve these 
goals of diversity and higher liquidity the following measures were implemented: 
Exemption of withholding taxes and improvement in local currency convertibility 
conditions: Four months before the announcement of ABF-2, countries like Hong Kong 
SAR and Singapore relieved non-residents from withholding taxes in order to attract more 
foreign investments in local currency securities by increasing the investment yield. Since 
then there has been progress in this respect in other countries as well. In Malaysia, the 
creation of ABF-2 fastened the review process by National Bond Market Committee of 
withholding taxes. Exemption of investment income for all government and corporate 
bonds was also permitted by the Securities Commission in September 2004. Further, 
Thailand exempted withholding taxes on interest and capital gains arising from 
government, state agency and state enterprise bonds in 2005. Recently Korea stopped 
withholding tax on interest income on government securities for foreign investors. By the 
end of 2009, listed bond holdings of Korean debt securities by non-Korean Asian 
nationals rose to 27.9 trillion won or almost half of all foreign investors’ listed bond 
holdings. It continued to increase through the first quarter of 2010. However, due to heavy 
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rush of destabilising capital inflows, Thailand and Korea imposed back withholding taxes 
on capital gains and interest payments for government bonds in October 2010 and January 
2011 respectively (Packer and Remolona, 2012). 
Packer and Remolona (2012) highlighted that the conditions on local currency 
convertibility has improved over the past five years and thereby reducing foreign 
exchange risk. In April 2005 in Malaysia, non-resident investors were permitted to sell off 
forward foreign exchange contracts against ringgit and also allowed outflows for 
divestments in ringgit assets. In Korea, foreign investors were allowed to trade in forward 
foreign exchange transactions without any restriction with local counterparty banks. 
Further, the ability to borrow funds in the local market by foreign investors help in 
lowering the funding costs and assures higher returns for them. In Malaysia, overdraft 
facilities to foreign stockbrokers from authorised dealers for the settlement of purchase of 
listed securities were expanded. However, in some countries there are still restrictions on 
credit like overdrafts and loans for foreign investors. Removal of these restrictions can 
further help in increasing foreign investor contribution in local bond markets (Packer and 
Remolona, 2012). 
Reducing transaction costs and improvement in settlement process: The initiative of 
ABF-2 brought about an effective measure of international integration which gives the 
non-resident investors an opportunity to use omnibus accounts. For omnibus accounts, a 
local custodian is responsible for holding the investments of multiple clients in one 
account. Restriction on the omnibus accounts can cause higher transaction costs. In this 
respect, there has been a significant improvement in omnibus accounts and global clearing 
system in all the ABF-2 economies. In Korea since 2008 omnibus accounts in the name of 
international central securities depositories (ICSD) are allowed at the Korean Securities 
Depository (KSD). The benefits of these accounts include less costly investor registration 
certificates and the settlement between off-shore parties even outside the Korean time 
zone. Further, the introduction of ABF-2 has helped in reducing transaction costs for 
investors by establishing bond funds as exchange traded funds (ETF). ETF are more 
transparent for trading and also trade information is made available to all the participants 
as well as the authorities (Packer and Remolona, 2012). 
Improved governance: Improved governance helps in attracting more foreign 
investments in a country. For strengthening governance establishment of independent 
supervisory committees was suggested in the interest of all unit-holders in the 
performance of their monitoring functions (Packer and Remolona, 2012). 
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Reducing barriers to entry and cross-border hindrances: The main drawback in 
international bond portfolio diversification is barriers to entry. With the launch of ABF-2 
new foreign issuers were brought into the market in order to issue in local currency. Low 
liquidity in the foreign exchange derivatives market was another hindrance for the issuers 
to borrow from domestic bond markets. So, new measures were introduced in some 
countries like Malaysia where investors were allowed to buy forward contracts against 
ringgit to hedge payment. The Malaysian market was successful in attracting non-resident 
borrowers into the local market. In May 2005, Bank Negara Malaysia further liberalised 
the regulations to draw more foreign participation (Packer and Remolona, 2012). 
Exploiting the advantages of home bias in Asian economies: The vast literature on 
home bias in international portfolios confirms the advantages of geographical proximity. 
Investors tend to invest in economies which are geographically closer to them (Coval and 
Moskowitz, 2001) and share a common language (Eichengreen and Park, 2003). Packer 
and Remolona (2012) show evidence of high degrees of home bias among Asian 
economies. In the corporate bond market around 53% of the issuance of bonds was by 
investors from the Asian region. Thus, setting up an ABF-2 can help in exploiting the 
advantages of this home bias for the development of local currency bond markets in these 
regions. 
3.4 Background literature 
3.4.1 Access to external finance: 
Country-level studies 
There has been a lot of research to identify the factors which affect access to external 
financing. Most of the literature which explains external financing focuses on 
macroeconomic factors. Kashyap et al. (1993) was the first to examine the effect of 
monetary policy on firms’ financing decisions. The results of the US firms in the period 
from the early 1960’s to the late 1980’s show that contraction in the monetary policy 
reduces access of firms’ to bank loans. Oliner and Rudebusch (1995, 1996a, 1996b) 
further extended this analysis and while examining the impact of monetary policy. They 
emphasised that firms’ financing decisions are also affected by firm size. The empirical 
results over a period of 1973 to 1991 showed that a broad lending channel existed since 
small firms reduced their access to external finance during monetary contractions. 
A number of studies focused on cross-country comparisons of financial patterns. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) explored firm’s decision of capital structure in seven 
developed countries. They found that in the US financial structure variables were also 
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correlated to leverage in their sample of international firms. In a sample of 10 developing 
countries Booth et al. (2001) found that the variables affecting financing decisions are 
similar in both developed and developing countries. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998, 2002) analysed the capital structure in 30 developed and developing countries and 
found that the main reason behind the differences in financing patterns are differences in 
legal structures, development of stock markets and banks across countries.  However, they 
did not find any evidence that firms’ external financing can be predicted by proxies for 
relative development of the banking system and stock market development. Fan et al. 
(2012) used a cross-section of 47 developed and developing countries. They confirmed 
that leverage was higher and debt-maturity was shorter in countries with poor governance 
which is indicated by corruption levels. Barclay and Smith (1995) established that the US 
firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. 
Using a panel of large firms of 13 developing countries Laeven (2003) showed that 
financial openness and liberalisation helped in reducing financial constraints for the 
smaller firms. Using a sample of 36 countries Love (2003) proved that financial 
development helped in increasing access to external finance and this impact is greater on 
the financially constrained firms in countries with low levels of financial development. 
Further, Harris et al. (1994), Jaramillo et al. (1996) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
confirmed the importance of financial liberalisation and development of capital markets. 
Higher costs and barriers to entry also affect external finance. Bertrand et al. (2004) 
advocated that in France reforms in the banking sector during the 1980s enhanced 
competitiveness in the market. This was done by increasing entry and exit of firms and 
reducing industry concentration in industries which were bank dependent. Across Italian 
provinces Guiso et al. (2004) showed that financial development enhances 
entrepreneurship. Further, Black and Strahan (2002) showed that increased competition 
and deregulation facilitated entry of new firms. Overall, rise in the entry of new firms and 
improvement in credit market efficiency help in developing sources of external finance. 
The empirical evidence of developing countries shows that foreign bank participation 
(Clarke et al., 2006), and property rights protection for smaller firms (Beck et al., 2008) 
help in improving the access to external finance. The quality of legal system (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998) and investor protection (Love and Mylenko, 2003) help in 
reducing market asymmetries which further increases the share of bank financing. Beck et 
al. (2008) used a database covering 48 countries to investigate how financial and 
institutional development affects financing of large and small firms. They found that 
property rights protection significantly increased external financing of small firms more 
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than that of large firms due to its effect on bank finance. Love and Mylenko (2003) 
combined firm-level data from the World Bank Business Environment Survey (WBES) 
and found that the existence of private credit registries are associated with lower financing 
constraints and higher share of bank financing. 
Berger and Udell (1998), Galindo and Schiantarelli (2003) found that in both 
developed and developing economies, small firms have restrictive access to external 
finance. Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2005) showed that in countries with better and 
advanced legal and financial systems the effect of growth obstacles on firm’s growth is 
less. Further, using a data across Mexican states, Laeven and Woodruff (2007) proved that 
legal efficiency is positively correlated with firm size and the effect is stronger in the 
sectors with dominant proprietors. 
Cetorelli (2001) showed that countries which have more concentrated banking sector 
generally have larger average firm size. Further, Cetorelli (2003) argued that larger bank 
concentration is a barrier for the entry of young firms and delays the exit of older firms. 
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) stressed that on comparing the industries in the local markets 
within USA or across different countries (developed or developing), it can be concluded 
that banks with market power pose a threat to entry which damages the commercial sector 
of the economy. This is done mainly to protect the profits of their existing borrowers. 
Thus, reduction in political, legal and regulatory barriers to bank competition can help in 
increasing access to external finance, leading to faster growth of the economy. 
Firm-level studies 
With respect to the firm-specific factors Kashyap et al. (1996) realised that further 
analysis is required at the micro level of both individual banks and individual firms to 
study the access to external finance. The results showed that tighter monetary policy shifts 
firms’ mix of external financing and such shifts in loan can affect investments. Shumway 
(2001), Hillegeist et al. (2004) upheld the same opinion. Using a panel of US firms over a 
period of 1975 to 1986 Whited (1992) established that firms having financial constraints 
had less access to external finance, which in turn had an impact on firms’ capital 
investment decisions. Atanasova and Wilson (2004) used a panel of UK firms over a 
period of 1989 to 1999 to highlight that tight monetary policy increases the demand for 
bank financing but reduces the supply. They also found that firms have a higher 
substitution rate between loans and trade credit as compared to loans and internal funds. 
Better financial inclusion also helps to promote efficient asset portfolios and innovation 
(Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Ayyagari et al., 2007) and provides greater incentives for 
firms to acquire benefits from risk diversification and limited liability. Demirgüç-Kunt et 
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al. (2006) used firm-level data of 52 countries to investigate as to how the institutions in a 
country affect the choices of firms. They found that businesses are more likely to choose 
the corporate form in countries which have developed financial markets, efficient legal 
systems and proper creditor rights. 
Shin and Park (1999) and Hoshi et al. (1991) underlined the importance of business 
group affiliation in Korea and Japan respectively. Access to finance increases as they have 
access to group’s internal capital markets which are likely to have strong financial ties 
with large banks. Using a dataset of East Asian non-financial firms Allayannis et al. 
(2003) examined a firm’s choice between local, foreign and hedged foreign currency debt. 
They found that the use of synthetic local currency debt is related to the biggest drop in 
market value due to illiquidity in the currency derivative market during the crisis. 
Bougheas et al. (2006) used data from UK manufacturing firms over a period of 1989 to 
1999. They used the ratio of a firm’s short-term debt to total external debt as their 
measure of bank financing and the ratio of a firm’s total external debt to its total liabilities 
which more closely tracks overall access to external financing. They used various firm-
level characteristics such as size, collateral, profitability, riskiness, etc. and concluded that 
smaller, riskier and younger firms have a strong impact from monetary policy conditions. 
Using a data of over 4000 firms in 38 countries Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2005) 
showed that firms that have French legal origin face higher restrictions in accessing 
external finance than firms in common law countries. They stress that legal system 
adaptability is crucial for corporate finance. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) examined 
firms’ choice of capital structure and found that firms’ decision of capital structure is 
constrained by capital markets. The costs of contracting and monitoring increase the cost 
of capital raised from the market, and thus lowering the desired leverage. González et al. 
(2007) used firm-level data of 60,000 Spanish non-financial firms from 1992 to 2002 to 
find that Spanish firms are largely dependent on short-term non-bank financing which 
accounts for 65% of the total firm debt. Short-term bank debt is mostly used at the time of 
economic expansions. This suggests a shift from non-bank financing as firm’s conditions 
improve. 
Beck et al. (2006) showed that older, larger and firms with foreign ownership take the 
benefit of larger external finance. Using a firm-level database of 48 countries Beck et al. 
(2008) showed that firm size, financial development and property rights protection are 
important factors in influencing the financing decisions of external finance. Their results 
showed that firms which are smaller in size finance only a smaller portion of their 
investment with formal sources of external finance. The figures showed that smaller firms 
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fund 12 percentage points less of investment using bank finance as compared to large 
firms as smaller firms use more of informal sources of finance. Tang (2009) claimed that 
with the availability of better credit information (via Moody’s 1982 credit rating) 
investors have better information about a firm’s quality which improves firm’s access to 
finance. Further, Duchin et al. (2010) studied the effect of financial crisis on the supply of 
external finance. The results showed a negative effect on the supply of external finance 
for non-financial firms and the decline is more for the firms which have higher short-term 
debt or are financially constrained. 
Nofsinger and Wang (2011) concluded that high levels of property rights, contract 
enforcement, and corruption protection are important determinants of access to finance for 
start-up firms to remove information asymmetry and moral hazard problems. Clarke et al. 
(2012) evaluated firms’ financial constraints and their likelihood of survival during the 
early phase of the recent global financial crisis in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Their 
results showed that firms with greater access to financing were able to survive the crisis. 
The impact on the operation of large and older firms was less by mid-2009 as compared to 
smaller and younger firms. As information asymmetries between borrower and lender are 
less for larger and older firms, they have access to cheaper and easier credit (Beck et al., 
2008a). 
Ellul et al. (2012) analysed the linkages between taxes, transparency, access to 
finance and investment. They show that there is a trade-off between external financing 
and tax costs of transparency. This trade-off depends on the corporate tax rates, auditor’s 
quality and cash flows from companies’ asset base. The results highlight that there is a 
negative relation between firm-level transparency and tax pressure, while a positive 
relation exists between transparency and audit quality. Adding to this, investment and 
access to finance are greater for firms with higher transparency and lower tax burden. 
3.4.2 Bond market development and policy initiatives across the world 
A considerable amount of research has been carried out focusing on the development 
of banking and financial systems across the world in the past few years. As majority of the 
firms use bank credit as the main source of external finance, development of financial and 
bond markets are essential. Although bond markets have been growing, they are still not 
distinctively large as compared to the size of banking sector. Important factors affecting 
bond market development include economic stability of a country, quality of property 
rights and contracting institutions (Braun and Briones, 2006). 
During the time period of 1991-2001, Braun and Briones (2006) showed that across 
46 countries 82% of the capital raised by the firms accrued from bank debt. Further, bond 
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issuance was majorly concentrated in the developed countries with U.S. and Japan 
accounting for almost two-thirds of the stock. On the other hand, emerging countries 
constituted only 6.7% of the total, half of it in East Asia and Pacific Area. 
Various policy initiatives have been undertaken across the world for the development 
of bond markets. Eichengreen et al. (2006) provided a comparative analysis of the bond 
market developments in the two regions of East Asia and Latin America. They showed 
that the Asian bond markets are larger and better capitalised due to stable policies, 
stronger investor protections. On the other hand, Latin American bond markets are more 
liquid but progress in terms of corporate bonds is slow in both Latin America and East 
Asia. So, policy initiatives are undertaken to develop the financial markets in both Latin 
America and East Asia. These policy initiatives are divided into five categories. These are 
strengthening of legal and financial system in general, more investments for building up 
market infrastructure, policies to encourage institutional investor participation, measures 
to promote foreign investors’ participation and finally extra-national initiatives. In Asia 
extra-national initiatives include efforts to build bond markets at the regional level, while 
in Latin America these are focused on enhancing the access of borrowers to international 
financial markets. 
In November 2011, the G-20 nations supported an action plan for the development of 
local currency bond markets. International institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the OECD developed 
a diagnostic framework identifying the general preconditions, important components and 
obstacles for successful bond market development. The diagnosis included desirable 
reforms such as adopting growth supporting policies that encourage the private sector to 
increase investment or relax capital account restrictions for broadening investor base, 
assessing the legal and regulatory framework for public debt management. Other reforms 
recommended in corporate bond markets include reducing cost of issuance, establishment 
of standard documentation for corporate bond issuance, defining the role of 
intermediaries, creating over-the-counter (OTC) trading and credit rating requirements 
(IMF, 2013). 
Lee and Park (2008) confirmed that the financial crisis of 2008 had an impact on the 
Asian offshore bond markets due to re-pricing of credit and liquidity risk. This resulted in 
a decline in offshore bond issuance. However, the deterioration in external debt financing 
had minor impact on Asian currency debt markets. According to Ghosh (2006), since the 
financial crisis of 1998, the East Asian securities market has almost tripled. However, in 
the East Asian bond markets firms have limited access to finance. Most of the growth in 
the bond markets (more than 50% of the growth during 1997-2004 in all economies in the 
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region except Hong Kong SAR, China and Korea) was due to the bonds issued by 
governments. 
Chan et al. (2011) highlighted the contribution of ABF-2 initiative to a broader, 
highly liquid, low-cost and efficient investment technique in broadening the investor 
participation. ABF-2 initiative has performed well in the past few years, however, their 
impact in attracting investors other than EMEAP central banks has been mixed. By the 
end of July 2010, total non-EMEAP investment in the ABF-2 market funds was USD 129 
million as compared to USD 716 million in the Pan Asia Bond Index Fund (PAIF). With 
respect to the increase in market size ABF-2 has done considerable improvement in the 
local markets of eight ABF-2 economies. Since 2005 maximum development happened in 
China, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore. Government bonds dominate most of the markets, 
except Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore, where corporate bonds have a 
larger share. There has been a huge increase in the local currency corporate bond issuance 
in ABF-2 regions especially since 2008. Since 2008 the corporate bond issuance in local 
currency has been around 86%. The development of local corporate markets played an 
important role during the crisis of 2008-2009. While raising of funds in the global 
corporate markets during the financial crisis became difficult, Asian companies raised 
funds from their local bond markets in large quantities. 
Corporate bond markets act as a ‘spare-tyre’ in capital markets, when the banks stop 
lending. Gochoco-Bautista and Remolona (2012) stressed that the global financial crisis 
of 2008 affected the international bond markets adversely and domestic bond markets in 
the ASEAN nations provided finance in a limited way. While on the other hand, Shim 
(2012) emphasised that from 2005 till 2011 the corporate bond markets in emerging Asia 
continued to grow rapidly even during the financial crisis period. Further, the sharp 
increase in the corporate bond issuance during the period of 2008-2009 compensated for 
the decline in corporate bank lending. 
Using a dataset of nine Asian economies, China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan, for the period of 1995 to 
2007, Mizen and Tsoukas (2014) emphasised that firm-specific characteristics play a 
crucial role in firms’ decision to issue bonds. On the other hand, market development 
factors like market size and liquidity have smaller but significant role in issuance of 
corporate bonds. They further confirmed that policy initiatives of ABF and ABF-2 helped 
in improving domestic corporate bond issuance by encouraging greater market depth and 
liquidity. 
96 
 
3.4.3 Relation between firm’s leverage and investment 
There is a wide literature in corporate finance focusing on the ways in which 
financing constraints and fluctuations in the availability of finance can affect firms’ 
investment activity (Fazzari et al., 1988; Hoshi et al., 1991; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). 
The main theme of these studies is based on liquidity and the availability of internal 
funds. This is an important factor in influencing corporate investment when there are 
information asymmetries in the capital market. 
Fazzari et al. (1988) estimated an equation of investment spending as a function of 
cash flow and Tobin’s Q using firm-level data on 421 manufacturing firms over the period 
of 1970 to 1984. Their results showed that cash flow has a higher impact on firms’ 
investments for the firms facing financial constraints and interpreted this as an evidence of 
information-related capital market imperfection. Hoshi et al. (1991) explored the 
relationship between firms’ capital structure and investment for Japanese firms. They 
found that investment is more sensitive to liquidity for firms which have weaker links to a 
main bank and thus face more problems in raising capital. On the other hand, firms which 
have closer linkages to larger Japanese banks which serve as a primary source of external 
finance. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) investigated the relationship between financing 
constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivities by analysing the firms identified by 
Fazzari et al. (1988). Their results showed that firms which are less financially 
constrained show higher sensitivities than firms that are more financially constrained. 
Thus, higher sensitivities cannot be interpreted as evidence for the fact that firms are more 
financially constrained. 
Following Fazzari et al. (1988), the literature on the relationship of cash flow and 
investment started to grow. Whited (1992), Hubbard et al. (1995), Ng and Schaller (1996) 
used financial variables as control variables in the estimation of a standard Euler equation 
for various categories of firms. They used data for US firms and found that the standard 
Euler equation holds for firms facing less financial constraints. Bond and Meghir (1994) 
found similar results for UK firms. Another branch of literature tried to identify the 
relation between capital market imperfections and firms’ investment using alternative 
measures of investment opportunities rather than Q. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) 
used a set of VAR forecasting equations for a subset of information available to the firm 
for evaluating a linear expectation of the present discounted value of marginal profits. 
This was used as a measure of firms’ investment opportunities. They, then, estimated the 
investment regression using this variable and cash flow. 
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Almeida and Campello (2007) compared the effect of tangibility on investment-cash 
flow sensitivities for different measures of financial constraints. The results showed that 
investment-cash flow sensitivity should increase the tangibility of firm’s assets only for 
financially constrained firms. Carpenter and Guariglia (2008) used the contracted capital 
expenditure of UK firms to capture information about investment opportunities available 
to insiders. To improve the measurement of investment opportunities firms’ contractual 
obligations were used as a proxy. Inclusion of this variable along with Tobin’s Q helped 
in improving the degree in which investment opportunities are measured. Their results 
showed that cash flow helps in capturing the effect of credit frictions. Guariglia et al. 
(2012) focused on a panel of unlisted firms from transition economies and found that 
financially constrained firms are likely to face higher irreversibility and might be more 
hesitant to raise investment spending. Irreversibility, therefore, hampers the investment-
cash flow sensitivities even for firms which are liquidity constraint. 
Wei and Zhang (2008) used firm-level data for eight East Asian emerging economies 
for the period before the Asian financial crisis, that is, from 1993–1996. They found that 
there is a decline in the sensitivity of a firm’s capital investment to its cash flow as cash 
flow rights of shareholders increase. While this sensitivity increases as the degree of the 
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of firm’s shareholders increase. 
George et al. (2011) analysed the firms in India which are affiliated to Indian business 
groups. They find strong investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms which are both 
independent as well as affiliated to groups, but they could not find any significant 
difference in the sensitivity between them. 
More recently Arslan et al. (2006) investigated the relationship between financial 
constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivities by focusing mainly on the cash holdings 
of firms. The main idea of the paper was that higher cash holdings of firms increase their 
ability to undertake profitable investment opportunities. The results showed that the 
hedging role of cash is more important in countries with higher asymmetric information 
and excessive costs of external finance. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) found that banking 
crises results in negative growth in industries that are more dependent on external 
financing. Lemmon and Roberts (2010) studied the effects of the collapse of the junk-
bond market in 1990 on the investment of firms which were dependent on junk bond 
financing. Further, Duchin et al. (2010) studied the impact of the recent financial crisis on 
firm’s investment. The results showed that corporate investment declined significantly 
following the beginning of financial crisis, controlling for firm fixed effects and 
investment opportunities. They also showed that the decline is larger for firms which are 
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more dependent on short-term debt or operate in industries which rely more on external 
financing. Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) studied the interaction between financing and 
investment decisions in a dynamic model. They found that financially unconstrained firms 
with less growth opportunities prefer senior debt while constrained firms favour junior 
debt. 
3.5 Difference-in-differences modelling 
3.5.1 Theoretical literature 
Difference-in-differences estimation is used in most of the literature with policy 
analysis exploiting natural experiments. In the simplest case, there are two time periods 
and two groups- control and treatment group. The treatment group might consist of 
people, cities, countries, firms, etc. and the two time periods chosen would include the 
period of policy change. Following the approach in Wooldridge (2010) the difference-in-
differences method is described in this section. 
Let 𝒳 be the control and 𝑍 be the treatment group; the dummy variable of 𝒹𝑍 equals 
1 for those in the treatment group, and 0 otherwise. Let dummy 𝒹2 denote the second 
time-period (post-policy-change). The impact of the policy change can be analysed as 
follows: 
   𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝒹𝑍 + a0𝒹2 +  a1𝒹2. 𝒹𝑍 + ℯ      (13) 
where 𝑌 is the dependent variable. The dummy variable of 𝒹𝑍 captures the difference 
between the treated and control groups before the policy change. The time period dummy 
𝒹2 captures the aggregate factors that would cause changes in 𝑌 in the absence of a policy 
change. The coefficient of interest is 𝑎1 on the interaction term 𝒹2. 𝒹𝑍 which is the 
dummy variable equal to 1 for the observations in the treatment group in the second 
period. 
Let Ῡ𝑋,1 and Ῡ𝑍,1 denote the sample average of 𝑌 for the control and treated groups 
respectively in the first year. Let Ῡ𝑋,2 and Ῡ𝑍,2 are the averages of 𝑌 for the control and 
treated groups respectively in the second year. Then the OLS estimator â1 can be 
expressed as: 
   â1 = (Ῡ𝑍,2 − Ῡ𝑍,1) − (Ῡ𝑋,2 − Ῡ𝑋,1)        (14) 
This estimator is represented as the difference-in-differences (DD) estimator. 
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The basic equation (13) can be modified further by obtaining both a different state 
and control group within the treatment state. If the two periods are again labelled as 1 and 
2, let 𝑍 represent the state implementing the policy and let 𝐹 denote the new state group, 
then the equation can be expanded as: 
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝒹𝑍 + 𝛽2𝒹𝐹 + 𝛽3𝒹𝑍. 𝒹𝐹 + a0𝒹2 + a1𝒹2. 𝒹𝑍 + a2𝒹2. 𝒹𝐹 +  a3𝒹2. 𝒹𝑍. 𝒹𝐹 + ℯ, (15) 
The coefficient of interest is now 𝑎3, the coefficient on the triple interaction term 
𝒹2. 𝒹𝑍. 𝒹𝐹, and the OLS estimate  â3 can be denoted as: 
â3 = (Ῡ𝑍,𝐹,2 − Ῡ𝑍,𝐹,1) − (Ῡ𝑋,𝐹,2 − Ῡ𝑋,𝐹,1) − (Ῡ𝐹,𝐸,2 − Ῡ𝐹,𝐸,1)       (16) 
where the 𝒳 subscript means the state not implementing the policy and the 𝐸 subscript 
means the new control group within the state. The estimator in equation (16) is called the 
difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimator. 
3.5.2 Empirical literature 
Econometric methods which are most commonly used in quasi-experimental studies 
are instrumental variables, regression discontinuity methods, and difference-in-differences 
technique for policy analysis. The use of these econometric methods has grown and has 
become more sophisticated since the 1970s. Difference-in-differences is a common 
method of analysis in microeconomic studies related to development, environment, 
education, labour, public finance and health, but is still somewhat under-used in industrial 
organization and macroeconomics. Difference-in-differences policy analysis compares the 
outcome within groups affected more or less by a policy change. 
Card and Krueger (1994) examined the long-run effects of the 1992 minimum-wage 
increase in New Jersey from USD 4.25 to USD 5.05 per hour. They tested the fast-food 
employment growth in New Jersey and Pennsylvania before and after the rise. They found 
that the New Jersey minimum wage increase did not reduce total employment, however, it 
slightly reduced the average number of hours of work per employee. Moehling (1999) 
used difference-in-differences approach to examine the effect of state child labour laws on 
child labour employment. The results showed that the laws contributed little in reducing 
child labour. Angrist and Lavy (2001) examined the impact of teacher’s training on pupil 
achievement in Jerusalem elementary schools using difference-in-differences approach. 
The estimates showed that providing training to teachers is a cost-effective means of 
increasing test scores of pupils. 
Slaughter (2001) analysed the relation between trade liberalization and per capita 
income across countries. Using difference-in-differences approach on four post-1945 
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multilateral trade liberalisations no strong and systematic link was found between trade 
liberalisation and convergence. Alatas and Cameron (2003) tried to exploit the geographic 
differences to compare the employment changes in clothing, textiles, footwear and leather 
industries on either side of the Jakarta-West Java border. Using matched difference-in-
differences they found negative employment impact for small-domestic firms while no 
impact for large firms- foreign or domestic firms. While Bainbridge et al. (2003) 
estimated the effect of public child care subsidies on single mothers’ employment rates 
from 1991–1996. The results showed that expenditure on child care subsidies had 
significant and substantial beneficial impact on the employment of single mothers with 
young children. 
Leigh (2003) analysed the impact of Western Australian minimum wage increase 
arising from six increases between 1994 and 2001 from 3.49% to 9.29%. On aggregating 
the increases the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the minimum wage was 
found to be -0.13. Kugler (2005) assessed the wage effects of severance payments savings 
accounts (SPSAs) in Colombia after the 1990 Labour Market Reform. The results showed 
that SPSAs shifted between 60% and 80% of firm’s contributions towards workers’ lower 
wages. Neumark et al. (2005) presented nonparametric difference-in-differences estimates 
of the effects of minimum wages on ‘family income to needs distribution’ in the United 
States. The results did not show any evidence that increase in minimum wage reduces the 
proportions of poor and low-income families. 
Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2006) used Spanish database of grants received by 
900 municipalities during the period of 1993-2003 from upper-tier government. Using 
differences-in-differences they tested the hypothesis that political alignment affects the 
distribution of grants across municipalities. The results showed significant effect of 
partisan alignment on the amount of grants received by municipalities. In the case of 
single-party, aligned municipalities received over 40% more grants as compared to the 
unaligned municipalities. Draka et al. (2006) studied the impact of minimum wage policy 
in the UK in 1999 on firms’ profitability. They used pre-policy information to create 
treatment and control groups for the implementation of difference-in-differences 
approach. Their results showed that firms’ profitability was significantly reduced by the 
introduction of minimum wage policy. Using a dataset of Irish manufacturing plants Görg 
et al. (2008) analysed the relationship between government subsidy and exporting activity 
by firms with a difference-in-differences estimator. The results showed that large grants 
influence exporting firms to compete more effectively in the international market. 
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Pellizzari (2010) explored the empirical effects evidence for European countries 
using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and discovered a large cross-
country and cross-industry wage differences between jobs found through informal and 
formal methods. They argued that such variation can be explained by firms’ recruitment 
strategies. In labour markets where employers invest largely in formal recruitment 
activities, matches created through formal channel are likely of better quality than those 
created through informal networks. Imberman and Kugler (2012) examined the impact of 
in-class breakfast programmes on class performance as measured by standardized test 
scores, grades and attendance rates. Using difference-in-differences strategy they 
identified the schools where this programme was introduced. They found that in-class 
breakfast increased maths and reading achievements by about one-tenth of a standard 
deviation relative to providing breakfast in the cafeteria. 
Vandoros et al. (2013) used difference-in-differences approach to compare health 
trends, before and after the financial crisis in Greece, with trends in a control population 
(Poland) that did not experience a recession. The results showed strong evidence of a 
statistically significant negative effect of the financial crisis on health trends. Relative to 
Poland, Greece experienced a significantly larger increase in the odds of reporting poor 
health after the crisis, while there was no difference in health trends between Poland and 
Greece before the financial crisis. Nakamura et al. (2014) evaluated the impact of Scottish 
ban on multi-buy promotions of alcohol in 2011 using difference-in-differences method. 
This method was used to compare the volume of alcohol purchased by Scottish 
households with those in England and Wales between January 2010 and June 2012. They 
found that there was no significant impact of the ban on the volume of alcohol purchased 
either by the whole population or individual socio-economic groups. 
3.6 Empirical methodology 
3.6.1 Baseline model 
To confirm the impact of bond market policy initiatives on firms' access to external 
finance, this chapter examines the determinants of external finance to explain the effect of 
the policy initiatives. Following the recent literature which verifies the impact of policy 
initiatives (Card and Krueger, 1994; Vandoros et al., 2013; Mizen and Tsoukas, 2014) the 
empirical models are estimated using difference-in-differences methods. The difference-
in-differences method (DD) helps in differentiating the impact of the policy initiative on 
firms in the countries which participated in the initiative (treated group) from the firms in 
Taiwan (control group) which did not participate in the policy initiative but faced similar 
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bond market development. The treated group includes seven Asian economies namely- 
Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  
The dependent variables capture measures of external finance and are based on the 
ratios of short-term debt to total debt (Bougheas et al., 2006) and long-term debt to total 
assets (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999)
34
. The former ratio refers to access to 
bank finance versus market finance, while the latter ratio is more related to access to bond 
financing as compared to total assets held by the firms. These ratios help to remove 
demand-side influences as increase in the demand of credit is likely to affect both 
numerator and denominator of the ratio, leaving the ratio unchanged (Bougheas et al., 
2006). The baseline models are represented as follows: 
𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
=  𝒶0 +  𝒶1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 + 𝒶2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝓉 +  𝒶3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝓉 + 𝒶4𝒳𝒾𝑗𝓉 + ℯ𝒾𝑗𝓉, (17) 
𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
=  𝒶0 +  𝒶1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 + 𝒶2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝓉 +  𝒶3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝓉 + 𝒶4𝒳𝒾𝑗𝓉 + ℯ𝒾𝑗𝓉 (18) 
where 𝑖 = 1, 2, …., N refers to the cross-section of units (firms in this case) in country 𝑗 at 
time 𝓉. 
𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
 and 
𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
 are the ratios of short-term debt to total debt and long-term debt to 
total assets respectively. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 is a country dummy which takes value one if a country 
participates in ABF, ABF-2 or ABMI and zero otherwise. 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝓉 is a time dummy which 
takes value one for the years 2005-2012 and zero otherwise
35
. The policy effect is given 
by the coefficient of the interaction term 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝓉. A significant coefficient value 
on the interaction term should imply that the policy initiative had a crucial impact on 
access to finance with a considerable difference between the control and treated group. 
The models are estimated using difference-in-differences with firm fixed effects to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm-level. Country dummies are included in 
the model to control for country-level differences, while time dummies interacted with 
industry dummies are included in order to control for all time-varying demand shocks at 
the industry level (Brown et al., 2009 and Brown and Petersen, 2009). Clustered standard 
errors at the firm level are included as the observations over time might be correlated 
                                                          
34
 Short-term debt is made up of the sum of bank overdrafts, short-term group and director loans, hire 
purchase, leasing and other short-term loans, but is predominantly bank finance. Long-term debt is made of 
bonds, mortgages, loans and similar debt which represents debt obligations due for more than one year from 
the company's balance sheet date or due after the current operating cycle. 
35
 By observing the treatment after 2005, this chapter is mainly focusing on the impact of Asian Bond Fund-
2 in 2005. ABF-2 initiative differs from others as it involves the actual creation of local currency bond 
funds. The earlier ABF initiative had limited itself to dollar-denominated issues that are traded mostly in 
more developed international bond markets. ABF was important because it afforded the EMEAP central 
banks an opportunity to work together for building trust in order to foster cooperation and further develop 
financial markets in the region (Ma and Remolona, 2006). 
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within firms. Finally, 𝒳 is the vector of explanatory factors at firm-level and country-level 
and ℯ𝒾𝑗𝓉 are the disturbance terms. 
The set of control variables, which are included in vector 𝒳, are taken from previous 
studies. With respect to the firm-level factors previous literature suggests that firm size is 
an important indicator of external financing. Firm size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets (Gopalan et al., 2013 and Mizen and Tsoukas, 2014). Larger 
firms have better access to external finance as they are less financially constrained, while 
smaller firms are more dependent on short-term bank financing (Bougheas et al., 2006; 
Beck et al., 2008). 
Liquidity of firms is measured by the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
According to Ozkan (2001), liquidity of firms is likely to have a mixed impact on access 
to external financing. Higher liquidity might encourage firms for higher debt ratios due to 
increased ability to meet short-term obligations. This implies a positive relationship 
between liquidity and external finance. However, firms with higher liquidity might also 
reduce their debt access exerting a negative impact on external finance. Following 
Bougheas et al. (2006) gearing is measured by total liabilities to shareholder's equity. 
González et al. (2007) shows that more leveraged firms have fewer requirements of 
external financing. On the contrary, Mizen and Tsoukas (2014) show that higher 
leveraged firms are more likely to issue corporate bonds. 
Following Mizen et al. (2012) the expansion rate of firms is measured by investments 
to total assets ratio. According to Pagano et al. (1998) and Datta et al. (2000), growing 
firms are more likely to issue bonds as compared to the firms with less opportunities for 
expansion. Also, firms with higher expansion rate are likely to undertake bond issuance 
earlier (Hale and Santos, 2008). Firm’s operating cycle is calculated as the ratio of net 
sales to net fixed assets. Firms with higher operating cycle depend more on short-term 
debt to finance the sales (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Beck et al., 2008). 
Finally, cash flow is measured by the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation and amortization to total assets (Almeida and Campello, 2010). Firms with 
higher cash flow or higher cash surplus are expected to reduce their leverage (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). 
In addition to firm-level variables, this chapter also controls for other economic 
factors in vector 𝒳 such as GDP growth rate, legal regulation and balance of trade 
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(scaled by GDP)
36
. Among the economic factors, GDP growth rate and balance of trade 
are the measures of economic development of a country. Better economic conditions 
might encourage firms to shift towards non-debt liabilities and thus showing a negative 
effect on external finance. Firms in countries with higher levels of legal regulation are 
more likely to rely on external financing due to reduced information asymmetries. This 
results in higher growth (La Porta et al., 1998) and better working of financial contracts 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). 
3.6.2 Access to external finance and investment after the policy change 
This section examines the influence of external finance on firms’ investment 
spending during the post-policy period
37
. One of the objectives of the Asian bond market 
initiatives is to provide alternative sources of financing for private and public investments 
to enterprises (Kawai, 2010). It is particularly interesting to examine the impact of long-
term debt issued for firms’ investment spending as the Asian Bond Fund initiatives are 
expected to expand long-term debt issuance. It is argued that this is likely to have a 
positive effect on firms' investment spending. To test this hypothesis the dependent 
variable of firms’ investment spending (Inv) is measured as the ratio of annual capital 
expenditure to total assets (Duchin et al., 2010). The models are estimated as follows: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 + 𝑎2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 +  𝑎3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗
                   𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 +   𝑎6𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎7𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎8𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎9𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,      (19) 
where 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 refers to the measures of external finance i.e. both short-term and long-term 
debt ratios, CF measures firm's cash flow and Q controls for firm's investment 
opportunities. The main variable of interest is the interaction term between leverage and 
the DD coefficient,  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡, captures the impact of post-policy access to 
external finance on firms' investment expenses for the treated group. Due to unavailability 
of data on market value of assets (e.g. number of shares outstanding and stock price) in 
Global Compustat it was difficult to construct Tobin's Q (Baum et al., 2011), but 
investment opportunities are controlled for in two ways. First, following Konings et al. 
(2003) and Bakucs et al. (2009) sales growth is used as a proxy for Tobin's Q. Second, 
time dummies interacted with industry dummies in all the specifications, are used which 
is an indirect way for controlling investment opportunities as used in Guariglia et al. 
(2012). 
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 Other additional controls are also included such as stock market capitalisation, global liquidity indicator 
and a global financial crisis dummy. These results are given in section 3.9.5 and it confirms that the main 
results remain unchanged even after including other control variables. 
37
 The direct impact of the ABF policies on firms’ investment spending was also explored and the results 
showed a positive and significant impact, implying an increase in investment spending by firms after these 
policies were introduced. 
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3.6.3 Accounting for firm-level heterogeneity 
Intuitively, not all firms are expected to benefit equally from the above mentioned 
policy initiatives. Fazzari et al. (1988) highlight the importance of differences across firms 
in relation to financial constraints originating from the imperfections of capital market. 
Due to asymmetric information firms facing higher costs of external finance are likely to 
be more financially constrained. Bris et al. (2014) find that larger firms in the Euro area 
benefited the most from financial integration. Consistent with this result, Gozzi et al. 
(2010) find that larger firms have better financing from international capital markets. 
Stiebale (2011) further stressed that financially constrained firms face difficulties in 
obtaining external finance. It is also argued that firms that face financial constraints might 
be less well positioned to take advantage of the policy initiatives in Asia. Since these 
firms are more susceptible to information asymmetry effects. The well-known fact is that 
there is little public information available for financially constrained firms and it is 
difficult for financial institutions to gather this information. Obtaining external finance is, 
therefore, likely to be particularly difficult and/or costly for them. Therefore, this chapter 
hypothesises that financially unconstrained firms are more likely to reap the benefits of a 
policy change. 
To test this hypothesis, firms are divided into constrained and unconstrained groups 
using two main criteria: profits and coverage ratio. The former classification scheme is 
measured by the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes relative to total assets (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002). Evidence shows that less profitable firms are more financially 
constrained (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Livdan et al., 2009). Coverage ratio is measured 
as earnings before interest and taxes over total debt which measures project quality 
(Mizen and Tsoukas, 2012). Hence, this classification scheme captures firms' 
creditworthiness
38
. As the policy initiative might be related to unobserved within-firm 
changes, firms are divided into constrained and unconstrained categories using the pre-
policy period of 1996-2004
39
. Firms are classified as constrained if their profits and 
coverage ratio are below the 50th percentile of the distribution in the pre-policy period. 
    Further, the differential impact of the influence of external finance on firms' 
investment spending across constrained and unconstrained firms is investigated. Theory 
predicts that firms with financial frictions accompanied with negative shocks to external 
finance might lack sufficient financial slack to fund profitable investment opportunities 
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 Interest coverage was used by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Guariglia (1999) as an indicator of 
financial constraints to identify differences in inventory investment. 
39
 A firm is classified as constrained or unconstrained in the post-policy period of 2006-2012 using values of 
2004, that is, one year prior to the onset of the policy as firm variables are likely to be endogenous to the 
choices made by firms. 
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internally (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). These effects are 
stronger for constrained firms that face greater costs in raising external capital (Duchin et 
al., 2010). 
3.7 Data and summary statistics 
3.7.1 Data 
The data of this chapter includes eight Asian economies namely Hong Kong SAR, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand
40
. The data 
covers the period of 1996 to 2012 which also includes the period of major bond market 
development initiatives. The data are extracted from different sources including Dealogic 
Bondware, Standard and Poor’s Compustat Global database, Bloomberg, Global Financial 
database and IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY). 
Bondware is a database compiled by Dealogic, an independent financial-information 
provider. The main purpose of Bondware is to permit the ranking of bookrunners (the lead 
underwriters controlling the distribution of paper) by amount or number of deals 
underwritten; indeed, the data are effectively provided by the bookrunners. This is why 
Bondware only captures those issues that the bookrunner wants to advertise. Bondware 
provides coverage of the debt markets in the world with information along various 
dimensions on the entire population of bond offerings. In this chapter Bondware is used in 
identifying the corporate bonds issued in the international markets and to accumulate data 
relating to issue date, maturity date, outstanding amount and currency
41
. 
Bloomberg is an online database providing current and historical financial quotes, 
business newswires, and descriptive information, research and statistics of over 52,000 
companies worldwide. Bloomberg is used to categorise similar data for firms that issue 
bonds in the Asian domestic markets. Thus, the data covers bond issues of firms 
denominated in local currency as well as in foreign currency, mainly US dollars. 
Compustat Global database is a financial database which provides market information 
on active and inactive global companies throughout the world. It covers publically traded 
companies in more than 80 countries which represents 90% of the world’s market 
capitalisation including coverage of more than 96% of European market capitalisation and 
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 China is not taken into consideration due to its disparities with other East Asian economies in terms of 
growth, capital account convertibility and restricted financial markets. Corporate savings in China are 
higher due to domination of state-owned banks and restricted equity market which favour the large firms by 
improving their retained earnings and profitability (Lin, 2009). In addition, repressed financial system in 
China provides cheap capital (lower interest rate) which again favours large firms (Prasad, 2009). 
41
 The definition of corporate bonds is in line with recent studies on Asian bond markets (see Gyntelberg et 
al., 2005; Mizen and Tsoukas, 2014) and includes all non-government long-term issues in a given currency. 
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88% of Asian market capitalisation. In addition, Compustat Global offers data models 
specific to industrial companies and financial services sectors including banks, insurance 
companies, real estate investment trusts and brokers/security dealers. In this chapter the 
balance sheet data for these Asian firms are taken from Compustat Global database. The 
initial sample included a total of 71,792 annual observations on 7,436 companies. 
Information on financial accounts and ratios are provided for the period of 1996-2012
42
. 
Finally, the data for economic factors such as GDP growth rate, balance of trade (scaled 
by GDP), interest rate spread, inflation and property rights protection are taken from the 
Global Financial database and IMD WCY database. WCY database analyses and ranks 
how nations and enterprises organise their competencies to achieve increased prosperity. 
Following normal selection criteria used in the literature, companies with incomplete 
records of explanatory variables and negative sales are excluded from the data. In 
addition, observations in the 1% from the upper and lower tails of the distribution of the 
regression variables are excluded to control for the potential influence of outliers. Finally, 
the panel has unbalanced structure with a total of 62,237 annual observations and 518 
firms in Hong Kong SAR, 451 in Indonesia, 1,599 in Korea, 1,219 in Malaysia, 253 in the 
Philippines, 861 in Singapore, 1,745 in Taiwan, and 640 in Thailand that function 
between 1996 and 2012 within different sectors such as manufacturing, utilities, 
resources, services and financials. 
3.7.2 Summary statistics 
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for all the variables, differentiating between 
control and treated groups, as well as before and after the introduction of the policy 
initiative. The values for the whole sample (column 1); treated and control groups 
(columns 2 and 3); before and after the policy initiative (columns 5 and 6); p-values for 
the test of equality of means (columns 4 and 7) are reported. From columns 2 and 3 
significant difference in the short and long-term debt issued across the two groups of 
economies can be found. Further, columns 5 and 6 show the debt levels for pre- and post-
policy periods. Regarding the short-term debt the results do not show any significant 
difference between the two time periods. On the other hand, long-term debt values show 
considerable improvement after the introduction of the policy and this difference is 
significant at the 5% level. With respect to other variables the results show that firms are 
larger, have higher levels of gearing, lower liquidity and expansion rate and higher 
investment spending in the treated group as compared to the control group. As for 
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 Bond tickers are used to link the bond-specific data from Bloomberg with accounting data from 
Compustat Global. The matching of the bond data from Bondware with data from Compustat Global was 
made feasible using firms’ names. 
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country-specific variables the treated group displays higher GDP growth, lower legal 
regulation and higher balance of trade compared to the control group. Moving to columns 
5 and 6, all variables show significant differences before and after the policy with GDP 
growth being the only exception. On average, introduction of the policy, helped in 
improving firm-level factors such as firm size, liquidity, expansion rate and operating 
cycle of firms. 
On the whole, these preliminary statistics indicate two main points. First, there is a 
noticeable difference between the control and treated group in terms of both short and 
long-term debt issuances. Second, there is an improvement in the level of long-term debt 
issuance after the implementation of the policy initiatives. Also, there is a notable 
improvement in the performance of firms highlighted by the firm-level factors after the 
policy initiative. In the following sections a formal regression analysis framework tests 
the role of the policy initiative in firms' access to external finance. 
3.8 Empirical results 
3.8.1 Baseline model 
Table 3.2 reports the results for the baseline model. The main variable of interest, 
‘𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝓉’, measures the impact of the policy initiative on the treated group. To 
ascertain the magnitude of the DD coefficient, percentage point effects are calculated by 
dividing the coefficient value (marginal effect) with the predicted probability of the 
model. The results show that the introduction of the policy in the treated group led to a 
reduction in firms' access to short-term debt by 4.87% and an increase in firms’ access to 
long-term debt by 11.96%. This finding emphasises the fact that policy initiatives helped 
firms in the treated group to improve their access to long-term debt while reducing their 
short-term debt finance as compared to the control group. This also implies that firms 
issued long-term debt that they would not have done in the absence of the policy 
implementation. 
These findings lend support to the evidence presented in Mizen and Tsoukas (2014) 
who show that the policy initiatives of ABF, ABF-2 and ABMI had a significant effect on 
a firm's decision of bond issuance. It also supports the findings of Shim (2012) that 
domestic corporate bond markets in emerging Asia experienced a rapid growth from 2005 
to 2011 as compared to other emerging markets even during the global financial crisis. 
One of the factors affecting the rapid growth in corporate bond issuances is the 
functioning of credit rating agencies which are established as a part of the government 
initiatives (Shim, 2012). 
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Focusing on firm-level factors, a significant coefficient on firm's size shows that 
larger firms have greater access to long-term debt and reduce their short-term debt. This 
confirms the finding by Bougheas et al. (2006) that size is an important determinant of 
access to bank and market debt. Liquidity of firms shows a negative impact on short-term 
debt, while a positive impact on long-term debt suggesting that firms with higher liquidity 
are likely to raise more long-term debt and reduce short-term debt. Ozkan (2001), 
Aggarwal and Zong (2006) show that higher liquidity of firms improve access to external 
finance. Moving to gearing of firms, it enters with the expected negative and positive 
signs on short and long-term debt ratios respectively. This result is in line with González 
et al. (2007) for short-term debt as they confirm that more leveraged firms have less desire 
for external financing. On the other hand, firms with higher leverage are likely to issue 
more corporate bonds (Mizen and Tsoukas, 2014) resulting in an increase in access to 
long-term debt. 
Expansion rate measured by investments to assets ratio shows a negative and positive 
effect on short and long-term debt ratios respectively. This indicates that firms with higher 
investments are more likely to opt for long-term debt issuance. Operating cycle measured 
by sales to assets ratio attains a negative coefficient on long-term debt ratio, while a 
positive coefficient on short-term debt ratio. This confirms that firms depend more on 
short-term debt rather than on long-term debt to finance their increasing sales. Cash flow 
enters with a negative coefficient on both long and short-term debt ratios which show that 
firms with substantial cash flow require less in terms of external finance. 
Country-specific factors include GDP growth, legal regulation and balance of trade. 
GDP growth is generally insignificant, but the balance of trade shows a positive effect on 
short-term debt and an insignificant effect on long-term debt. Improvement in the balance 
of trade, an indicator of economic health of a country, increases access to external 
financing in the form of short-term debt. Finally, legal regulation registers a positive 
effect on long-term debt ratio and a negative effect on short-term debt ratio. This implies 
that with an improvement in a country's legal framework firms are more likely to increase 
their long-term debt issuance rather than short-term debt exposure. 
3.8.2 Accounting for firm-level heterogeneity 
This section explores the link between the policy shift and firms' financing while 
taking into account firm-level heterogeneity. The results are reported in Table 3.3. 
Columns 1-2 in the table gives results for the firms with low and high profits, followed by 
low and high coverage ratios in columns 3-4 for short-term debt ratio. Similarly, results 
for the long-term debt ratio for different firm classifications are provided in columns 5-8. 
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The results of the DD coefficient show that unconstrained firms are able to reap more 
readily the benefits of the policy change. On the contrary, constrained firms were mainly 
unaffected by the policy change. The economic interpretation provides a more interesting 
story as the unconstrained firms reduce their short-term debt and increase their access to 
long-term debt ratio much more as compared to constrained firms after the policy 
initiative. In economic terms, after the introduction of the policy, unconstrained firms in 
the treated group reduced their access to short-term debt by around 9.45%-9.51%, while 
they increased their access to long-term debt by 18.25%-26.84% as compared to 
unconstrained firms in the control group. The test of equality for constrained and 
unconstrained firms shows a significant difference at 5% level for both short and long-
term debt ratios. 
This result provides support to the evidence given by Fazzari et al. (1988) that 
financially constrained firms face higher external financing costs. Constrained firms are 
less likely to have access to external finance as they face higher agency costs of 
borrowing from financial markets when compared with the cost of internal financing 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Overall, the results show that unconstrained firms are able 
to access external finance easily as compared to the constrained firms in the treated group. 
3.8.3 The impact of investment spending 
This section takes into account the role of firms' financing position in influencing the 
impact of the policy initiative on investment spending. Table 3.4 reports the results of 
post-policy firms' investment spending for different measures of leverage
43
. Column 1 
provides the results for short-term debt to total debt and in column 2 leverage is measured 
as long-term debt to total assets. 
The findings show that the interaction term of leverage and DD is negative for firm's 
investment spending in column 1 and positive in column 2. The magnitude of the 
interacted coefficients suggests that after the policy was introduced firms reduced their 
investment spending using short-term debt by 10.04%, while increased their investment 
spending using long-term debt by 67.65%. These coefficients are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The results indicate that as firms reduced their access to short-term debt, 
after the policy implementation, firms reduced their investment spending using short-term 
debt. On the contrary, firms' increased access to total long-term debt after the policy 
which helped them to spend more of long-term debt on their investment spending. 
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 The term After*Lev has been omitted from the results due to very high correlation with other variables 
such as Treat*After*Lev and Lev. 
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The above results support the evidence provided by previous studies that the 
development of financial markets helps to improve growth and investment in emerging 
markets (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Love, 2003). With respect to other control variables 
both sales growth and cash flow have a positive and significant coefficient for investments 
in almost all the columns. This result is again in line with the empirical studies such as 
Fazzari et al. (1988) and Wei and Zhang (2008) which show that firms' cash flow per unit 
of capital is positively related to the rate of investment per unit of capital even when a 
measure of Tobin’s Q is included as an explanatory variable of investment. 
Overall, the results confirm that the growth of Asian domestic bond markets has 
helped firms to finance their investments by increasing their access to long-term debt. 
Levinger et al. (2014) show that strong growth in Asia's corporate bond markets have 
made funds available for investment and expansion in recent years along with deepening 
of capital markets and diversification of financing sources. 
3.8.4 Accounting for financial constraints 
Next, the link between the policy change and firms' financing is explored while 
categorising firms into financially constrained and unconstrained. Table 3.5 reports the 
results of the post-policy investment spending and leverage for constrained and 
unconstrained firms. The results indicate that the policy initiative did not have any 
significant impact on the investment spending of constrained firms. On the contrary, 
unconstrained firms reduced their investment spending using short-term debt and 
increased their investment spending using long-term debt after the introduction of the 
policy. The economic interpretation is even more interesting which indicates that 
unconstrained firms reduced their investment spending using short-term debt by 9.78%-
12.67%, while they increased their investment spending using long-term debt by 88.50%-
89.60%. However, the test of equality does not show a significant difference between the 
two groups for short-term debt ratio but it shows a significant difference between the 
groups at 5% level for long-term debt ratio. In sum, the results again indicate that it is the 
unconstrained group of firms in the treated group that benefited the most from the policy 
initiative in comparison to the firms in the control group. 
This outcome is in line with the study of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) that capital 
tightening has worse effect on poorly capitalised firms. Fazzari et al. (1988) found that 
financial effects on investment differs across firms and are likely to be more severe for 
firms facing financial constraints in the capital market. Thus, there is a stronger 
relationship between external finance and investment spending for unconstrained firms in 
comparison with constrained firms. 
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3.9 Robustness section 
3.9.1 Propensity score matching 
This chapter employs a propensity score matching technique to check the validity of 
the treated and control groups. One to one matching technique of the firms is used without 
replacement. This means that once an untreated firm has been selected to be matched to a 
given treated firm, that untreated firm is no longer available for consideration as a 
potential match for subsequent treated firms. Hence, each untreated firm is included in at 
the most one matched set. Matching without replacement increases the efficiency of 
matching as compared to matching with replacement. However, regardless of theoretical 
differences several studies have provided evidence that the number of matches and the 
choice of matching with or without replacement has a minimum effect on treatment 
effect's bias and efficiency (Ho et al., 2007 and Stuart, 2010). Matching is done using non-
categorical variables such as firm size, liquidity, leverage, expansion rate, operating cycle 
and cash flow using caliper 0.001 (Yörük, 2008)
44
. 
The results of the main variables of interest are reported in Table 3.6. The results in 
panel A verify the significant and positive impact of the policy initiative on firms' access 
to long-term debt ratio and the negative impact on access to short-term debt ratio. Panel B 
confirms that the policy initiative helped unconstrained firms to increase their access to 
long-term debt and reduce their short-term finance. Panel C demonstrates that firms 
reduced their investment spending using short-term debt, while they increased their 
investment spending using long-term debt after the policy was introduced. Finally, in 
panel D the relationship between external finance and investment spending is found to be 
stronger for unconstrained firms as compared to their constrained counterparts. Thus, it is 
confirmed that the main results are robust to a matching technique which also shows the 
validity of the control and treatment groups in the main models. 
3.9.2 Using the ABF index as a measure of the treatment 
To further support the accurate identification of the policy initiative on the treated 
group, an index is used as a measure of the treatment. Specifically, the Markit iBoxx ABF 
index is used which is designed to reflect the performance of the local currency 
denominated sovereign and quasi sovereign debt from eight Asian countries/territories. 
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 Although not reported here, caliper value of 0.0001 is also used for the propensity score matching 
method. In every procedure with calipers 0.001 and 0.0001 the propensity score and the coefficient estimate 
of almost all the control variables are statistically indifferent between the treated and control group. 
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The index gives a broad coverage of the sovereign and sub-sovereign bond universe of the 
treated countries whilst upholding minimum standards of investability and liquidity
45
. 
The results shown in Table 3.7 confirm that the main findings are upheld. The results 
continue to show that firms reduced their access to short-term debt, while increasing their 
access to long-term debt in the post-policy period. Further, it is found that firms reduced 
their investment spending using short-term debt, while they increased their financing of 
investment spending using long-term debt. Thus, it can be concluded that employing an 
index as a measure of treatment does not alter the results drastically. 
3.9.3 Addressing potential endogeneity concerns 
This section presents the instrumental variable method (two-stage least squares 2SLS) 
used to deal with the potential endogeneity concern of the explanatory variables and bond 
market policy initiative. The identification of the policy initiative requires an exogenous 
variable which is correlated with the bond market development policy but does not 
directly impact firm’s access to external finance. As credible exogenous instruments for 
the policy initiative legal origin of a country, such as British, French and German origin, 
are implemented. Legal origin has also been used previously as an instrument for financial 
development of a country in a recent study by Liberti and Mian (2010). La porta et al. 
(2008) explained that a country’s legal origins based on British, French, German, or 
Scandinavian legal origins have a statistically large impact on country’s level of financial 
development. Beck et al. (2003) further stressed that legal traditions of a country effects 
the ability of a system to adjust to changing commercial requirements and encourages 
financial development of a country. 
In addition to the policy initiative, it is also believed that all the control variables used 
in the model are endogenous and they are instrumented by using their own values lagged 
twice. The validity and importance of the instruments for both the policy and other control 
variables are verified using a number of tests. The results for these tests are reported at the 
foot of the tables
46
. 
Table 3.8 shows the results of the 2SLS model. The results validate a significant and 
positive impact of the policy initiative on firms' access to long-term debt ratio and a 
negative impact on access to short-term debt ratio with a stronger effect on unconstrained 
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 The index history statistics starts on 31/12/2000 and covers a variety of markets with small (Hong Kong, 
Singapore) and large (Korea, China) bond markets. Using simple weights will skew the index in favour of 
larger markets and reduce the weight of smaller markets. Hence, the baseline weight of these indices is 
adjusted by the local bond market size, sovereign local debt rating and GEMLOC investability indicator. 
46
 In addition to the statistics reported in the tables of the results, the Anderson Rubin chi-square test was 
also employed and obtained identical p-values as with Anderson Rubin F-test. 
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firms. Further, the results show that with an increase in firms' access to long-term debt, 
their post-policy investment spending also increased, while post-policy investment 
declined for firms dependent on short-term debt. Finally, the link between leverage and 
post-policy investment is much stronger for unconstrained firms as compared to their 
constrained counterparts. Other control variables maintain their significance and expected 
signs. 
Overall, the diagnostic tests do not specify any problems regarding the application of 
instruments used. The Kleibergen-Paap statistics reject the null hypothesis that the 
equation is underidentified. The Anderson-Rubin and Stock-Wright statistics, which are 
the weak instrument-robust inference tests, accept the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
of the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero. Finally, the Hansen J statistic of the 
overidentifying restriction also shows that the instruments are valid
47
. Thus, these results 
provide a reliable robustness check to the main results. 
3.9.4 Placebo tests: Difference-in-differences for pre-policy period 
This section presents placebo tests as a robustness check to the main results. If 
homogeneity across time-periods is assumed then similar results should also hold prior to 
the treatment period. Following Angrist and Krueger (1999) and Imberman and Kugler 
(2012), the difference-in-differences is conducted for the pre-policy period of 1996-2004. 
Instead of the reform taking place in 2005-2012, it is assumed that the reform took place 
in 2002-2004
48
. If there are any pre-existing trends, then there should be a significant 
impact of the policy on access to finance. This procedure checks if any underlying trends 
are influencing the results. If the results show insignificant effects of the policy on access 
to finance, then it proves the validity of the treatment effect. 
Table 3.9 presents the results which demonstrate an insignificant impact of the policy 
initiative on both short-term and long-term debt ratios for both constrained and 
unconstrained firms. Further, the results of post-policy investment spending and leverage 
show an insignificant effect of firms' leverage on post-policy investment outlays for both 
constrained firms and their counterparts. In sum, the placebo test strengthens the validity 
of the empirical strategy and main results. 
                                                          
47
 In addition to the statistics reported in the tables of the results, we also employed the Anderson Rubin chi-
square test and obtained identical p-values with the Anderson Rubin F-test. 
48
Difference-in-differences test for the pre-policy period are also performed using the reform period after 
1999, 2002 and 2003. The results are almost similar, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to the results of 
2002-2004 reform period. 
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3.9.5 Including additional control variables 
In this section additional control variables are included in the models, while a wide 
set of explanatory variables have been explained in the main models to ensure that the 
findings are not driven by omitted-variable bias. A dummy for the global financial crisis is 
included which takes value one for the period 2007-2010, and zero otherwise. Additional 
control variables, such as stock market capitalisation and global liquidity are also added. 
Stock market capitalisation is likely to be an important determinant of external financing 
as countries with larger stock markets help firms to increase long term credit and access to 
external finance (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). Global liquidity is measured by 
cross-border credit growth in the Asia-Pacific region. This variable is included to capture 
the market reactions to quantitative easing and tapering by United States on emerging 
economies in terms of capital flows across borders. Thus, this section tries to unravel the 
impact of the policy initiative on firms' external financing by controlling for these 
additional variables. 
The results are given in Table 3.10 and confirm that the policy did have a significant 
impact on firms' external financing. The results again confirm that firms increased their 
access to long-term debt and reduced their short-term debt. Further, firms increase their 
investment spending using long-term debt, while they reduce their investment spending 
using short-term debt. Finally, the results show that both these relationships are stronger 
for unconstrained firms as compared to constrained firms. 
3.9.6 Excluding Korea 
In order to confirm that the main results are not driven by Korea which is the biggest 
bond market country in the treated group, Korea is removed from the sample. The results 
are shown in Table 3.11 which confirms that the results are both qualitatively and 
quantitatively identical to the main results. The results show that firms reduced their 
access to short-term debt, while increased their access to long-term debt in the post-policy 
period. Further, the results show that firms reduced their investment spending using short-
term debt while they increased their financing of investment spending using long-term 
debt. Finally, these relationships are found to be more sensitive for unconstrained firms, 
compared to their constrained counterparts. Thus, it can be concluded that the inclusion of 
Korea in the sample does not bias the results in any way. 
3.9.7 Alternative classification of firms 
In the main empirical results the firms are classified into constrained and 
unconstrained using the 50th percentile of the distribution in the pre-policy period. In 
order to confirm that these results are not driven by the way the sample is divided, a 
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robust framework of classification scheme is used. Following Tsoukas (2011), the firms 
are divided into constrained and unconstrained firms using the 75th percentile as a cut-off 
point in the pre-policy period. Thus, constrained firms take value one if their profits and 
coverage ratio are below the 75th percentile of the distribution of all the firms in that 
particular year, and zero otherwise. Table 3.12 confirms that the policy helped 
unconstrained firms to increase their access to long-term debt and reduce their short-term 
debt much more as compared to the financially constrained firms. In addition, 
unconstrained firms increased their investment spending using long-term debt much more 
as compared to firms which are financially constrained. While in terms of short-term debt 
there is no significant difference between constrained and unconstrained firms with 
respect to their post-policy investment spending. Hence, to conclude, the main results are 
also robust to an alternative classification of firms. 
3.10 Conclusion 
After the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 the need for developing local financial 
markets was realised in order to reduce over-dependence on bank-dominated financial 
system and under-developed bond markets. Thus, in order to develop sound and more 
liquid bond markets to prevent further capital account crises and financial instability, 
Asian bond market initiatives were introduced in eight Asian economies. Using a unique 
panel dataset on eight Asian countries over a period of 1996 to 2012, this chapter analyses 
the impact of the Asian bond market initiatives on firms’ access to external finance. The 
results based on the difference-in-differences method suggest that firms' reduced their 
short-term debt and increased their access to long-term debt after the introduction of the 
ABF-2. With respect to the firm-level heterogeneity, the results show that the policy 
initiatives helped unconstrained firms to increase their corporate bond issuances and 
reduce their bank finance much more as compared to their financially constrained 
counterparts. Next, the chapter takes into account the influence of firms’ external finance 
on investment spending in the post-policy period. The results show that increased access 
to credit for firms in the form of total long-term debt had a positive impact on firms' 
investment spending. Finally, this chapter finds that with respect to long-term debt ratio 
unconstrained firms are able to increase their post-policy investment spending much more 
as compared to constrained firms. This is due to their increased access to long-term debts 
after policy. 
The results of this chapter confirm the fact that the Asian bond market initiatives 
helped in expanding the Asian domestic bond markets. However, the level of 
development is widely diverse between different ASEAN countries. These policy 
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initiatives have helped in expanding the local sovereign bond markets in Asia but the 
progress in terms of corporate bond markets is still low. Thus, more progress is required 
for growing diversified issuer base so that firms can receive funding from various sources 
without increasing shock volatility. This is crucial as significantly advanced corporate 
bond markets have a substantial effect on investment and regional growth by supplying 
long-term funding opportunities.  
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Figures 
Figure 3-1: Size of bond markets for treated and control groups 
(a) LCY bond market size (USD billions) 
 
(b) LCY corporate bond market size (USD billions) 
 
Notes: Treated group includes Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand, while the control group is Taiwan.  
119 
 
(c) Size of bond market by country 
 
Notes: Country abbreviations: HK= Hong Kong SAR; ID = Indonesia; KR = Korea; MY= Malaysia; PH = 
Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH= Thailand; TW= Taiwan 
Figure 3-2: Banking sector development in treated and control group 
  
120 
 
Tables 
Table 3.1: Statistics for all the explanatory variables 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Whole sample Treated 
group 
Control 
group 
p-value Before 
ABF-2 
After 
ABF-2 
p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Short-term debt 
(in USD bn) 
47.03 
(266.61) 
60.10 
(302.41) 
3.15 
(14.64) 
0.000 46.37 
(260.73) 
47.45 
(270.34) 
0.629 
Long-term debt 
(in USD bn) 
52.29 
(328.68) 
66.89 
(372.80) 
2.91 
(14.37) 
0.000 49.06 
(299.32) 
54.41 
(346.62) 
0.051 
Firm Size 8.41 
(3.11) 
8.42 
(3.43) 
8.37 
(1.59) 
0.127 8.17 
(3.10) 
8.56 
(3.11) 
0.000 
Liquidity 2.12 
(1.89) 
2.07 
(1.93) 
2.27 
(1.77) 
0.000 1.92 
(1.67) 
2.25 
(1.99) 
0.000 
Gearing 1.57 
(2.40) 
1.66 
(2.49) 
1.29 
(2.07) 
0.000 1.72 
(2.59) 
1.48 
(2.27) 
0.000 
Expansion rate 0.48 
(0.35) 
0.47 
(0.36) 
0.49 
(0.33) 
0.001 0.47 
(0.35) 
0.48 
(0.35) 
0.033 
Operating cycle 6.36 
(12.84) 
5.98 
(12.20) 
7.47 
(14.53) 
0.000 4.96 
(10.09) 
7.21 
(14.19) 
0.000 
Cash flow 9.10 
(8.47) 
9.12 
(8.51) 
9.03 
(8.37) 
0.301 9.26 
(8.22) 
9.00 
(8.61) 
0.002 
Investment 
spending 
5.24 
(5.40) 
5.27 
(5.39) 
5.16 
(5.43) 
0.053 5.37 
(5.56) 
5.15 
(5.29) 
0.000 
Sales growth 0.08 
(0.28) 
0.84 
(0.28) 
0.81 
(0.28) 
0.334 0.09 
(0.29) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
0.000 
GDP growth 4.44 
(3.64) 
4.46 
(3.72) 
4.38 
(3.35) 
0.033 4.41 
(4.12) 
4.45 
(3.30) 
0.200 
Legal regulation 5.50 
(3.64) 
5.06 
(0.52) 
5.63 
(1.98) 
0.000 5.91 
(1.71) 
5.26 
(1.77) 
0.000 
Balance of Trade 6.25 
(9.10) 
6.41 
(10.28) 
5.68 
(1.43) 
0.000 6.91 
(9.06) 
5.83 
(9.10) 
0.000 
Observations 62,237 48,375 13,862  24,174 38,063  
 
Notes: The table presents sample means with standard deviations in parentheses. The p-values of test of 
equalities of means are reported. Treat is a dummy that takes value one for the firms in countries which 
participated in the policy initiative of 2005, and zero otherwise. After is a dummy that takes value one for 
the period from 2005-2012 and zero otherwise. Firm size: Log of total assets. Liquidity: Current 
assets/Current liabilities. Gearing: Total liabilities/Shareholder’s equity. Expansion rate: Total 
investments/Total assets. Operating cycle: Net sales/Net fixed assets. Cash flow: Earnings before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization/Total assets. Investment spending: Capital 
expenditures/Total assets. Tobin’s Q: Sales growth is used as a proxy. GDP growth: Annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Legal regulation: An index of 0 to 
10 based on a survey question of "The legal and regulatory framework encourages the competitiveness of 
enterprises". Balance of trade: Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of 
GDP.  
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Table 3.2: Baseline model for access to external finance 
 Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total asset 
 (1) (2) 
Treat*After -3.110*** 1.073*** 
 (-3.51) (3.79) 
Firm size -5.614*** 2.877*** 
 (-10.46) (13.37) 
Liquidity -5.111*** 0.354*** 
 (-19.77) (5.89) 
Gearing -0.732*** 1.209*** 
 (-6.06) (15.21) 
Expansion rate -10.691*** 4.534*** 
 (-7.17) (7.85) 
Operating cycle 0.141*** -0.031*** 
 (4.75) (-4.00) 
Cash flow -0.105*** -0.081*** 
 (-3.83) (-9.08) 
GDP growth -0.047 0.015 
 (-0.70) (0.59) 
Legal regulation -0.930*** 0.415*** 
 (-3.23) (4.35) 
Balance of Trade 0.125** 0.014 
 (2.53) (0.82) 
Predicted probability 63.80 8.97 
N 42,117 46,061 
R
2
 0.074 0.109 
No. of firms 5,912 6,100 
 
Notes: In column 1 the dependent variable is short-term debt to total debt, while in column 2 the 
dependent variable is long-term debt to total asset. Country dummies and time dummies 
interacted with industry dummies are included in the models with fixed effects, clustered over 
firms. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% 
(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).  
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Table 3.3: Access to external finance and firm-level heterogeneity 
  Short-term debt to total debt   Long-term debt to total assets  
 Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Treat*After -0.332 -6.096*** -0.756 -6.152*** 0.417 1.619*** -0.279 2.131*** 
 (-0.26) (-4.53) (-0.64) (-4.23) (0.89) (4.45) (-0.54) (6.75) 
Firm size -5.354*** -6.435*** -5.558*** -6.302*** 2.870*** 2.971*** 2.907*** 2.406*** 
 (-5.64) (-7.88) (-6.16) (-7.84) (7.13) (9.42) (7.30) (9.25) 
Liquidity -5.344*** -5.204*** -6.770*** -4.564*** 0.362*** 0.419*** 1.086*** 0.229*** 
 (-11.93) (-15.70) (-12.07) (-14.72) (3.31) (6.45) (6.48) (4.31) 
Gearing -0.325** -1.320*** -0.330** -1.448*** 0.782*** 1.722*** 0.790*** 1.727*** 
 (-2.23) (-6.14) (-2.39) (-5.97) (7.83) (13.14) (8.52) (12.06) 
Expansion -7.825*** -11.527*** -9.455*** -10.954*** 3.668*** 4.953*** 4.708*** 3.716*** 
rate (-3.42) (-5.77) (-4.25) (-4.87) (3.99) (6.65) (4.94) (5.55) 
Operating 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.124*** 0.147*** -0.038*** -0.027*** -0.047*** -0.030*** 
cycle (2.93) (3.36) (2.71) (3.43) (-2.86) (-2.74) (-2.81) (-3.51) 
Cash flow -0.191*** -0.062 -0.173*** -0.090** -0.016 -0.104*** 0.001 -0.061*** 
 (-4.09) (-1.61) (-3.82) (-2.36) (-0.98) (-9.12) (0.04) (-6.23) 
GDP growth -0.130 -0.021 -0.179* 0.098 0.013 0.014 0.028 -0.004 
 (-1.23) (-0.23) (-1.90) (1.02) (0.30) (0.46) (0.63) (-0.14) 
Legal -1.618*** -0.395 -1.129*** -0.538 0.366** 0.391*** 0.276 0.338*** 
regulation (-3.41) (-1.09) (-2.60) (-1.40) (2.03) (3.68) (1.52) (3.40) 
Balance of  0.087 0.064 0.104 0.069 -0.017 0.032 -0.018 0.019 
Trade (1.17) (0.95) (1.44) (1.00) (-0.61) (1.62) (-0.57) (1.12) 
Predicted probability 62.05 64.52 60.75 64.67 9.90 8.87 11.49 7.94 
N 16,368 25,749 16,616 25,501 17,400 28,661 16,893 29,168 
R2 0.086 0.077 0.116 0.066 0.085 0.132 0.116 0.113 
No. of firms 2,684 4,980 2,657 4,929 2,744 5,186 2,658 5,151 
Test of equality         
p.value: Treat*After 0.002 0.004 0.042 0.000 
         
 
Notes: The p-value refers to the test of equality between constrained and unconstrained firms. Robust t-
statistics are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% 
(*).  Also, see notes to Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.4: Post-policy investment and access to external finance 
Dependent variable = Investment spending 
 Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total asset 
 (1) (2) 
   
Treat*After*Lev -0.523** 3.450*** 
 (-2.26) (5.36) 
Sales growth 0.820*** 0.768*** 
 (8.74) (8.65) 
Cash flow 0.032*** 0.037*** 
 (6.12) (7.72) 
Lev -1.134*** 5.002*** 
 (-4.90) (5.20) 
Treat*After 0.487** -0.192 
 (2.09) (-1.22) 
Treat*Lev -0.071 -3.171*** 
 (-0.24) (-2.91) 
Predicted probability 5.21 5.10 
N 39,300 42,926 
R2 0.054 0.053 
No. of firms 5,675 5,861 
   
 
Notes: The dependent variable is firm-level investment spending measured as the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets. ’Lev’ is measured as short-term debt to total debt in column 1 and long-term 
debt to total assets in column 2. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance is 
denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.5: Firm-level heterogeneity for post-policy investment and leverage 
Dependent variable = Investment spending 
 Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
 Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Treat*After*Lev -0.470 -0.754** -0.365 -0.572* 1.422 5.117*** 1.553* 5.018*** 
 (-1.45) (-2.10) (-1.07) (-1.69) (1.47) (5.42) (1.87) (3.89) 
Sales growth 0.729*** 0.794*** 0.742*** 0.775*** 0.684*** 0.741*** 0.725*** 0.689*** 
 (5.54) (5.82) (5.16) (6.05) (5.48) (5.81) (5.17) (5.87) 
Cash flow 0.016** 0.021*** 0.018** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.034*** 
 (1.96) (2.78) (2.20) (3.50) (2.89) (3.89) (2.90) (5.06) 
Lev -1.967*** -0.650** -1.920*** -0.673** 6.854*** 3.357** 6.415*** 3.869*** 
 (-4.79) (-2.28) (-4.80) (-2.41) (4.71) (2.45) (4.95) (2.74) 
Treat*After 0.126 0.772** 0.248 0.575* -0.371 -0.111 -0.232 -0.165 
 (0.37) (2.26) (0.73) (1.70) (-1.57) (-0.49) (-0.94) (-0.79) 
Treat*Lev 0.686 -0.295 0.605 -0.481 -3.220** -3.002* -4.014*** -1.654 
 (1.42) (-0.70) (1.25) (-1.18) (-1.99) (-1.88) (-2.80) (-0.90) 
Predicted probability 4.20 5.95 4.34 5.85 4.10 5.77 4.19 5.67 
N 15,715 23,585 15,914 23,386 16,707 26,219 16195 26731 
R2 0.051 0.068 0.058 0.064 0.050 0.065 0.058 0.062 
No. of firms 2,542 4,588 2,513 4,556 2,594 4,787 2,513 4,769 
Test of equality         
p.value: 
Treat*After*Lev 0.575 0.678 0.006 0.023 
         
 
Notes: The p-value refers to the test of equality between constrained and unconstrained firms. Robust t-
statistics are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% 
(*). Also, see notes to Table 3.4.  
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Table 3.6: Robustness: Propensity score matching 
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
Treat*After   -4.293***   1.379***  
   (-3.95)   (4.25)  
N   22,584   25,609  
R2   0.093   0.119  
Panel 2:  Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low  High Low High Low High Low High 
Treat*After -1.426  -6.770*** -0.320 -7.039*** 0.470 1.681*** -0.053 1.982*** 
 (-0.84)  (-4.19) (-1.57) (-4.04) (0.86) (4.11) (-0.09.) (5.81) 
N 8,707  13,877 8,650 13,934 9,561 16,048 9,000 16,609 
R2 0.103  0.110 0.134 0.096 0.111 0.157 0.126 0.139 
Test of equality          
p.value: Treat*After  0.023  0.014 0.080 0.004 
        
   Dependent variable: Investment spending    
   
Panel 3: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
Treat*After*Lev   -0.843**   4.578***  
   (-2.30)   (3.73)  
N   20,631   22,931  
R2   0.059   0.057  
Panel 4:  Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low  High Low High Low High Low High 
Treat*After*Lev -1.099** -1.152** -0.947 -1.002* 3.999** 6.480*** 2.708 5.951** 
 (-2.13)  (-1.97) (-1.53) (-1.90) (2.16) (3.64) (1.51) (2.50) 
N 8,192  12,439 8,073 12,558 8,805 14,126 8,271 14,660 
R2 0.058  0.082 0.060 0.078 0.055 0.076 0.059 0.070 
Test of equality          
p.value: 
Treat*After*Lev  0.952  0.952 0.332 0.276 
          
 
Notes: The Table reports regression results for propensity score matching technique. The remaining 
specifications, which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 3.2 to 3.5. Statistical 
significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).  Also, see notes to Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.7: Robustness: ABF index 
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
ABF index*After  -0.168*   0.097***  
  (-1.67)   (2.59)  
N  26,887   29,117  
R2  0.066   0.100   
Panel 2: Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
ABF index*After -0.146 0.060 -0.260* 0.057 0.061 0.034 0.122* 0.008 
 (-0.90) (0.39) (-1.88) (0.32) (0.95) (0.64) (1.74) (0.20) 
N 9,896 16,991 9,909 16,978 10,464 18,653 10,031 19,086 
R2 0.083 0.068 0.117 0.054 0.077 0.124 0.127 0.110 
Test of equality         
p.value: ABF index*After 0.342 0.165  0.865 0.107 
      
 Dependent variable: Investment spending    
   
Panel 3: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
ABF index*After*Lev  -0.004**   0.021***  
  (-2.12)   (4.06)  
N  26,019   28,162  
R2  0.044   0.042   
Panel 4: Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
ABF index*After*Lev -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.010 0.021*** 0.009 0.006 
 (-1.37)   (-1.41) (-1.00) (-1.15) (1.16) (2.82) (1.16) (0.63) 
N 9,946 16,073 9,928 16,091 10,511 17,651 10,054 18,108 
R2 0.034 0.061 0.037 0.059 0.034 0.059 0.035 0.059 
Test of equality         
p.value: ABF index*After*Lev 0.999 0.999  0.441 0.834 
         
 
Notes: The Table reports regression results of ABF index as a measure of treatment. The remaining 
specifications, which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 3.2 to 3.5. Statistical 
significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.8: Robustness: IV regressions 
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
Treat*After  -3.426***   1.161***  
  (-3.69)   (3.89)  
N  32,555   35,776  
R2  0.071   0.104  
Kleibergen-Paap  0.000   0.000  
Anderson-Rubin  0.000   0.000  
Stock-Wright  0.000   0.000  
Hansen J  0.778   0.698  
Panel 2:  Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Treat*After -0.410 -6.425*** -0.660 -6.095*** 0.343 1.784*** -0.487 2.244*** 
 (-0.31) (-4.60) (-0.52) (-4.08) (0.69) (4.72) (-0.90) (6.77) 
N 12,253 19,428 12,601 19,130 13,069 21,829 12,837 22,124 
R2 0.080 0.075 0.112 0.062 0.081 0.126 0.110 0.103 
Kleibergen-Paap 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anderson-Rubin 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Stock-Wright 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J 0.693 0.562 0.456 0.361 0.624 0.841 0.811 0.898 
Test of equality         
p.value: Treat*After  0.002  0.005  0.022  0.000 
       
  Dependent variable: Investment spending    
Panel 3: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
Treat*After*Lev  -2.431   7.509***  
  (-6.12)   (4.90)  
N  18,051   24,289  
R2  0.020   0.022  
Kleibergen-Paap  0.000   0.000  
Anderson-Rubin  0.000   0.000  
Stock-Wright  0.000   0.000  
Hansen J  0.778   0.698  
Panel 4:  Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Treat*After*Lev -0.623 -2.390*** 0.523 -2.244*** 2.368 4.918** -1.083 8.141*** 
 (-1.60) (-4.48) (-1.11) (-4.07) (0.83) (2.55) (-0.42) (4.01) 
N 7,430 7,033 7,686 7,238 9,654 14,422 9,428 14,736 
R2 -0.140 0.029 -0.557 0.029 -0.760 0.023 -0.628 0.025 
Kleibergen-Paap 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anderson-Rubin 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Stock-Wright 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J 0.693 0.562 0.456 0.361 0.624 0.841 0.811 0.898 
Test of equality         
p.value: Treat*After*Lev  0.007  0.017  0.459  0.005 
 
Notes: Robust z-statistics for IV (2SLS) regressions are reported in the parenthesis. The remaining specifications, which 
are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 3.2 to 3.5. The Kleibergen-Paap is a test of under-
identification distributed as chi-square under the null of under-identification. The Anderson Rubin and Stock-Wright LM 
statistic are weak-instrument-robust inference tests, which are distributed as F-test and chi-square respectively, under 
the null that coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero, and the over-
identifying restrictions are valid. Hansen J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see 
notes to Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.9: Robustness: Placebo test 
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
Treat*After  -0.467   -0.989*  
  (-0.26)   (-1.67)   
N  15,387   16,492   
R2  0.097   0.096   
Panel 2: Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Treat*After -3.363 7.460* -1.973 5.080 -0.399 -2.507*** -1.007 -1.446 
 (-1.26) (1.74) (-0.84) (1.19) (-0.32) (-2.69) (-0.82)   (-1.56) 
N 4,809 8,999 4,925 8,883 4,982 9,814 4,952 9,844 
R2 0.110 0.102 0.142 0.095 0.087 0.142 0.121 0.128 
Test of equality         
p.value: Treat*After 0.032 0.149  0.180 0.764 
      
 Dependent variable: Investment spending    
   
Panel 3: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
Treat*After*Lev  0.493   -0.531   
  (1.53)   (-0.67)   
N  13,145   14,049   
R2  0.070   0.066   
Panel 4: Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Treat*After*Lev 0.678 0.841 0.841 0.268 -2.438* 0.417 -1.567 2.641 
 (1.28) (1.42) (1.54) (0.46) (-1.67) (0.27) (-1.31) (1.25) 
N 4,527 7,166 4,641 7,052 4,692 7,800 4,668 7,824 
R2 0.109 0.058 0.126 0.045 0.103 0.056 0.126 0.047 
Test of equality         
p.value: Treat*After*Lev 0.841 0.478  0.174 0.084 
         
 
Notes: Table provides placebo test results. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. The 
remaining specifications, which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 3.2 to 3.5. 
Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.10: Robustness: Including additional control variables 
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
Treat*After  -3.640***   1.302***  
  (-4.05)   (4.64)  
N  37,922   41,673  
R2  0.078   0.099  
Panel 2:  Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Treat*After -0.920 -6.844*** -1.353 -6.907*** 0.709 1.912*** -0.023 2.348*** 
 (-0.71) (-5.02) (-1.12) (-4.71) (1.51) (5.28) (-0.04) (7.42) 
N 14,310 23,612 14,488 23,434 15,289 26,384 14,764 26,909 
R2 0.088 0.082 0.120 0.068 0.075 0.124 0.112 0.108 
Test of equality         
p.value: Treat*After  0.002  0.003  0.046 0.000 
       
  Dependent variable: Investment spending    
   
Panel 3: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
Treat*After*Lev  -0.740***   3.796***  
  (-3.03)   (5.52)  
N  35,828   39,292  
R2  0.046   0.045  
Panel 4:  Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Treat*After*Lev -0.471 -0.933** -0.520 -0.695* 1.565 4.571*** 1.840** 3.517** 
 (-1.37) (-2.43) (-1.42) (-1.94) (1.53) (4.37) (2.04) (2.31) 
N 13,928 21,900 14,064 21,764 14,872 24,420 14,344 24,948 
R2 0.033 0.065 0.035 0.062 0.034 0.062 0.035 0.060 
Test of equality         
p.value: Treat*After*Lev  0.368  0.735  0.039 0.342 
         
 
Notes: Table provides test results using additional control variables. Robust t-statistics are reported in the 
parenthesis. The remaining specifications, which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in 
Tables 3.2 to 3.5. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to 
Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.11: Robustness: Excluding Korea 
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
Treat*After  -3.429***   1.199***  
  (-3.58)   (3.94)  
N  34,850   38,570  
R2  0.073   0.109  
Panel 2:  Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Treat*After -0.436 -6.468*** -0.355 -6.728*** 0.463 1.594*** -0.406 2.247*** 
 (-0.31) (-4.51) (-0.27) (-4.30) (0.92) (4.06) (-0.74) (6.68) 
N 14,135 20,715 14,274 20,576 15,123 23,447 14,545 24,025 
R2 0.084 0.079 0.112 0.068 0.081 0.140 0.113 0.121 
Test of equality         
p.value: Treat*After  0.002  0.002  0.073  0.000 
       
  Dependent variable: Investment spending    
   
Panel 3: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
Treat*After*Lev  -0.271   2.755***  
  (-1.07)   (3.81)  
N  32,777   36,231  
R2  0.056   0.054  
Panel 4:  Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Treat*After*Lev -0.377 -0.417 -0.303 -0.415 0.525 3.336 0.533 3.892*** 
 (-1.07) (-1.05) (-0.80) (-1.11) (0.50) (3.24) (0.58) (2.99) 
N 13,599 19,178 13,662 19,115 14,550 21,681 13,938 22,293 
R2 0.051 0.069 0.060 0.067 0.049 0.066 0.059 0.063 
Test of equality         
p.value: Treat*After*Lev  0.936  0.818  0.057  0.035 
         
 
Notes: Table provides results excluding Korea. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. The 
remaining specifications, which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 3.2 to 3.5. 
Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 3.2.  
131 
 
Table 3.12: Robustness: Alternative classification schemes 
Panel 1:  Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
  Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Treat*After -0.287 -10.113*** -1.962** -8.053*** 0.604* 2.075*** 0.591 2.098*** 
 (-0.29) (-4.74) (-2.12) (-3.39) (1.73) (4.00) (1.55) (6.15) 
N 25,735 16,382 25,508 16,609 27,491 18,570 25,944 20,117 
R2 0.083 0.082 0.118 0.058 0.099 0.121 0.123 0.104 
Test of equality         
p.value: Treat*After  0.000 0.017 0.019 0.003 
       
  Dependent variable: Investment spending    
    
Panel 2:  Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets 
  Profit Coverage ratio Profit Coverage ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Treat*After*Lev -0.503* -1.347** -0.660** -0.688 2.064*** 6.012*** 2.739*** 2.224 
 (-1.90) (-2.57) (-2.36) (-1.45) (2.65) (4.04) (3.72) (0.63) 
N 24,643 14,657 24,359 14,941 26,329 16,597 24,802 18,124 
R2 0.053 0.074 0.057 0.068 0.051 0.072 0.055 0.064 
Test of equality         
p.value: 
Treat*After*Lev  0.142 0.096 0.019 0.487 
         
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. The remaining specifications, which are not 
reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 3.2 to 3.5. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% 
(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 3.2.  
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Chapter 3- Appendix 
Table A3.1: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
 Size Liq. Gearing Exp. rt. Op. cy. CF GDP gr. LR Trade INV Sales gr. 
            
Size 1.000           
Liq. -0.183 1.000          
Gearing 0.213 -0.314 1.000         
Exp. rt. 0.069 -0.193 0.001 1.000        
Op. cy. -0.078 0.059 -0.032 -0.432 1.000       
CF 0.064 0.093 -0.158 0.123 -0.017 1.000      
GDP gr. -0.095 0.022 -0.042 -0.028 0.034 0.049 1.000     
LR -0.700 0.077 -0.113 0.113 0.048 -0.024 0.202 1.000    
Trade -0.445 0.037 -0.033 -0.001 0.003 -0.024 0.077 0.335 1.000   
INV 0.093 -0.115 -0.015 0.306 -0.212 0.261 0.030 -0.029 -0.071 1.000  
Sales gr. 0.066 -0.048 0.022 -0.063 0.050 0.302 0.176 0.020 -0.044 0.144 1.000 
            
 
Notes: Abbreviations: Size: Firm size Liq.: Liquidity. Gearing: gearing. Exp. rt: Expansion rate. Op. cy.: 
Operating cycle. CF: cash flow. GDP gr.: GDP growth. LR: Legal regulation. Trade: Balance of trade. 
INV: Investment spending. Sales gr.: Sales growth 
 
Table A3.2: Definition of variables 
Variables Description Source 
   
Treat A country dummy which takes value 1 if a country participates in ABF,  Author’s 
 ABF-2 or ABMI and 0 otherwise. interpretation 
After A time dummy which takes value 1 for years after 2005 and 0 otherwise 
Author’s 
interpretation 
Treat*After The difference-in-difference (DD) coefficient measuring the policy effect. 
Author’s 
interpretation 
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets Compustat Global 
Liquidity Current assets/ Current liabilities Compustat Global 
Gearing Total liabilities/ Shareholder’s equity Compustat Global 
Expansion rate Total investments/Total assets Compustat Global 
Operating cycle Net sales/ Net fixed assets Compustat Global 
Cash flow Earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization/ Compustat Global 
 Total assets (%)  
Investment spending Capital expenditure/ Total assets Compustat Global 
Tobin’s Q Sales growth is used as the proxy. Compustat Global 
GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant Global Financial 
 local currency. Database (GFD) 
Legal regulation It is a measure based on an index from 0 to 10. The survey question reads as IMD WCY 
 
 “The legal and regulatory framework encourages the competitiveness of 
enterprises”.  
Balance of Trade Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP. GFD Database 
Legal origin Dummy takes value 1 based on country’s legal origins as British, French,  La porta et al.  
 German. (2008) 
   Market Market capitalisation is the share price times the number of shares   
   capitalisation outstanding as a percentage of GDP.  
Crisis A time dummy which takes value 1 for years after 2007-2010 and 0 Author’s  
 otherwise. interpretation 
Global liquidity Global cross-border credit in Asia-Pacific region (YOY %). BIS 
   
 
Notes: The Table provides the definitions of the variables used in the models. 
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Chapter 4: Volatility and Firms’ Exporting Decisions for 
Heterogeneous Firms during the Financial Crises49 
4.1 Introduction 
The breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system in 1971-73, after three decades of fixed 
exchange rate system, to floating exchange rates triggered a lively debate on exchange 
rate volatility and international trade. In 1984, International Monetary fund (IMF) 
conducted a study for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which 
examined the effects of exchange rate volatility on world trade. IMF (1984) argued 
however that there are various channels through which exchange rates can affect trade but 
exchange rate risk plays a major role. The economic literature on the relationship between 
exchange rate volatility and trade has evolved over time in recent decades. Two main 
issues in this literature are related to exchange rate volatility and currency misalignments. 
In the last thirty years, there has been an enormous liberalisation of capital flows resulting 
in an increase in the scale and variety of cross-border financial transactions. This has 
increased the magnitude of exchange rate movements, especially in countries with under-
developed capital markets and unstable economic policies. Standard economic analysis 
implies that movements in exchange rates affect both value of a firm and cash flow of a 
firm’s operations. Thus, such volatility has increased the interest of researchers in 
studying the exposure of multinational firms to foreign exchange rate risk. 
Detailed theoretical and empirical literatures on exchange rate volatility and 
international trade can be found in Clark et al. (2004), Greenaway and Kneller (2007) and 
Auboin and Ruta (2013). The studies showing adverse effects of exchange rate volatility 
on the volume of international trade were widespread throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
Notable examples of these studies include Baron (1976), De Grauwe and Verfaille (1988), 
Giovannini (1988) and Bini-Smaghi (1991). Baron (1976) argued that in a world where 
exchange rate volatility is the only source of uncertainty, perfect forward markets 
neutralise any effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade. Further, Bini-Smaghi (1991) 
discussed various papers that found slight evidence of exchange rate variability on 
international trade and assessed some of the reason why the empirical relationship 
between exchange rate risk and trade could not be fully explained. 
Exchange rate volatility also has a significant impact on firm value, regardless of 
whether a firm is considered to be domestic or foreign (Levi, 1994; Marston, 2001). 
                                                          
49
 I am grateful to Marina-Eliza Spaliara for providing the FAME data of UK manufacturing firms. I also 
thank Céline Azémar and Sai Ding for their useful comments and suggestions. 
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Detailed analysis of theoretical and empirical studies on firm-level exchange rate 
exposure is given by Muller and Verschoor (2006). This detailed study highlights the 
various determinants which influence a firm’s sensitivity to exchange rate fluctuations, 
such as a firm’s cost and revenue structure, elasticity of input and output markets, firm’s 
competitive position in the market, etc. Empirical studies on exchange rate exposure 
provide mixed and conflicting evidence. According to Bartov and Bodnar (1994), one of 
the reasons for difficulty in measuring the impact of exchange rate exposure on firm value 
is that firms are aware of the currency risks faced by them and thus, try to eliminate this 
risk by hedging. 
While macro-economic volatility is well studied, the impact of micro-economic 
volatility on export openness is unexplored in the literature. Some of the recent studies by 
Comin and Philippon (2005), Davis et al. (2006) and Buch et al. (2008) study the 
evolution of firm-level volatility over time. To the best of my knowledge, Buch et al. 
(2009), Vannoorenberghe (2012) and Vannoorenberghe et al. (2014) study the link 
between trade openness and output volatility at the firm level. Based on a panel of 500 
firms from the Netherlands, Denmark and Israel, a classical chapter by Hirsch and Lev 
(1971) shows that firms with more diversified exports have less volatile sales, which is in 
line with standard portfolio theory. A recent study by Juvenal and Monteiro (2013) shows 
that Argentinean firms face more stable and diversified exports. Volatility can have an 
adverse impact on firms’ profitability and performance. Shaver (2011) predicts that by 
diversifying sales, firms can reduce financial constraints. Exporting behaviour of firms 
signal higher firm quality and expected cash flow which can further increase external 
finance for funding investments. Thus, diversification helps in reducing volatility and 
improving productivity of firms (Juvenal and Monteiro, 2013), helps firms to finance 
investment (Shaver, 2011) and improve profitability (Wagner, 2014). 
The purpose of this chapter is to study the link between macroeconomic and 
microeconomic volatility on firm-level exports. Specifically, this chapter looks at the 
impact of exchange rate volatility at the macro-level and employment growth volatility at 
the firm-level. The motivation comes from the fact that very few studies look at the 
relationship of both macro- and micro-level volatility on firms’ exports. While, most 
studies focus on the impact of exchange rate volatility on firms’ exports (Ozturk, 2006; 
Coric and Pugh, 2010), this chapter goes one step further and also looks at the impact of 
firm-level volatility on exports. The development of aggregate volatility may hide 
important differences across firms. If outputs across firms are imperfectly correlated, it is 
likely that the impact of aggregate and firm-level output volatility is developed differently 
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(Comin and Philippon, 2005; Buch et al., 2006). Thus, it is important to take into account 
uncertainties at both aggregate and firm-level to study its different impacts. 
This chapter uses a unique dataset for the UK manufacturing firms over the period of 
1990-2009. Focusing on UK firms is important as the UK is the fifth largest exporter in 
the world, which provides an interesting case study for both country and firm-level 
volatility on exports
50
. Another interesting aspect is related to the dataset which majorly 
includes unquoted and smaller firms, which are more likely to face the adversities of 
exchange rate and firm-level uncertainties. 
There is a wide macro literature which focuses on the relationship between financial 
constraints and exchange rate volatility. However, these studies are generally using macro 
or disaggregated data at the sector-level. Caglayan and Demir (2014) and Héricourt and 
Poncet (2013) are the only studies which study the impact of exchange rate volatility at 
the firm-level. This chapter departs from these previous studies and also takes into 
consideration the relationship between financial constraints and firm-level volatility, in 
addition to exchange rate volatility. An increase in exchange rate and firm-level volatility 
may increase the sunk costs of exports which can hinder future earnings and investments 
of exporting firms. Thus, firms which are financially constrained are more likely to face 
the adversities of macro and micro-level uncertainties. 
In addition, for the first time the differences in the responses to exchange rate and 
micro volatility during the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of the early 
1990s and the recent global financial crisis are documented in this chapter. This chapter 
explores the sensitivity of the relationship between country and firm-level volatility to 
firms’ exports for financially constrained and unconstrained firms during two major 
crises, namely the ERM crisis of early 1990s and the global financial crisis of 2008. The 
ERM crisis of early 1990s was a traditional exchange rate crisis, while the recent crisis of 
2008 was mainly a banking crisis. This offers an interesting experiment to explore the 
differential effect of volatility to firm-level exports for different types of firms during two 
different types of financial crises. 
Figure 4-1 displays the growing trend of the log of real export sales for the period of 
1990-2009. The graph shows an upward trend during the ERM crisis period of 1990-1993 
and then stabilises for the rest of the years before it falls sharply during the global 
                                                          
50
 This information is taken from the World Factbook maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
The World Factbook provides information on the history, people, government, economy, geography, 
communications, transportation, military, and transnational issues for 267 world entities. Link: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2078rank.html. 
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financial crisis period of 2007-2009. Further, Figure 2 provides the graph showing the 
trend of both exchange rate and firm-level volatility. The panel on the left shows the 
evolution of exchange rate volatility over the sample period. The graph shows that 
exchange rate is more volatile during the ERM crisis and then dips from 1996. The 
exchange rate volatility again rises steeply during the end of the sample which comprises 
of the global financial crisis. The right panel of Figure 4-2 shows the movement of firm-
level volatility for the entire sample period. The graph shows that the firm-level volatility 
remains constant in the initial part of the sample till 2005 and then starts to increase 
during the end of the sample which consists of the global financial crisis. 
Overall, the graphs show that exchange rate volatility was higher during both the 
financial crises. However, firm-level volatility was quite stable at the initial part of the 
sample and started to rise sharply closer to the global financial crisis. Evidence shows that 
there has been a decline in aggregate volatility (Stock and Watson, 2002) and an increase 
in firm-level volatility (Comin and Mulani, 2006) over the past thirty years. Comin and 
Philippon (2005) also provide evidence that there is a negative correlation between 
aggregate volatility and firm-level volatility for a cross-section of OECD countries during 
the 1990s. Thus, it would be interesting to explore the differential impact of these 
uncertainties on firms’ real export sales during the two different financial crises using 
empirical analysis. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section two provides a detailed literature review 
on exchange rate volatility at both macro and firm-level, and the relationship between 
firm-level uncertainty and trade openness. Section three gives a comparison of the ERM 
crisis and the global financial crisis in the context of United Kingdom. In section four the 
econometric modelling strategy is described. The data used in the empirical analysis, 
along with summary statistics, is presented in section five, and the econometric results are 
reported in section six. In section seven various robustness tests for the main models are 
included and finally, in section eight the concluding remarks are provided. 
4.2 Background literature 
4.2.1 Exchange rate uncertainty and trade at country-level 
There is a vast empirical literature on exchange rate uncertainty and trade conducted 
by academics and policy-oriented economists in support of theoretical considerations, but 
it provides mixed results similar to the theoretical models. Studies such as Taglioni 
(2002), Coric and Pugh (2010) and Ozturk (2006) found 33 studies showing a negative 
relationship between exchange rate variability and trade volume and 25 studies leading to 
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the opposite conclusion. IMF (2004) made an attempt to get some conclusive results and 
found that there was no obvious (negative) association between exchange rate volatility 
and trade. IMF (2004) used a gravity model which controlled for the determinants of trade 
patterns other than exchange rates such as GDP (or demand), distance positions and other 
factors influencing transaction costs relevant to bilateral trade. The results show little 
evidence of exchange rate variability affecting differentiated or homogeneous products 
differently, providing little support to earlier theoretical findings. Further, Rahman and 
Serletis (2009) showed a negative relationship between exchange rate volatility and 
exports in UK, but exports responded asymmetrically to negative and positive shocks of 
exchange rate. Chit et al. (2010) investigated exports in five emerging Asian economies 
and in thirteen industrialised countries. Their results show that exchange rate volatility has 
a negative and significant impact on exports of emerging Asian economies to the world 
market. 
The early work by Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) utilized the model of Ethier (1973) 
and examined the impact of exchange rate volatility on aggregate and bilateral trade flow 
data for all G-7 countries except Italy. Cushman (1983) used a similar model as Hooper 
and Kohlhagen (1978) and found a negative and significant effect of volatility for six out 
of fourteen cases of bilateral trade flows between industrial countries. Finally, the IMF 
(1984) used the simplified version of Cushman’s model to estimate bilateral exports 
between G-7 countries for the period of first quarter of 1969 to the fourth quarter of 1982. 
Variability had a significantly negative coefficient in only two cases, while positive 
coefficients were significant in several cases. 
A number of papers studied the empirical relationship between exchange rate 
depreciation and export surges. Fang et al. (2006) explored the effect of exchange rate 
depreciation on exports for Asian economies such as Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, 
Japan, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Republic of Korea, and Thailand. They found that 
depreciation of currency reduced exports for most countries but its contribution to export 
growth varied across countries. Bernard and Jensen (2004) studied the sources of 
manufacturing export booms for US between 1987 and 1992 and found that changes in 
exchange rates were an important determinant of the rise in exports. 
Some recent studies focused on cross-country analysis. For example, Wei (1998) used 
data on 1000 country pairs and found no evidence in the data to validate the role of 
hedging hypothesis. Further, he found that country paired with large trade potential and 
exchange rate volatility deterred goods trade to a larger extent. Dell’Ariccia (1999) 
analysed the impact of exchange rate volatility on the bilateral trade of 15 EU members 
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and Switzerland over the period of 1975-1994, using different measures of exchange rate 
uncertainty. The results showed that exchange rate has small but negative impact on trade. 
Reducing volatility to zero in 1994 resulted in an increase in trade by 10 to 13 percent, 
depending on the measure of variability. Arize et al. (2000) focused on the impact of 
exchange rate volatility on export demand to less developed economies and found a 
negative relationship in both short-run and long-run. 
Doganlar (2002) studied the impact of exchange rate volatility on the exports of five 
Asian economies. The results showed that exchange rate volatility reduced real exports 
which meant that exporters in these countries were risk-averse. With the increase in 
exchange rate volatility, producers in these countries preferred to sell in domestic markets 
rather than foreign markets. Chit (2008) examined the impact of exchange rate volatility 
on the bilateral exports within ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) for the period 
from 1982:Q1 to 2005:Q1. The results showed that bilateral real exchange rate volatility 
had a significant and negative impact on bilateral exports of ACFTA countries. These 
results were also robust to different estimation techniques and model specifications. 
Using a sample of 12 industrialised countries, Hondroyiannis et al. (2008) studied the 
relationship between exchange rate volatility and aggregate export volumes. A model with 
real export earnings of oil-exporting economies as a determinant of export volumes was 
used for estimation over the period of 1977:1–2003:4. The results showed little evidence 
of a negative and significant effect of volatility on trade. Calderón and Kubota (2009) 
examined the ability of trade and financial openness to mitigate or exacerbate real 
exchange rate volatility using a sample of industrialised and developing countries for the 
period of 1975-2005. Using the method of instrumental variables, they found that high 
exchange rate volatility was caused by the volatility of productivity shocks, monetary and 
fiscal policy shocks. Also, countries which were related to international markets of goods 
and services faced less volatility of real exchange rate. Finally, financial openness 
increased the fluctuations in the real exchange rate. 
Alvarez et al. (2009) examined the impact of exchange rate volatility on the exported 
quantity of goods (intensive margin) and on the range of goods (extensive margin). They 
found that exchange rate volatility had a negative impact on trade as countries reduced the 
number of goods exported. In addition, they found that exchange rate volatility made 
countries to choose a narrow set of exported goods, particularly in developing countries 
with export concentration. 
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Arize et al. (2008) empirically investigated the impact of exchange rate volatility on 
the export flows of eight Latin American countries over the quarterly period 1973–2004. 
The results showed that with an increase in volatility of real effective exchange rate, 
approximating exchange rate uncertainty, there is a significant and negative effect on 
export demand in both short-term and long-term for each of the Latin American country. 
Haddad and Pancaro (2010) provided evidence of the relationship between the real 
exchange rate and export expansion. They found a positive relationship between the two 
variables but for countries with low per capita income. However, in the longer run the 
impact of undervaluation on exports became insignificant for different levels of income. 
Caglayan et al. (2010) investigated the effects of exchange rate uncertainty and 
financial depth on manufacturing exports from 28 emerging countries over the period of 
1978-2005. They show that for majority of the countries exchange rate uncertainty had a 
negative effect on the South-South and South-North trades. In some cases, this effect was 
also unidirectional; that is, South-South or South-North. Finally, they showed that while 
financial depth has a positive effect on exports, exchange rate volatility has a negative 
impact on exports. Arunachalaramanan and Golait (2011) examined the impact of an 
appreciation of Chinese Renminbi (RMB) on India’s bilateral trade with China. The 
results showed that an appreciation of the RMB against the Rupee improved bilateral 
trade balance from the Indian perspective. Thus, an appreciation of RMB increases the 
cost of intermediate products that are not easily substitutable in the short-run. 
Freund and Pierola (2012) examined the determinants of 92 episodes of export surges 
and found that large depreciations of the real exchange rate was an important determinant 
of export surges especially in developing countries. Nicita (2012) investigated the impact 
of misalignments on trade estimating fixed effect models for a panel data on 100 countries 
for the period of 2000-2009. They found that currency devaluation promote exports and 
reduces imports, contrary to currency overvaluation. These misalignments across 
currencies have a diversion effect quantifiable at about 1% of world trade. Manova (2013) 
showed that when financially developed countries became exporters, they were more 
likely to export bilaterally and ship greater volumes and sell more of each volume. 
4.2.2 Theoretical evidence on exchange rate exposure at micro-level 
There are various approaches which analytically describe how currency fluctuations 
can affect firm value. Lessard (1979) was the first to document the degree to which the 
nature of currency risk exposure changed as the period for which one considered exposure 
was farther in the future. Later, Stulz and Williamson (2000) split the overall impact of 
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exchange rate movements on firm value differentiating between transaction-translation 
exposure, contractual exposure, and competitive exposure, respectively. 
Transaction exposure refers to the exposure a firm is facing regarding of its 
commercial transactions which have already been booked. The terms of these transactions 
are settled at a given point of time and hence it is easier to measure their exposure by 
accounting systems. It is important to also take into account the implicit or explicit 
contractual agreements while measuring the overall exchange rate exposure. Such 
commitments create contractual exposure. A firm’s value of domestic and foreign assets 
and liabilities are also affected by the currency fluctuations which cause translation 
exposure. The last component of exchange rate exposure called competitive exposure is 
measured over longer time horizons. Exchange rate fluctuations also have an impact on 
the relative prices of goods sold in different countries which affect a firm’s competiveness 
in a particular market and indirectly also influences the economic environment and future 
development possibilities (Levi, 1994 and Marston, 2001). Direct exposures such as 
transaction, contractual and translation exposures are easier to manage by well-structured 
hedging strategies. While, indirect exposures such as competitive exposure provides 
variability in the cash flows of companies (Di Iorio and Faff, 2000), it is complex to 
correctly estimate competitive exposure (Luehrman, 1990; Williamson, 2001) and hedge 
it effectively. 
Some authors tried to get a clearer view of the mechanism of exchange rate exposure 
and built theoretical models to capture the impact of exchange rate volatility on firm value 
in an analytical way. Shapiro (1975) made the first attempt to model the relationship 
between firm value and exchange rates. He used a two-country model predicting that a 
depreciation of the home currency led to an increase in the value of a domestic firm and a 
decrease in the value of foreign firms. Dumas (1978) and Hodder (1982) elaborated on 
this Shapiro’s model considering a company with both domestic and foreign activities. 
Describing the impact of currency fluctuations on the profit function that allowed for 
purchasing, sales and payment collection at three different points in time, Dumas (1978) 
suggested that a firm’s total exchange rate exposure was a function of future exchange 
rate volatility, macroeconomic effects and the responsive behaviour of the firm. Hodder 
(1982) took the value of a firm as a starting point and showed that a firm’s exchange rate 
exposure could be divided into four parts- the domestic price related exposure, the foreign 
real asset exposure, the inflation related exposure and the firm’s fully exposed foreign 
borrowing exposure. Hodder showed that even a domestic firm could be exposed to 
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exchange rate uncertainties and this exposure was contingent upon the adjustment of 
prices. 
Cornell and Shapiro (1983) and Flood and Lessard (1986) developed another set of 
models driven by financial intuition. The main idea was that a firm’s value was the 
present value of its current and future cash flows and hence the exchange rate exposure 
could be estimated by looking at the effects of exchange rate movements on these cash 
flows. Flood and Lessard (1986) analysed the operating exposure of firms and 
distinguished between the competitive and the conversion effect of exchange rate 
volatility. Further, Booth and Rotenberg (1990) generalised Flood and Lessard’s model 
and included commodity arbitrage constraints. The model showed that the key variables 
influencing currency risk exposure of companies included firm’s real price and cost 
structure, its discount rate, the transaction costs related to the economic barriers to 
arbitrage, etc. 
In another model by Hekman (1985), corporate valuation theory, corporate 
macroeconomic connections and an expectation theory of exchange rate movements were 
related. Assuming perfect capital markets, a Cobb-Douglas production function with 
constant production parameters and constant returns, he explored the impact of exchange 
rate fluctuations on three components of corporate value which included the value of 
after-tax, non-financial, operating cash-flows and the value of outstanding debt. This 
model highlighted the relevance of investment financing choices and hedging decisions. 
Tufano (1996) also contributed in understanding that financial risk exposure was of 
high interest. The interesting feature of this model was that observed exposure decreased 
as the volatility of gold prices increased. This conclusion was extended to currency risk 
exposure by Friberg and Nydahl (1997) who found that more volatile exchange rates had 
less impact on competition and exchange rate pass-through. Levi (1994) explored the 
relationship between firm value and exchange rates from a micro-point of view of a firm. 
He developed a multi-currency model, taking into account both the tax rate and firm’s net 
monetary asset and liability position for each currency. He showed that the impact of 
exchange rate volatility was inversely related to the tax rate and the opportunity cost of 
capital. 
Allayannis and Ihrig (2001) used a Taylor series expansion of the value of a firm 
around a date state variable and showed that exchange rate changes affected a firm’s 
returns through three channels: the competitive structure of the market, the export share 
and the import share. Marston (2001) extended this analysis of different competitive 
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structures and showed that economic exposure was dependent on marginal cost behaviour, 
product demand elasticity, and output reaction of firms. 
Bodnar et al. (2002) used a duopoly model to distinguish between three different 
impacts of exchange rate volatility on firm’s value. The first was related to the impact of 
exchange rate volatility on profits, the second one related to the impact of the exchange 
rate movements on the share of total expenditure borne by the exporter and the final one 
was related to the influence on the domestic-currency profit margin of the exporter due to 
price changes. Thus, Bodnar et al. (2002) showed a link between the exchange rate 
exposures and the impact of pricing on profitability pass-through effects. The model 
implied a negative relationship between product substitutability and pass-through and 
thus, a positive correlation with exposure. Bartram et al. (2010) extended prior theoretical 
models to document a global firm’s foreign exchange exposure and empirically showed 
that firms pass through part of the currency changes to customers to utilise both 
operational and financial hedges. They showed that for a typical firm, pass-through and 
operational hedging reduced exposure by 10-15% and financial hedging with foreign debt 
reduced exposure by about 40%. 
To summarise, these contributions indicated the sensitivity of firm value to exchange 
rate volatility depends on various factors such as the nature of a firm’s activities, import 
and export structure of firms, competitiveness of the input and output markets. 
4.2.3 Empirical evidence on exchange rate exposure and trade at micro-level 
Focusing on firms, rather than on aggregates helps to address the problem of 
endogeneity arising from the feedback effects of aggregate trade flows on exchange rates. 
Abbott et al. (2001) examined the impact of exchange rate volatility on UK exports in the 
period of floating sterling 1973Q2- 1990Q3. The results showed that long-run exchange 
rate variability did not have any significant influence on UK export volumes. Vita and 
Abbott (2004) investigated the impact of exchange rate volatility on UK exports to EU 
countries. They used monthly data for the period 1993m1 to 2001m6 divided by market of 
destination and sectors. Their results at both aggregate and sectoral level showed that UK 
exports to EU14 were income elastic, relative price inelastic and largely unaffected by 
short-term exchange rate volatility. While, long-term measure of volatility showed a 
negative and significant influence on UK exports to EU countries. 
Harchaoui et al. (2005) used industry-level data for 22 Canadian manufacturing 
industries to examine the relation between exchange rates and investment during 1981-97. 
The results showed that there was an insignificant effect of exchange rates on total 
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investments. Using sectoral data, Byrne et al. (2008) studied the impact of exchange rate 
volatility on the volume of bilateral US trade. Their findings showed that by 
distinguishing trade into differentiated goods and homogeneous goods, exchange rate 
volatility has a significant and negative effect across different sectors, with stronger effect 
for exports of differentiated goods. 
Todani and Munyama (2005) examined the characteristics of short-term South 
African exchange rate volatility and investigated its impact on South African export flows 
for the period 1984 to 2004. The results showed that there was no significant relationship 
between exchange rate volatility and export flows in South Africa or when a significant 
relationship exists, it was positive. Muûls (2008) analysed the interaction between credit 
constraints and export behaviour at firm-level. The results showed that the chances of 
firms being exporters were higher if they enjoyed lower credit constraints and higher 
productivity levels. Further, an exchange rate appreciation influences existing exporters to 
reduce their exports, entry of credit constrained exporters and exit of less productive 
exporters. 
Greenaway et al. (2006) studied the effect of exchange rate movements on firms’ 
decisions on entry, exit and export share. The results on UK manufacturing firms showed 
that exchange rate movements had little impact on firms’ export participation and exit 
decisions. On the other hand, it had a significant impact on export share of firms after 
entering  export markets. While analysing the export behaviour of multinational firms, 
they found that the export behaviour of these firms were less sensitive to exchange rate 
changes compared to the indigenous firms. 
Greenaway et al. (2007) used a panel of 9292 UK manufacturing firms over the period 
of 1993-2003 to explore the link between firms’ export market participation and financial 
health. The results showed that exporters displayed better financial health than non-
exporters. Similarly, continuous exporters were financially better-off compared to the 
starters. Further, they did not find any evidence that firms with better ex-ante financial 
health were more likely to start exporting. Greenaway and Kneller (2008) focused on 
exporting UK manufacturing firms in the period of 1988-2002 in order to isolate the 
impact of participation in export markets. They found that the proportion of UK firms in 
the exports market had increased in recent years. Regional and industry agglomerations 
were important for successful entry of new exporters. Finally, these exporters were also 
larger and had higher productivity. 
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Greenaway et al. (2010) studied the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on firm 
decisions on export market entry and export intensity for UK manufacturing firms from 
1988 to 2004. The results showed that exchange rate uncertainty has little impact on 
firms’ export participation but a major impact on export intensity. Greenaway et al. 
(2010b) studied the effect of exchange rate changes on firms’ export decisions. They 
extended the analysis by considering the changes in imported intermediaries. The results 
showed that the negative impact of exchange rate on exports of existing exporters is lower 
in the industries which import a larger share of their intermediate inputs. Taking into 
account firm-level heterogeneity, they found that larger firms respond more to the changes 
in the imported input-weighted exchange rate, while firms with the greatest export sales 
are affected less. 
Berthou and Fontagné (2008) studied the effects of introduction of the Euro on trade. 
Using French firm-level exports data over a period of 1998-2003, they computed intensive 
and extensive margins of exports. The estimated results showed the existence of a 
differentiated effect of the Euro on French exports. Finally, they did not find any 
differentiated effect of the Euro between Eurozone and non-Eurozone destinations, 
suggesting that the Euro had a positive effect on French exports to non-Eurozone 
countries. Solakoglu et al. (2008) used annual firm-level data for 500 firms in Turkey for 
the years 2001 and 2003 to study the relationship between real exports and exchange rate 
volatility. The results showed that there was no negative or positive relationship between 
volatility and real exports. Further, they found that level of international activity and firm 
size did not influence the volatility effect on exports but firms used import revenue to 
lower exchange rate exposure. 
Bellone et al. (2010) analysed the relationship between financial constraints and 
firms’ export behaviour. The results showed that firms which are financially healthy are 
more likely to become exporters and financial constraints act as barriers to export 
participation. Firms which have better access to external finance are more likely to start 
exporting. Berman and Héricourt (2010) used a large cross-country and firm-level data of 
nine developing and emerging economies to study the effect of financial factors on firms’ 
exporting decisions and exporting volumes. The results showed that firms’ access to 
finance plays an important role in their entry decision to enter the export market. 
However, better financial health does not increase the probability of a firm remaining in 
the exporting market. They further find that productivity is an important determinant of 
exporting decision of firms if firms have better access to external finance. Finally, they 
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found that an improvement in a country’s financial development has a positive impact on 
both number of exporters and exporters’ selection process. 
Using a firm-level data base, Berman and Héricourt (2011) found that currency 
depreciation had two opposite effects on exports for firms which were indebted in foreign 
currency. It included a pro-competitive effect which increased both the amount of exports 
by firms and the number of firms. While, a balance-sheet effect forced firms to leave the 
export market and reduce the number of firms. These results explained the negative 
relationship of trade after the emerging market crises and gave a finance-based empirical 
foundation to the “exchange rate disconnect puzzle". 
Berman et al. (2012) presented a model to analyse the reaction of exporters to 
exchange rate changes in the presence of distribution costs in the export market. Using 
French firm-level data for 1995-2005 with destination-specific export values and volumes, 
they showed that high performance firms reacted to depreciation by increasing their 
export price instead of export volumes.  
The firm-level analysis of Taglioni (2012) provided a pessimistic result of a direct 
negative relationship between exchange rate appreciation and export growth in the short-
run. The author gave the argument that the impact of exchange rate appreciation on trade 
differed across intensive and extensive margins of trade. The author also found evidence 
which supported the offsetting effects of a change in the exchange rate on different 
margins of trade using firm-level data on Chile, Macedonia, Pakistan, and Turkey. 
Cheung and Sengupta (2013) investigated the real effective exchange rate (REER) 
effects on the share of exports of Indian non-financial sector firms for the period 2000–
2010. Their main findings showed that there was a significant negative impact of 
exchange rate volatility on export shares of Indian firms. Also, Indian firms which had 
smaller shares of exports had stronger response to REER volatility and change. 
Héricourt and Poncet (2013) analysed 100,000 Chinese exporters over the 2000–2006 
period to study the impact of real exchange rate volatility on export performance. They 
confirmed a deterring effect of exchange rate volatility on trade. They extended this 
analysis and highlighted the importance of financial constraints in determining the macro-
effect of REER volatility in real outcomes. 
Manova et al. (2011) used Chinese exports data at firm-product-destination level to 
investigate how comparative advantage of firms reflected local credit constraints. They 
showed that foreign-owned firms and joint ventures displayed better export performance 
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compared to private domestic firms, with a greater advantage in sectors with higher 
financial vulnerability. They further found that private Chinese firms were more 
successful exporters than state-owned enterprises in financially dependent industries. 
Caggese and Cuñat (2013) developed a dynamic model which showed that financial 
frictions affected decisions of new firms to enter the domestic market along with the 
riskiness of operating firms. In particular, the model predicted that financial frictions 
reduced the ability of firms to finance the fixed costs of entering the export market. 
Further, they predicted that financing frictions reduced the aggregate productivity gains 
encouraged by trade liberalisation by 30%-50% as they distorted the selection into export 
of the most productive firms. 
Caglayan and Demir (2014) investigated the effects of exchange rate volatility on 
productivity growth of manufacturing firms with heterogeneous access to debt, domestic 
and foreign equity markets in Turkey. They found that volatility had a negative effect on 
productivity growth even if firms had better access to debt and equity markets. They also 
found that productivity was positively related to credit market access and export-oriented 
firms reacted positively to currency appreciations and were hurt more from volatility. 
4.2.4 Firm-level uncertainty and trade-openness 
Over the past thirty years, a decline in the aggregate volatility has been documented 
by studies such as McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Stock and Watson (2002). While, 
at the firm-level there is an increase in volatility. Firm-level volatility can be measured 
using financial or real data. Comin (2000) and Campbell et al. (2001) used financial data 
for the US and documented an increase in the volatility of idiosyncratic stock returns. Use 
of accounting data showed an increase in idiosyncratic volatility of sales, employment, 
earnings and capital expenditures (Chaney et al., 2002; Comin and Mulani, 2006). 
Buch et al. (2006) provided a theoretical model of trade openness and output 
volatility. They showed that there are mainly three factors which can affect volatility of 
output. Firstly, domestic and exporting firms might react in a different way as they have 
different elasticities of their labour demand and supply. Studies such as Fabbri et al. 
(2003) and Navaretti et al. (2003) showed that multinational firms have higher elasticity 
of labour demand compared to the national firms. Between the period of 1961 and 1991, 
Slaughter (1996) found that the demand for US production labour demand was more 
elastic while there was no significant change in the elasticity of demand for non-
production labour. 
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Secondly, exporting firms are exposed to domestic and foreign demand shocks and 
technology shock in the domestic market. While, domestic firms only face shocks in the 
domestic market. Finally, the correlation between domestic and foreign demand shocks 
affect the exposure of firms which in turn affects output volatility. If the shocks are 
correlated imperfectly across countries, then exporting firms might benefit from the 
diversification effect, reducing the volatility of output. 
There are not many empirical studies which study the link between output volatility 
and export openness at the micro-level. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) studied the 
impact of trade openness and output volatility using an industry-level dataset of 
manufacturing production and trade. Their results showed that sectors which are more 
open to international trade are more volatile and trade is accompanied by increased 
specialisations. Finally, they found that the marginal impact of openness on volatility 
doubled in the last thirty years, which implied that trade became more closely related to 
volatility over time. Buch et al. (2009) studied the link between export openness and 
output volatility at the firm-level. They showed that firm-level volatility was higher than 
the level of aggregate volatility and exporters had a lower volatility of sales compared to 
non-exporters. As firms increase their international interactions by becoming exporters, 
output volatility declines. Finally, they found that smaller firms face higher volatility of 
output. 
Caglayan et al. (2012) investigated the empirical linkages between sales uncertainty 
and firms’ inventory investment behaviour while controlling for firms’ financial strength. 
They found that higher sales uncertainty leads to increase in stocks of inventories. They 
also found that firms with more liquid assets and net trade credit are able to respond to 
demand shocks efficiently. Thus, the effects of sales uncertainty are stronger for firms 
which are financially constrained and smaller in size. García-Vega et al. (2012) studied 
the link between firms’ earnings volatility, financial constraints, survival probabilities and 
export market participation by constructing a dynamic monopolistic competition model 
with heterogeneous firms. Using a panel of 23,674 UK firms over the period 1993–2006, 
they showed that trade enables firms to smooth their sales, resulting in a reduction of 
financial constraints and average probability of bankruptcy. 
Vannoorenberghe (2012) studied the impact of exports in the total sales on firm-level 
volatility. They showed that the share of exports in firms’ total sales has a positive and 
significant impact on the volatility of sales. Further, they pointed that output variations on 
domestic and export market are negatively correlated at the firm-level. Further, it is shown 
that export share of firm influenced domestic sales and export volatility. 
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Di Giovanni et al. (2013) used a database of French firms for the period 1990-2007 to 
study the role individual firms in generating aggregate fluctuations. They created a multi-
sector model of heterogeneous firms which sold to multiple markets in order to justify a 
theoretically-founded decomposition of firms’ annual sales growth rate into different 
components. They found that the main components contributing to aggregate sales 
volatility are the firm-specific factors, mattering as much as the factors which capture 
shocks across firms within a sector or country. 
Denis and Kannan (2013) studied the economic impact of uncertainty shocks in the 
UK during the recent global financial crisis. They found that uncertainty shocks have a 
significant impact on economic activity, mainly on industrial production and GDP in UK. 
They measured uncertainty shocks using stock-market volatility and dispersion of one-
year ahead forecasts of GDP in UK. Firm-level stock volatility is highly correlated with 
the real sales growth volatility (Bloom et al., 2007). Their results showed that the impact 
of uncertainty on industrial production in UK is quite similar to that of the US both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. However, unemployment is less affected by uncertainty 
shocks. Finally, uncertainty shocks reduce industrial production by about a quarter of the 
decline in industrial production during the recent crisis. 
Vannoorenberghe et al. (2014) used Chinese firm-level data to show that small 
exporting firms which sell to more diversified countries have more volatility in exports, 
compared to larger exporters. This is because a more diversified pool of destinations make 
small exporters more likely to export occasionally to some markets, resulting in an 
increase in volatility. Görg and Spaliara (2014a) used firm-level data for UK to 
investigate the link between export market participation decisions and firm growth and 
survival during the recent financial crisis. They showed that the financial variables played 
an important role in predicting export market entry, especially during the financial crisis. 
They also found that exporters mainly continuous exporters performed well compared to 
non-exporters, both in and out of the crisis. 
Overall, the studies above provide a useful background to setup a linkage between 
macroeconomic and firm-level volatility to trade openness of firms. However, the studies 
focused on UK do not take into account the two financial crises of early 1990s and the 
global financial crisis together. 
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4.3 Comparison of UK’s trade scenario during the ERM crisis and the global 
financial crisis 
This section highlights the United Kingdom’s experience during the 1990-93 crisis, as 
well as during the 2008-09 crisis from a macroeconomic aspect. In the early 1990s, the 
UK entered into a recession termed as the ‘European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
crisis’, generated by the double digit inflation of consumer prices from the strong growths 
at the end of 1980s. The tightening of monetary policy resulted in falling of house prices 
and a decline in consumer confidence. Due to UK’s membership of the ERM, its interest 
rates were maintained at higher level and had to face inconsistent monetary tightening 
policy, even though UK’s economy was contracting with higher unemployment rates. 
Thus, when UK decided to withdraw its membership from the ERM in September 1992, 
the interest rates were free to come down (Fender, 2010). 
The ERM crisis was a foreign exchange crisis similar to the previous exchange rate 
crises of 1949 and 1967 where the UK was forced off an unsustainable exchange rate peg. 
During the UK recession of the early 1990s, output fell only during the third quarter of 
1990. However, unemployment rate was at its peak at 10% in 1992. The ERM crisis 
occurred when the UK economy was already emerging from the bottom of the recession 
from the late 1980s. It led to a change in the monetary policy regime of UK to inflation 
targeting regime. The ERM crisis contributed in improving the rate of growth and the 
process of growth more stable in UK (OECD, 2010). The UK recession of 1990s did not 
have much impact on UK’s exports. The trade surplus in Q1 1995 stood at £3.3 billion 
(1.4% of GDP) compared to a trade deficit of £4.6 billion (2.2% of GDP) in the period of 
Q2 1985-Q4 1988. This trade surplus was supported by the increase in exports, declining 
imports and persistent depreciation of Sterling, which reduced the severity of the 
recession (Fender, 2010). 
The recovery from the ERM crisis was fast and impressive as the real GDP growth 
was 3.8% in 1994, with the lowest inflation in 27 years and unemployment fell 
significantly. This stability of output growth and low inflation suggested that the 
widespread structural reforms launched in the 1980s made the UK economy more 
competitive, flexible and less-inflation prone (OECD, 2010). 
Vigfusson et al. (2009) accessed the exchange rate sensitivity of export prices and 
found that the movements in the exchange rate sensitivity of export prices over time have 
been significantly affected by the country and region-specific shocks such as the Asian 
financial crisis (for emerging Asia), deepening integration with the United States (for 
Canada), and the effects of the 1992 ERM crisis (for the United Kingdom). For the United 
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Kingdom, the rolling regression estimates of Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) 
from a ten-year window showed an upward trend in the exchange rate sensitivity through 
much of the sample period, but it is rapidly reversed in the early 2003. The decline in the 
exchange rate sensitivity of UK export prices at that time reflected that the impact of the 
1992 ERM crisis had finally rolled out of the sample. 
In contrast, the recent financial crisis of 2008 was a banking crisis which led to an 
economic crisis. This crisis was global caused by the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage 
market in the US. There has been an exceptional drop in the world trade during the last 
quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. This drop in world exports was due to a 
sharp deterioration of worldwide demand and activity, which was severe in the rich club 
of OECD countries (Araújo and Oliveira-Martins, 2011). Limited availability of trade 
credit and financial shortages may have led to higher risk aversion and negative 
confidence effects, which is another important determinant of the global downturn 
(Auboin, 2009; Bricongne et al., 2012). 
OECD (2010) pointed out that the UK in particular was hit the hardest from the global 
financial crisis as the economy was exposed to the crisis due to its large financial sector 
and strong cross-border linkages through trade. On the trade side, export volumes dropped 
by 20% annualised in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. Since the 
global recession, both imports and exports of goods have contracted, reflecting a decline 
in both domestic and foreign demand, respectively. From the last quarter of 1995 till the 
final quarter of 2007, the trade worsened with a deficit of £12.9 billion. As per the recent 
DBIS (2011) report, UK’s imports and exports totalled USD 1256 billion in 2009 which is 
equivalent to 4.3% of world trade. From 2008 to 2009, UK’s exports dropped by 22.1% in 
USD and imports by 22.5% in USD. Following the final quarter of 2007, the trade deficit 
narrowed as both imports and exports fell due to contraction in both domestic and foreign 
demands in the global recession of 2008. The UK had a persistent downturn than the 
majority of OECD economies and the effective sterling exchange rate fell by 20% in the 
second half of the 2008 (Fender, 2010). 
In the ERM crisis the government did not implement any extraordinary measures but 
in the present global crisis UK used a set of extraordinary measures. Since UK is a part of 
the EU, EU issued a set of guidelines early in the crisis to preserve the financial stability 
and ensure fair competition. The assistance implemented in UK during the global 
financial crisis included liquidity support provided by the Bank of England. During the 
global crisis, it was difficult for both banks and non-financial firms to raise money from 
the bond markets and bank lending was also under serious pressure. Hence, Bank of 
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England provided easy credit by buying high quality commercial debt form the secondary 
market (OECD, 2010). 
The evidence above provides an analysis of the impact of the two financial crises in 
UK. Further, this chapter explores the relationship between both exchange rate and firm-
level volatility on trade taking into account firm-level heterogeneity and two recent 
financial crises. In the following sections this chapter provides the estimation strategy and 
data. 
4.4 Econometric background of fixed effects estimation 
Consider the linear unobserved effects model for 𝑇 time periods: 
    𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑡 = 1, … … . . , 𝑇     (20) 
The 𝑇 equations in the above model can be written down as: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑇 + 𝑢𝑖 
where 𝒋𝑻 is still the 𝑇 x 1 vector of ones. This equation represents a single random draw 
from the cross section. 
The fixed effects assumptions are the following: 
Assumption 1: E (𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖, 𝑐𝑖) = 0, 𝑡 = 1, … … . . , 𝑇. 
This assumption is of strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables conditional on the 
unobserved effect, 𝑐𝑖. Estimating 𝛽 under this assumption transforms the equation by 
eliminating the unobserved effect 𝑐𝑖. The fixed effects transformation, also called the 
within transformation, is obtained by first averaging the equation over 𝑡 = 1, … … . . , 𝑇 to 
get cross section equation: 
      ?̅? = ?̅?𝑖𝛽+𝑐𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖         (21) 
where ?̅?𝑖 = 𝑇
−1 ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,  ?̅?𝑖= 𝑇
−1 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 , and  ?̅?𝑖= 𝑇
−1 ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 . Subtracting equation 
(21) from equation (20) for each t gives the fixed effects (FE) transformed equation, 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 
or 
?̈?𝑖𝑡 = ?̈?𝑖𝑡𝛽 + ?̈?𝑖𝑡,   𝑡 = 1,2, … … . , 𝑇 
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where ?̈?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖, ?̈?𝑖𝑡= 𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 and ?̈?𝑖𝑡= 𝑢𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖. The time demeaning removed the 
individual specific effect 𝑐𝑖. 
Assumption 2: To ensure that the FE estimator is asymptotically well behaved, a standard 
rank condition on the matrix of time-demeaned explanatory variables is required: 
rank (∑ 𝐸(𝑥′̈ 𝑖𝑡?̈?𝑖𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 ) = rank [𝐸(𝑿
′̈
𝑖𝑡?̈?𝑖𝑡] = K. 
If 𝑥𝑖𝑡 includes an element that does not vary over time for any i, then the corresponding 
element in ?̈?𝑖𝑡 is identically zero for all t and any draw from the cross sections. The fixed 
effects estimator can be expressed as 
?̂?𝐹𝐸 = (∑ 𝑋′̈ 𝑖?̈?𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
)
−1
(∑ 𝑋′̈ 𝑖?̈?𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
) = (∑ ∑ 𝑥′̈ 𝑖𝑡?̈?𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
)
−1
(∑ ∑ 𝑥′̈ 𝑖𝑡?̈?𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
) 
It is also called the within estimator as it makes use of the time variation within each cross 
section (Wooldridge, 2002). 
4.5 Empirical Methodology 
4.5.1 Baseline Model 
This section studies the impact of both macroeconomic and firm-level volatility on 
firms’ exporting decisions. The baseline model borrows mainly from Greenaway et al. 
(2010). Following Greenaway et al. (2010), the dependent variable of firm-level exports is 
measured as the natural logarithm of real export sales. The following baseline model is 
estimated: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠)𝒾𝓉 =  𝒶0 + 𝒶1𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝓉+𝒶2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝒾𝓉 + 𝑎3𝒳𝒾𝓉 + ℯ𝒾𝓉,     (22) 
where 𝒾 = 1, 2, …., N refers to the cross-section of units (firms in this case), for time 
period 𝓉 = 1, 2, …., T. 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 refers to the exchange rate uncertainty at the 
macro-level. Using monthly real exchange rate series
51
, a GARCH (1,1) model is 
implemented and the monthly measures are annualised to match the frequency of the 
panel data (Caglayan and Demir, 2014)
52
. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is measured by employment 
growth (Comin and Philippon, 2005). Following Buch et al. (2009), it is calculated as the 
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 Real exchange rates are more accurate and superior indicators of changes in competitiveness which are 
calculated after correcting for the movements in nominal exchange rates for inflation differentials. Effective 
exchange rate changes are not measured against one particular currency, but instead use an average index of 
a whole basket of currencies, each weighted according to the issuing countries' respective importance as a 
trade partner (UNCTAD, 2012). 
52
 This measure resembles the volatility clustering which is often found in high frequency financial series 
(Caglayan and Demir, 2014). 
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squared residual of a regression of employment growth on its own lagged values and a set 
of time fixed effects
53
. The baseline model is estimated using firm fixed effects to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm-level. Time dummies are included to control for 
cyclical factors originating from the business cycle. In addition, industry dummies are 
also included that control for fixed effects across industries. Finally, X is a vector which 
includes other explanatory variables at the firm-level, ℯ𝒾𝓉 are the disturbance terms. 
Vector X contains various factors which influence firm-level exports in line with the 
literature. Firms’ decision to export is based on a combination of sunk cost and firm-level 
factors (Melitz, 2003). Exporting is associated with additional upfront expenditures that 
make production for foreign markets more dependent on external financing. Sunk costs of 
trade involve collecting information about the profitability of potential export markets; 
setting up and maintaining foreign distribution networks; making market-specific 
investments in capacity, product customisation and regulatory compliance (Manova, 
2013). 
To begin with firm specific characteristics, firm size is an important determinant of 
exports. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total real assets (Mizen and 
Tsoukas, 2014). Firms which are larger in size are able to cope well with financial 
constraints and have greater access to external funds, which is necessary to finance the 
sunk and fixed costs of exports (Cheung and Sengupta, 2013). Labour productivity of 
firms is calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of total real sales to total number of 
employees (Greenaway et al., 2010b). This variable also captures the efficiency of the 
firms
54
. Efficient firms are more likely to handle unfavourable movements in exchange 
rates and output levels in a better way. Also, productivity of firms is one of the important 
determinants of export market decision as more productive firms are less likely to exit the 
market (Görg and Spaliara, 2013). Following Greenaway et al. (2010b), firm’s age is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years after establishment. Firms’ age 
is an important factor affecting sales growth as older firms might have more experience 
advantages enabling them to sustain international growth (Autio et al., 2000). Finally, 
collateral is measured as the ratio of net tangible assets to total assets, which captures the 
ability of firms to borrow externally (Cheung and Sengupta, 2013). According to Manova 
(2013), higher collateralised firms are able to offset potential credit constraints and 
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 These regressions help to avoid growth rates from autocorrelation dynamics and from macroeconomic 
development affecting all firms uniformly. Thus, this measure gives a ‘conditional’ idiosyncratic volatility 
of output growth. 
54
 Total factor productivity could not be estimated using the methodology suggested by Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) due to missing data for wages and salaries in the dataset. 
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expand exports. All time-varying firm-level variables are lagged by one period to reduce 
possible simultaneity problems. 
4.5.2 Accounting for the financial constraints 
Since all firms are not expected to be equally affected by the adversities of exchange 
rate and firm-level volatility, firm-level heterogeneity is taken into account. Both 
exchange rate and firm-level volatility are expected to increase the transaction and 
variable costs for exporters, resulting in an increase in uncertainty for exporter’s earnings 
(Ethier, 1973). Firms are classified into constrained and unconstrained firms using two 
criteria- size and profits. Size is measured by the log of real sales and profits are measured 
by the real profit and loss for each period. Firms with lower sales and less profits are 
considered as financially constrained. More profitable firms are able to service their debts 
and thus pay lower spreads (Santos, 2010). To test this hypothesis, a dummy for 
constrained firms (Cons) is constructed which takes value one if real sales and profits of 
firms are below the 50th percentile of the distribution of all firms in the sample period, 
and zero otherwise. This dummy is then interacted with the volatility measures to capture 
the impact of volatility on export sales for constrained and unconstrained firms. 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝑎2𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖) + 𝑎3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗
                                    𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝑎4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝑎5𝒳𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                  (23) 
If the interaction terms for both exchange rate and firm volatility are significantly 
different from one another, then it can be concluded that the impact of volatility on firms’ 
export sales are varied across constrained and unconstrained firms. 
4.5.3 Accounting for firm heterogeneity during financial crises 
The sample included in this chapter spans across two important financial crises in the 
UK, namely the ERM crisis and the most recent global financial crisis. Therefore, it 
provides an interesting setup to explore the relationship between volatility and firm-level 
exports during the two separate crises periods for constrained and unconstrained firms. 
Dummies for the two separate crises (Crisis) are constructed and then interacted with the 
main volatility measures and constrained (Cons) dummy to study the sensitivity of exports 
to different levels of uncertainties during extreme economic situations for constrained and 
unconstrained firms. The estimated models are represented as: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠)𝒾𝓉 =  𝒶0 +  𝒶1𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝓉 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝒶2𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝓉 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖) +
                                              𝒶3 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝓉 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖  + 𝒶4 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝓉 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡) ∗
                                              (1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖) +𝒶5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝒾𝓉 + 𝑎6𝒳𝒾𝓉 + ℯ𝒾𝓉    (24) 
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𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠)𝒾𝓉 =  𝒶0 +  𝒶1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝓉 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝒶2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝓉 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖) +
                                               𝒶3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝓉 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖  + 𝒶4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝓉 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡) ∗
                                               (1 −  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖) +𝒶5𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝒾𝓉 + 𝑎6𝒳𝒾𝓉 + ℯ𝒾𝓉   (25) 
where 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 = ERM crisis takes the value one for the periods 1990-1993, and zero for 
the periods 1994-2006
55
. Evidence shows that the ERM crisis of early 1990s was not a 
global phenomenon and most of the trade partners of UK were experiencing strong 
growth. This led to higher demand of UK exports, resulting in a strong growth of UK 
exports even in crisis (Fender, 2010).  𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 = Global financial crisis takes the value one 
for the period 2007-2009, and zero for the period 1994-2006. In contrast to the ERM 
recession of 1990s, the effect of 2008 global recession was quite different. During the 
global financial crisis, the UK faced a persistent downward trend in export growth due to 
contraction in both domestic and foreign demands (Fender, 2010). 
If the interaction terms during the crisis are significantly different from the same terms 
outside of the crisis, then it can be concluded that the impact of volatility on firms’ 
exports are diverse for constrained and unconstrained firms across different crises and 
tranquil periods. 
4.6 Data and summary statistics 
4.6.1 The dataset 
The balance sheet and financial data of UK firms are taken from the Financial 
Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. According to the UK Companies Act, all limited 
liabilities companies are required to submit their annual financial statements during a 
specific period of time from the year-end date to Companies House. Companies house 
then cautiously inspects this information which is then made available to public. One of 
the leading providers of legal information in the UK, named Jordan, then collects this data 
from Companies house. Finally, Bureau van Dijk collects this database from Jordan and 
provides it for commercial use through the FAME database. 
The FAME database provides data on active and inactive, public and private limited 
liability firms for the maximum period of 10 years. The main advantage of this database is 
that it provides both balance-sheet and off balance-sheet data on income statements, profit 
and loss account, cash flow statements and information about ownership. This database 
includes forms which operate in various industries such as agriculture, manufacturing, 
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 Studies such as Vaitlingam (2009) and OECD (2010) highlight the ERM crisis periods as 1990-1993. 
While, taking into account the ERM crisis, the data years of the global financial crisis are removed from the 
sample. Similarly, we remove the ERM crisis years from the sample when considering the global financial 
crisis. 
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construction, forestry and mining, retail and wholesale, hotels and restaurants, the public 
sector, the financial sector, and the regulated utility industry. 
FAME is a database of over nine million companies in the UK and Ireland in a 
detailed format with up to ten years of data. The database helps to search by a wide 
selection of criteria such as name, code, location, size, and many others. The majority of 
UK firms in the dataset are not traded on the stock market or quoted on other exchanges 
such as the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and the Off-Exchange (OFEX) market. 
Unquoted firms are characterised by adverse financial conditions such as poor solvency, 
short track record and low real assets, compared to quoted firms which are generally 
larger in size with better financial health and long-established credit ratings (Greenaway 
et al., 2007). In addition, the data for the macroeconomic variables are drawn from the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) database. 
The firms included in the dataset operate in the UK manufacturing sector. The dataset 
used in this chapter is for the period 1990-2009, which is constructed by combining three 
different data files from 1989-1998, 1994-2004 and 2000-2009. The dataset for the period 
1989-1998 is obtained from FAME’s archived database, while the datasets for the period 
1994-2004 and 2000-2009 are directly downloaded from the FAME database available 
online. The archived data includes the years of the ERM crisis while the data downloaded 
from FAME includes the time period of the recent global financial crisis. Thus, 
combination of these two crises periods provides an interesting setup for the empirical 
study of this chapter. Following normal selection criteria, firm-years with negative export 
sales are excluded from the data. In addition, observations in the 1% from upper and 
lower tails of the distribution of the financial variables are excluded to control for the 
outliers. Finally, the panel has an unbalanced structure with 97,380 annual observations of 
firm-level real export sales for 17,251 firms over the period of 1990-2009 in different 
sectors such as manufacturing, utilities, resources, services and financials. 
4.6.2 Summary statistics 
Table 4.1 reports the level of exports, exchange rate and firm volatility and other firm 
factors in the two main crises periods- ERM crisis and global financial crisis. The values 
for the whole sample (column 1); the ERM and the global financial crises (columns 2 and 
3) and the p-value for the test of equality of means (column 4) are given in the table. The 
statistics show that the level of exports was much lower during the ERM crisis, compared 
to the global financial crisis. With respect to volatility, exchange rate volatility is much 
higher during the ERM crisis and firm-level volatility is higher during the global financial 
crisis. Finally, other control variables also show a significant difference across both the 
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crises periods. The p-values show a significant difference between the two crises periods 
at 5% level. 
Further, Table 4.2 shows the summary statistics taking into account firm-level 
heterogeneity in the model. The values for smaller and larger firms (columns 1 and 2); a 
p-value for the test of equality of means (column 3); for lower and higher profit firms 
(columns 4 and 5); a p-value for the test of equality of means (column 6) are provided in 
the table. To begin with, the statistics show that unconstrained firms with larger size and 
more profits enjoy higher exports, lower firm-level volatility, larger firm size, higher 
productivity, age and collateral. The p-value also shows a significant difference in the 
mean values of all the variables between constrained and unconstrained firms at 1% level. 
Overall, the summary statistics indicate two main points. Firstly, UK firms faced 
higher exchange rate volatility during the ERM crisis, while they faced higher firm 
volatility during the global financial crisis. Secondly, unconstrained firms have better 
financial health and are benefited from higher firm-level exports. Following sections 
provide formal regression tests on the relationship between macro and firm-level volatility 
and firms’ exports for constrained and unconstrained firms during the two crises. 
4.7 Empirical results 
4.7.1 Baseline model 
This section explores the relationship between volatility at the macro and micro levels 
and real exports of firms. The results of the fixed effects model are reported in Table 4.3. 
The estimates show negative and significant influences of exchange rate and firm-level 
volatility on firms’ exports. To ascertain the magnitude of volatility, percentage point 
effects are calculated by dividing the coefficient value (marginal effect) with the predicted 
probability of the model. Therefore, a 1% increase in exchange rate volatility leads to a 
1.70% reduction in firms’ exports. An identical increase in firm-level volatility reduces 
exports by 0.72%. This implies that firms experiencing high exchange rate and firm 
volatility face adverse effects on trade. These results for exchange rate volatility are very 
much in line with the previous studies on the UK by Greenaway et al. (2010b). Negative 
effects of exchange rate appreciations are also reported in studies such as Campa (2004), 
Das et al. (2007) and Greenaway et al. (2008). This implies that movements in exchange 
rates can affect the profits of firms and hence, firms are more likely to reduce exports in 
order to minimise the risk exposure in the absence of hedging incentives (Hooper and 
Kohlhagen, 1978; Kawai and Zilcha, 1986). The negative effect of firm-level volatility on 
exports highlights that firms facing higher volatility are more risky and have low market 
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value, thus, they have difficulty in obtaining external finance at lower costs (García-Vega 
et al., 2012). Credit constraints distort the level of firm exports as firms lower their export 
quantities in order to reduce the amount of external capital they need for variable costs 
(Manova, 2013). Further, Caggese and Cuñat (2013) predicted that financial constraints 
can reduce the aggregate productivity gains from trade liberalisation by 30% to 50% as 
they destruct the selection of the most productive firms into export market. 
Focusing on other firm-level variables, the results show a positive and significant 
impact of firm size on firms’ exports. These results imply that firms which are larger in 
size are more likely to export. This is because larger firms have more resources to initiate 
other activities such as entering into international markets (Wagner, 2001; Bonaccorsi, 
1992). Firms’ productivity and age do not show any significant impact on export sales of 
firms. While, firms’ collateral shows a significant and positive impact on firms’ exports at 
1% level of significance. Firms with higher collateral are more likely to export as they are 
in a better financial health. Further, firms with higher collateral value face lower external 
finance premium which allows them to invest more in assets that can further serve as 
collateral for borrowing (Jansen and Tsai, 2010; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
4.7.2 Accounting for the financial crises 
This section deals with the relationship between volatility and firms’ exports for 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Table 4.4 provides results for two main 
classifications- size and profits in columns 1 and 2 respectively. The volatility coefficients 
interacted with the dummy variables Cons and ( 1 - C o n s )  are reported in the table. The 
test of equalities of exchange rate and firm-level volatility reported at the foot of the table 
provide the difference in the coefficient values for constrained and unconstrained firms. 
The estimation results show that the exports of constrained firms are more adversely 
affected by the impact of exchange rate and firm-level volatility, compared to the 
unconstrained firms. In economic terms, a 1% increase in exchange rate and firm-level 
volatility reduces export sales of constrained firms by 2.03% - 3.4% and 2.66% - 2.68% 
respectively. While for unconstrained firms export sales are reduced by 1.32% - 1.51% 
due to a 1% increase in exchange rate volatility and firm-level volatility had insignificant 
impact. The test of equality for constrained and unconstrained firms shows a significant 
difference between the coefficient values at 1% level of significance for exchange rate and 
firm-level volatility. These results are in line with Héricourt and Poncet (2013) which 
highlight that firms which are financially vulnerable face higher exchange rate volatility. 
The empirical results also show similar evidence for firm-level volatility. Studies such as 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) show that higher firm-level volatility implies higher 
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transaction costs with stakeholders. Also, increase in firm volatility reduces firms’ access 
to external finance and increases their costs of borrowing (Minton and Schrand, 1999). 
Thus, firms which face lower credit constraints are more likely to export more (Muûls, 
2008). 
Thus, the real export sales of constrained firms are more adversely affected by 
exchange rate and firm-level uncertainty as compared to their unconstrained counterparts. 
4.7.3 Accounting for the financial constraints during crises 
This section addresses the response during two crises by examining the sensitivity of 
exchange rate and firm-level volatility to firms’ exports across constrained and 
unconstrained firms. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report the results of the ERM crisis and the global 
financial crisis respectively. The volatility coefficients interacted with the constrained 
(Cons) and Crisis dummy variables are reported in the tables. The test of equalities 
reported at the foot of the tables provide the difference in the coefficient values of 
exchange rate and firm-level volatility for constrained and unconstrained firms during 
crisis and non-crisis periods. 
Table 4.5 provides the interaction results of exchange rate volatility with ERM crisis, 
Cons and (1-Cons) dummy (columns 1 and 2) and the interaction of firm-level volatility 
with ERM crisis, Cons and (1-Cons) dummy (columns 3 and 4). To begin with columns 1 
and 2, during the ERM crisis periods the results show a negative and significant impact of 
exchange rate volatility on export sales of constrained firms, while unconstrained firms 
majorly have an insignificant effect of exchange rate volatility. During the non-ERM 
crisis periods, the results show a negative and significant impact of exchange rate 
volatility but only for firms which are smaller in size. While, unconstrained firms do not 
have face any negative impact of exchange rate volatility on their export sales during non-
crisis periods. In economic terms, a 1% increase in exchange rate volatility reduces export 
sales of constrained firms by 0.66% - 2.04% during the ERM crisis periods. The test of 
equality for exchange rate volatility also shows a significant difference between the 
coefficient values at 1% level for constrained and unconstrained firms during ERM crisis 
and non-ERM crisis periods in majority of the cases. 
Next, the results in columns 3 and 4 do not show a consistent significant and negative 
impact of firm-level volatility on constrained and unconstrained firms during the ERM 
crisis. While during the non-ERM crisis periods, constrained firms face a negative and 
significant impact of firm-level volatility on real export sales. A 1% increase in firm-level 
volatility reduces the real export sales of constrained firms by 4.03% - 4.33%. 
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Unconstrained firms do not face any negative impact of firm-level volatility during the 
non-ERM crisis periods. The test of equality also shows a significant difference between 
the coefficient values of firm-level volatility at 1% level of significance for constrained 
and unconstrained firms during the crisis and non-crisis periods. The other control 
variables in the model are also mostly significant and behave as conjectured.  
Moving to the global financial crisis, results are given in Table 4.6. The table provides 
the interaction of exchange rate volatility with Global crisis, Cons and (1-Cons) dummy 
(columns 1 and 2) and the interaction of firm-level volatility with Global crisis, Cons and 
(1-Cons) dummy (columns 3 and 4). Starting with columns 1 and 2, the results do not 
show consistent negative and significant impact of exchange rate volatility for constrained 
and unconstrained firms during both the global crisis and non-global crisis periods. 
Moving to the columns 3 and 4, the results show a highly significant and negative impact 
of firm-level volatility for constrained firms as compared to unconstrained firms during 
both the global crisis and non-global crisis periods. A 1% increase in firm-level volatility 
reduces real export sales of constrained firms by 1.86% - 2.31% during the global crisis as 
compared to unconstrained firms. An identical increase in firm-level volatility reduces 
export sales of constrained firms by 3.09% - 3.84% during non- global crisis periods as 
compared to unconstrained firms. The test of equality given at the bottom of the table 
shows a significant difference in the coefficient values of firm-level volatility during crisis 
and non-crisis periods for financially constrained and unconstrained firms at 1% level. 
In summary, it can be concluded that the adverse impact of exchange rate volatility on 
export sales was more significant for constrained firms during the ERM crisis, compared 
to unconstrained firms. While during the global financial crisis, the impact of exchange 
rate volatility was not very significant for both constrained and unconstrained firms. 
According to Fender (2010), the low value of sterling in the ERM crisis provided support 
to the UK’s total trade balance with strong export growth in capital goods, motor vehicles 
and other consumer goods. These persistent positive effects from net-trade reduced the 
severity of the recession of early 1990s. In contrast, Hardie et al. (2013) highlighted that 
even though the effective sterling exchange rate declined by more than 25% between 
2007Q3 and 2009Q1, the balance of trade in goods and services remained unchanged 
during and after the depreciation. Further, Levchenko et al. (2010) pointed out that the 
overall trade wedge in UK displayed only a small departure from the norm in the global 
crisis, implying that the behaviour of imports is rationalised by movements in aggregate 
demand and relative price movements. 
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On the contrary, the adverse impact of firm-level volatility on exports of constrained 
firms was much significant during the global financial crisis, compared to the ERM crisis. 
Görg and Spaliara (2013) showed that UK firms faced deterioration in their financial 
position which led to an increase in the hazard of export exit during the recent global 
financial crisis. Further, Denis and Kannan (2013) highlight that the impact of uncertainty 
shocks on economic activity in the UK is extremely significant during the recent global 
financial crisis. Uncertainty shocks reduced industrial production and GDP by 0.6 and 0.3 
percent respectively, during the recent financial crisis period. Chowla et al. (2014) also 
showed that United Kingdom was adversely affected by increase in risk and uncertainty 
associated with the global financial crisis. 
4.8 Robustness tests 
4.8.1 Endogeneity concerns 
The main results only partly address the problem of endogeneity and selection bias. 
Hence, following Buch et al. (2009) and Greenaway et al. (2007), the results of two-step 
GMM estimations are reported in this section to deal with the problem of regressor 
endogeneity. The identification of the impact of exchange rate and firm-level volatility 
requires the availability of exogenous instruments that are correlated with volatility, but 
do not directly affect the firm-level exports. The volatility of money supply is proposed 
(Clark et al., 2004; Chit et al., 2010) as a plausible exogenous instrument for exchange 
rate volatility. The motivation of using the standard deviation of the relative money 
supply as an instrument for the exchange rate volatility is that although relative money 
supplies are highly correlated with exchange rate, the monetary policies are less affected 
by export considerations (Frankel and Wei, 1993). In addition, lagged firm-level volatility 
is used as a reasonable instrument for firm-level volatility (Bo, 2001). With respect to all 
other control variables, their own values lagged twice and more are used as the 
instruments (Greenaway et al., 2007). The validity of the instruments is also checked 
using various diagnostic tests for weak instruments and over-identification, which are 
reported at the foot of the table. 
The results are reported in Table 4.7. The baseline model results mentioned in Panel 1 
confirm a negative and significant impact of exchange rate and firm-level volatility on 
firms’ exports. The results for constrained and unconstrained firms are mentioned in Panel 
2. The results again show that financially constrained firms face a negative and significant 
impact of both exchange rate and firm-level volatility on exports. While the impact of 
both macro and micro-level volatility on unconstrained firms is mainly insignificant. 
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Further, Panel 3 provides the results for constrained and unconstrained firms during the 
ERM crisis. The results again confirm that the impact of exchange rate volatility on export 
sales is highly significant for constrained and unconstrained firms with a significant 
difference in the coefficient values at 1% level. On the contrary, firm-level volatility had 
insignificant impact on export sales of constrained and unconstrained firms during the 
ERM crisis. Finally, Panel 4 shows the results for the global financial crisis. These results 
confirm that exchange rate volatility had insignificant impact on export sales of 
constrained and unconstrained firms during the global crisis. While the impact of firm-
level volatility was much adverse and significant on the export sales of constrained firms 
during the global financial crisis. The test of equality confirms a significant difference in 
the coefficient values of firm volatility for constrained and unconstrained firms during 
crisis and non-crisis periods at 1% level. 
Regarding the diagnostic tests, the Kleibergen-Paap statistics reject the null hypothesis 
that the equation is underidentified. The Anderson-Rubin and Stock-Wright statistics, 
which are the weak instrument-robust inference tests, does not reject the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero. Finally, the 
Hansen J statistic of the overidentifying restriction also shows that the instruments are 
valid. Hence, it can be concluded that the GMM results provide a reliable robustness 
check to the main results. 
4.8.2 Alternative measures of volatility 
In this section, alternative measures of exchange rate and firm-level volatility are used 
and then the models are re-estimated. Following Cheung and Sengupta (2013), the 
exchange rate volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of monthly exchange rate 
indices of the year
56
. While, firm-level volatility is calculated by using the squared 
residual of a regression of sales growth on its own lagged values and a set of time fixed 
effects (Buch et al., 2009). The results are given in Table 4.8. The results again display a 
negative and significant impact of exchange rate and firm volatility on exports of firms in 
Panel 1. Further in Panel 2, the results show a larger negative and significant impact of 
exchange rate and firm-level volatility on export sales of constrained firms, compared to 
their unconstrained counterparts. Panel 3 provides the results of the ERM crisis which 
show that the negative impact of exchange rate volatility on export sales was significant 
and higher for constrained firms, compared to unconstrained firms. Finally, in Panel 4 the 
results show a negative and significant impact of firm-level volatility on real export sales 
of constrained firms during the global financial crisis as compared to unconstrained firms. 
                                                          
56
 This standard deviation method is also used by Caglayan and Demir (2014), Aghion et al. (2009) and 
Ghosal and Loungani (2000). 
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Thus, it can be confirmed that the main results are upheld even after using alternative 
measures of exchange rate and firm-level volatility. 
4.8.3 Alternative classification of firms 
In the main empirical results, the firms are divided into constrained and unconstrained 
firms using the 50th percentile of the distribution. This section confirms that the results 
are not driven by the way we classify the firms by using a robust classification scheme. 
Following Tsoukas (2011), firms are divided into constrained and unconstrained firms 
using the 25th percentile as a cut-off point in the sample period. Thus, constrained firms 
take value one if their size and profits are below the 25th percentile of the distribution of 
all firms in the sample period, and zero otherwise. The results are given in Table 4.9. 
Panel 1 of Table 4.9 provides the results of exchange rate and firm-level volatility for 
constrained and unconstrained firms. The results show that the export sales of constrained 
firms are adversely affected by the exchange rate and firm-level volatility, compared to 
their unconstrained counterparts. Panel 2 provides the results of the ERM crisis which 
confirm a larger negative and significant impact of exchange rate volatility on export sales 
of constrained firms as compared to unconstrained firms. Finally Panel 3 shows the results 
of the global financial crisis. These results show a significant and negative impact of firm-
level volatility on export sales of constrained firms, while unconstrained firms are mostly 
unaffected. 
Thus, these results confirm that the main results are robust to an alternative 
classification of firms. 
4.9 Conclusion 
Following the build-up of large global imbalances and the outbreak of the financial 
crisis since the mid-2000s, the economic literature on the relationship between aggregate 
and firm-level volatility and trade has evolved. The relationship between exchange rate 
volatility and trade is a complex one and empirical evidence provides mixed evidence. 
However, on average, exchange rate volatility has a negative impact on trade. While, 
firm-level volatility is likely to have a negative impact on firms’ exports as firms facing 
higher volatility have less access to external finance due to increased costs of credit 
(Barnes, 2001). Thus, this chapter explores the link between different volatility at macro 
and firm levels and trade. In addition this chapter also focuses on two important financial 
crises and studies the influence of macro and micro volatility on firms’ exports during 
extreme economic events. 
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Using a unique panel dataset on UK manufacturing firms for the period 1990-2009, 
this chapter analyses the impact of macroeconomic and firm-level volatility on firms’ 
exports. The results show negative and significant effects of exchange rate and firm 
volatility on firm-level exports. After taking into account financial constraints at the firm-
level, the results show that the negative impact of exchange rate and firm volatility on 
exports is higher for constrained firms as compared to unconstrained firms. Further, this 
chapter considers the ERM crisis of early 1990s and the global financial crisis of 2008. 
The results indicate that during the ERM crisis constrained firms face a significant 
adverse impact of exchange rate volatility on exports, while the impact of firm-level 
volatility is mostly insignificant. On the contrary, during the global financial crisis, 
constrained firms face a significant negative impact of firm-level volatility on exports and 
an insignificant impact of exchange rate volatility on exports.  
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Figures 
Figure 4-1: Log of export sales for the period of 1990-2009 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Volatility for the period of 1990-2009 
 
 
  
166 
 
Tables 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics for crises periods 
Explanatory Variables Whole sample ERM crisis Global crisis p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log of exports 3.00 
(2.05) 
2.68 
(2.16) 
3.10 
(1.93) 
0.027 
REER volatility 3.89 
(1.99) 
4.68 
(0.90) 
4.40 
(1.42) 
0.000 
Firm volatility 0.21 
(0.66) 
0.07 
(0.30) 
0.69 
(0.12) 
0.000 
Size 3.47 
(1.70) 
3.28 
(1.68) 
4.10 
(1.40) 
0.000 
Productivity 0.02 
(0.86) 
-0.10 
(0.78) 
-0.21 
(1.17) 
0.000 
Age 2.72 
(1.01) 
2.51 
(1.10) 
2.99 
(0.89) 
0.000 
Collateral 0.28 
(0.20) 
0.30 
(0.19) 
0.23 
(0.20) 
0.000 
 
Notes: The Table reports sample means with standard deviations in parentheses for all the control variables 
used in the empirical analysis. The p-values of a test of the equality of means are reported. REER volatility 
is generated from a Garch (1,1) model using monthly real effective exchange rate (REER); Firm volatility is 
calculated by using the squared residual of a regression of sales growth on its own lagged values and a set 
of time fixed effects; Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total real assets; Productivity refers 
to labour productivity measured as the natural logarithm of real sales per employee; Age is calculated as 
the natural logarithm of the number of years since establishment; Collateral is measured as the ratio of 
tangible assets to total assets. 
 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics for different firm-level classifications 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Small 
firms 
Large 
firms 
p-value Lower 
profits 
Higher 
profits 
p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of exports 1.67 
(1.65) 
3.77 
(1.87) 
0.000 2.46 
(2.06) 
3.33 
(1.98) 
0.000 
REER volatility 3.74 
(2.06) 
3.94 
(1.97) 
0.000 3.75 
(2.14) 
3.94 
(1.94) 
0.000 
Firm volatility 0.24 
(0.75) 
0.20 
(0.61) 
0.000 0.17 
(0.56) 
0.24 
(0.71) 
0.000 
Size 2.74 
(1.18) 
3.76 
(1.79) 
0.000 3.25 
(1.61) 
3.56 
(1.72) 
0.000 
Productivity -0.22 
(0.86) 
0.20 
(0.82) 
0.000 -0.10 
(0.82) 
0.11 
(0.88) 
0.000 
Age 2.72 
(0.95) 
2.73 
(1.03) 
0.010 2.77 
(0.98) 
2.71 
(1.02) 
0.000 
Collateral 0.26 
(0.21) 
0.29 
(0.20) 
0.000 0.28 
(0.20) 
0.28 
(0.20) 
0.000 
 
Notes: The Table reports sample means with standard deviations in parentheses for the all the control 
variables used in the empirical analysis. The p-values of a test of the equality of means are reported. 
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Table 4.3: Baseline model for volatility and exports 
Dependent variable = Log of Exports 
 (1) 
REER volatility -0.052*** 
 (-5.35) 
Firm volatility -0.022** 
 (-2.39) 
Lagged Size 0.422*** 
 (20.12) 
Lagged Productivity -0.014 
 (-1.04) 
Lagged Age -0.034 
 (-0.90) 
Lagged Collateral 0.198*** 
 (2.59) 
Constant 1.201*** 
 (7.31) 
Predicted Probability 3.05 
N 47,917 
R2 0.053 
No. of firms 11,101 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is logarithm of firm-level real export sales. Time dummies and industry 
dummies are included in the models with firm fixed effects. Robust t-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).  
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Table 4.4: The role of financial constraints 
Dependent variable = Log of Exports 
 (1) (2) 
 Size Profits 
REER volatility*Cons -0.104*** -0.062*** 
 (-10.11) (-6.36) 
REER volatility*(1-Cons) -0.040*** -0.046*** 
 (-4.20) (-4.80) 
Firm volatility*Cons -0.081*** -0.082*** 
 (-5.54) (-3.81) 
Firm volatility*(1-Cons) 0.022** -0.006 
 (2.05) (-0.62) 
Lagged Size 0.401*** 0.426*** 
 (19.67) (20.24) 
Lagged Productivity -0.008 -0.012 
 (-0.63) (-0.92) 
Lagged Age -0.035 -0.039 
 (-0.93) (-1.05) 
Lagged Collateral 0.220*** 0.218*** 
 (2.91) (2.86) 
Constant 1.302*** 1.195*** 
 (8.03) (7.27) 
Predicted Probability 3.04 3.05 
N 47,917 47,917 
R2 0.065 0.056 
No. of firms 11,101 11,101 
Test of equality (p.value):   
REER volatility 0.000 0.000 
Firm volatility 0.000 0.001 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 
5% (**) and 10% (*). The ‘Cons’ dummy takes value one if real sales and profits of firms are below the 50th 
percentile of the distribution of all firms in the sample period, and zero otherwise. With respect to the test of 
equality REER volatility gives the test of equality between REER volatility*Cons and REER volatility*(1-
Cons); Firm volatility gives the difference between Firm volatility*Cons and Firm volatility*(1-Cons). Also, 
see notes to Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.5: Firm heterogeneity and the ERM crisis 
Dependent variable = Log of Exports 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Size Profits  Size Profits 
REER volatility* -0.062*** -0.020*** Firm volatility* -0.313*** -0.090 
Crisis*Cons (-7.53) (-2.99) Crisis*Cons (-2.61) (-1.01) 
REER volatility* -0.004 -0.013** Firm volatility* 0.122* 0.170** 
Crisis*(1-Cons) (-0.66) (-2.19) Crisis*(1-Cons) (1.68) (2.07) 
REER volatility* -0.035*** 0.006 Firm volatility* -0.132*** -0.123*** 
(1-Crisis)*Cons (-5.73) (1.05) (1-Crisis)*Cons (-7.18) (-4.52) 
REER volatility* 0.035*** 0.026*** Firm volatility* 0.029** -0.014 
(1-Crisis)*(1-Cons) (7.17) (5.29) (1-Crisis)*(1-Cons) (2.12) (-1.24) 
Firm volatility -0.034*** -0.038*** REER volatility -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (-3.00) (-3.23)  (3.89) (3.87) 
Lagged Size 0.384*** 0.406*** Lagged Size 0.398*** 0.402*** 
 (18.28) (18.79)  (18.76) (18.70) 
Lagged Productivity -0.019 -0.026* Lagged Productivity -0.023 -0.022 
 (-1.37) (-1.81)  (-1.61) (-1.59) 
Lagged Age -0.021 -0.019 Lagged Age -0.010 -0.015 
 (-0.55) (-0.50)  (-0.26) (-0.40) 
Lagged Collateral 0.175** 0.177** Lagged Collateral 0.164** 0.165** 
 (2.40) (2.39)  (2.23) (2.23) 
Constant 1.324*** 1.206*** Constant 1.215*** 1.220*** 
 (8.22) (7.37)  (7.48) (7.47) 
Predicted Probability 3.04 3.04 Predicted Probability 3.05 3.05 
N 44,860 44,860 N 44,860 44,860 
R2 0.059 0.050 R2 0.052 0.049 
No. of firms 10,748 10,748 No. of firms 10,748 10,748 
Test of equality 
(p.value): 
  Test of equality 
(p.value): 
  
REER 
volatility*Crisis 
0.000 0.144 Firm volatility*Crisis 0.001 0.018 
REER volatility*(1-
Crisis) 
0.000 0.000 Firm volatility*(1-
Crisis) 
0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% 
(**) and 10% (*). With respect to the test of equality REER volatility*Crisis gives the test of equality between 
REER volatility*Crisis*Cons and REER volatility*Crisis*(1-Cons); REER volatility*(1-Crisis) gives the test of 
equality between REER volatility*(1-Crisis)*Cons and REER volatility*(1-Crisis)*(1-Cons); Firm 
volatility*Crisis gives the difference between Firm volatility*Crisis*Cons and Firm volatility*Crisis*(1-Cons); 
Firm volatility*(1-Crisis) gives the test of equality between Firm volatility*(1-Crisis)*Cons and Firm 
volatility*(1-Crisis)*(1-Cons). Also, see notes to Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.6: Firm heterogeneity and the global financial crisis 
Dependent variable = Log of Exports 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Size Profits  Size Profits 
REER volatility* -0.026** -0.005 Firm volatility* -0.057** -0.071** 
Crisis*Cons (-2.13) (-0.39) Crisis*Cons (-2.18) (-2.11) 
REER volatility* 0.022** 0.013 Firm volatility* 0.034* 0.019 
Crisis*(1-Cons) (2.18) (1.25) Crisis*(1-Cons) (1.89) (1.24) 
REER volatility* -0.042*** 0.002 Firm volatility* -0.118*** -0.095*** 
(1-Crisis)*Cons (-8.13) (0.52) (1-Crisis)*Cons (-7.05) (-3.68) 
REER volatility* 0.032*** 0.019*** Firm volatility* 0.036*** -0.010 
(1-Crisis)* (1-Cons) (8.93) (5.39) (1-Crisis)* (1-Cons) (2.80) (-0.93) 
Firm volatility -0.017* -0.019** REER volatility -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (-1.91) (-2.12)  (3.87) (3.86) 
Lagged Size 0.362*** 0.381*** Lagged Size 0.373*** 0.375*** 
 (16.72) (17.18)  (17.12) (16.97) 
Lagged Productivity -0.011 -0.015 Lagged Productivity -0.017 -0.015 
 (-0.82) (-1.14)  (-1.24) (-1.11) 
Lagged Age -0.014 -0.012 Lagged Age -0.005 -0.010 
 (-0.36) (-0.30)  (-0.13) (-0.25) 
Lagged Collateral 0.224*** 0.219*** Lagged Collateral 0.212*** 0.210*** 
 (2.82) (2.74)  (2.67) (2.64) 
Constant 1.416*** 1.324*** Constant 1.303*** 1.310*** 
 (8.70) (8.03)  (7.62) (7.62) 
Predicted Probability 3.06 3.07 Predicted Probability 3.07 3.07 
N 43,464 43,464 N 43,464 43,464 
R2 0.049 0.039 R2 0.042 10,807 
No. of firms 10,807 10,807 No. of firms 10,807 0.039 
Test of equality 
(p.value): 
  Test of equality 
(p.value): 
  
REER volatility*Crisis 0.000 0.106 Firm volatility*Crisis 0.002 0.009 
REER volatility*(1-
Crisis) 
0.000 0.000 Firm volatility*(1-
Crisis) 
0.000 0.001 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 
5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 4.5.  
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Table 4.7: Robustness: GMM model 
Dependent variable = Log of Exports 
Panel 1:  
REER volatility -0.048*** 
 (-2.88) 
Firm volatility -0.021 
 (-1.31) 
N 20,515 
R2 -0.601 
No. of firms 5,278 
Kleibergen-Paap 0.000 
Anderson-Rubin  0.000 
Stock-Wright  0.000 
Hansen J  0.150 
Panel 2:  
 Size Profits 
REER volatility*Cons -0.179*** -0.705*** 
 (-5.54) (-3.22) 
REER volatility*(1-Cons) -0.030 0.125 
 (-1.19) (0.94) 
Firm volatility*Cons -0.054* 0.452 
 (-1.84) (1.31) 
Firm volatility*(1-Cons) 0.025 -0.185** 
 (1.08) (-2.16) 
N 34,908 34,908 
R2 -1.003 -3.655 
No. of firms 7,589 7,589 
Test of equality (p.value):   
REER volatility 0.000 0.012 
Firm volatility 0.032 0.092 
Kleibergen-Paap 0.000 0.012 
Anderson-Rubin  0.000 0.000 
Stock-Wright  0.000 0.000 
Hansen J  0.984 0.180 
Panel 3: ERM crisis 
 Size Profits  Size Profits 
REER volatility* -1.892** -0.331** Firm volatility* -6.819 9.094 
Crisis*Cons (-2.52) (-2.36) Crisis*Cons (-1.60) (1.48) 
REER volatility* -1.535** -0.452*** Firm volatility* -4.677 9.788 
Crisis*(1-Cons) (-2.47) (-2.80) Crisis*(1-Cons) (-0.94) (1.43) 
REER volatility* -1.095*** -0.283** Firm volatility* -2.303*** 2.503 
(1-Crisis)*Cons (-2.62) (-2.26) (1-Crisis)*Cons (-3.07) (1.60) 
REER volatility* -1.290** -0.147 Firm volatility* 2.327*** -0.379** 
(1-Crisis)* (1-Cons) (-2.46) (-1.37) (1-Crisis)* (1-Cons) (3.81) (-2.34) 
N 41,284 41,029 N 40,664 32,433 
R2 -16.192 -15.427 R2 -4.586 -4.407 
No. of firms 8,765 8,708 No. of firms 8,629 7,393 
Test of equality (p.value):   Test of equality (p.value):   
REER volatility*Crisis 0.012 0.000 Firm volatility*Crisis 0.226 0.767 
REER volatility*(1-Crisis) 0.096 0.004 Firm volatility*(1-Crisis) 0.003 0.087 
Kleibergen-Paap 0.042 0.006 Kleibergen-Paap 0.051 0.000 
Anderson-Rubin  0.000 0.000 Anderson-Rubin  0.000 0.000 
Stock-Wright  0.000 0.000 Stock-Wright  0.000 0.000 
Hansen J  0.063 0.071 Hansen J  0.328 0.231 
Panel 4: Global crisis 
 Size Profits  Size Profits 
REER volatility* 0.028 0.133 Firm volatility* -2.646** -1.722*** 
Crisis*Cons (0.05) (1.27) Crisis*Cons (-2.36) (-2.94) 
REER volatility* -0.036 -0.028 Firm volatility* -0.240 -1.347 
Crisis*(1-Cons) (-0.37) (-0.64) Crisis*(1-Cons) (-0.27) (-0.73) 
REER volatility* 0.331 0.278*** Firm volatility* -0.338** -0.414*** 
(1-Crisis)*Cons (0.92) (2.96) (1-Crisis)*Cons (-2.46) (-3.52) 
REER volatility* 0.201 0.302** Firm volatility* -0.274* -0.055 
(1-Crisis)* (1-Cons) (0.91) (2.52) (1-Crisis)* (1-Cons) (-1.80) (-0.20) 
N 33,846 33,846 N 22,848 22,848 
R2 -4.914 -5.861 R2 -5.073 -3.911 
No. of firms 8,201 8,201 No. of firms 6,096 6,096 
Test of equality (p.value):   Test of equality (p.value):   
REER volatility*Crisis 0.884 0.120 Firm volatility*Crisis 0.029 0.018 
REER volatility*(1-Crisis) 0.359 0.543 Firm volatility*(1-Crisis) 0.906 0.603 
Kleibergen-Paap 0.020 0.058 Kleibergen-Paap 0.059 0.038 
Anderson-Rubin  0.000 0.000 Anderson-Rubin  0.000 0.000 
Stock-Wright  0.000 0.000 Stock-Wright  0.000 0.000 
Hansen J  0.344 0.864 Hansen J  0.589 0.093 
Notes: Robust z-statistics for two- step GMM regressions are reported in the parenthesis. The remaining specifications, which are not reported for brevity, are 
identical to those in Tables 4.3 to 4.6. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The main measures of exchange rate and firm 
volatility are instrumented using volatility of money supply and lagged firm-level volatility, respectively. While, the other control variables are instrumented 
using their lagged levels at t-2 and more. The Kleibergen-Paap is a test of under-identification, distributed as chi-square under the null of under-identification. 
The Anderson Rubin and Stock-Wright LM S statistic are weak-instrument-robust inference tests, which are distributed as F-test and chi-square respectively, 
under the null that coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero, and the over-identifying restrictions are valid. 
Hansen J statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Also, see notes to Table 4.3.  
172 
 
Table 4.8: Robustness: Alternative measures of volatility 
Dependent variable = Log of Exports 
Panel 1:  
REER volatility2 -0.035*** 
 (-9.23) 
Firm volatility2 -0.151*** 
 (-6.79) 
N 50,741 
R2 0.065 
No. of firms 11,302 
Panel 2:  
 Size Profits 
REER volatility2*Cons -0.095*** -0.046*** 
 (-16.05) (-10.15) 
REER volatility2*(1-Cons) -0.020*** -0.027*** 
 (-5.00) (-6.82) 
Firm volatility2*Cons -0.269*** -0.235*** 
 (-5.84) (-5.97) 
Firm volatility2*(1-Cons) 0.062** -0.098*** 
 (2.11) (-3.07) 
N 50,741 50,741 
R2 0.086 0.068 
No. of firms 11,302 11,302 
Test of equality (p.value):   
REER volatility2*Cons 0.000 0.000 
Firm volatility2*Cons 0.000 0.005 
Panel 3: ERM crisis 
 Size Profits  Size Profits 
REER volatility2* -0.067*** -0.026*** Firm volatility2* -0.219** -0.163** 
Crisis*Cons (-7.41) (-3.50) Crisis*Cons (-2.08) (-2.21) 
REER volatility2* -0.016** -0.026*** Firm volatility2* 0.056 0.062 
Crisis*(1-Cons) (-2.57) (-3.98) Crisis*(1-Cons) (0.64) (0.65) 
REER volatility2* -0.063*** 0.017* Firm volatility2* -0.282*** -0.247*** 
(1-Crisis)*Cons (-6.02) (1.81) (1-Crisis)*Cons (-5.43) (-5.76) 
REER volatility2* 0.073*** 0.056*** Firm volatility2* 0.069** -0.097*** 
(1-Crisis)*(1-Cons) (8.40) (6.46) (1-Crisis)*(1-Cons) (2.11) (-2.85) 
N 46,100 46,100 N 46,100 46,100 
R2 0.071 0.059 R2 0.071 0.059 
No. of firms 10,772 10,772 No. of firms 10,772 10,772 
Test of equality (p.value):   Test of equality 
(p.value): 
  
REER volatility*Crisis 0.000 0.941 Firm volatility*Crisis 0.039 0.049 
REER volatility*(1-Crisis) 0.000 0.000 Firm volatility*(1-
Crisis) 
0.000 0.004 
Panel 4: Global crisis 
 Size Profits  Size Profits 
REER volatility2* -0.013 0.018 Firm volatility2* -0.523*** -0.818*** 
Crisis*Cons (-1.59) (1.54) Crisis*Cons (-5.09) (-4.53) 
REER volatility2* 0.052*** 0.032*** Firm volatility2* 0.085 -0.191 
Crisis*(1-Cons) (8.60) (5.72) Crisis*(1-Cons) (0.51) (-1.44) 
REER volatility2* -0.072*** 0.020** Firm volatility2* -0.278*** -0.238*** 
(1-Crisis)*Cons (-6.74) (2.08) (1-Crisis)*Cons (-5.41) (-5.57) 
REER volatility2* 0.076*** 0.056*** Firm volatility2* 0.072** -0.094*** 
(1-Crisis)*(1-Cons) (8.72) (6.33) (1-Crisis)*(1-Cons) (2.22) (-2.78) 
N 46,194 46,194 N 46,194 46,194 
R2 0.067 0.053 R2 0.066 0.054 
No. of firms 10,988 10,988 No. of firms 10,988 10,988 
Test of equality (p.value):   Test of equality 
(p.value): 
  
REER volatility2*Crisis 0.000 0.216 Firm 
volatility2*Crisis 
0.002 0.003 
REER volatility2*(1-
Crisis) 
0.000 0.000 Firm volatility2*(1-
Crisis) 
0.000 0.006 
Notes: Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. The remaining specifications, which are not 
reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 4.3 to 4.6. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 
5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.9: Robustness: Alternative cut-off points for firm classifications 
Dependent variable = Log of Exports 
Panel 1:  
 Size Profits 
REER volatility*Cons -0.130*** -0.063*** 
 (-10.71) (-6.38) 
REER volatility*(1-Cons) -0.053*** -0.048*** 
 (-5.47) (-4.94) 
Firm volatility*Cons -0.131*** -0.083*** 
 (-4.85) (-2.83) 
Firm volatility*(1-Cons) -0.000 -0.012 
 (-0.05) (-1.34) 
N 47,917 47,917 
R2 0.061 0.055 
No. of firms 11,101 11,101 
Test of equality (p.value):   
REER volatility*Cons 0.000 0.000 
Firm volatility*Cons 0.000 0.018 
Panel 2: ERM crisis 
 Size Profits  Size Profits 
REER volatility* -0.060*** -0.019*** Firm volatility* 0.223 -0.085 
Crisis*Cons (-4.02) (-2.59) Crisis*Cons (0.83) (-0.92) 
REER volatility* -0.016*** -0.014** Firm volatility* 0.018 0.133 
Crisis*(1-Cons) (-2.77) (-2.46) Crisis*(1-Cons) (0.27) (1.53) 
REER volatility* -0.069*** 0.003 Firm volatility* -0.226*** -0.116*** 
(1-Crisis)*Cons (-7.46) (0.57) (1-Crisis)*Cons (-6.15) (-3.36) 
REER volatility* 0.023*** 0.024*** Firm volatility* -0.003 -0.023** 
(1-Crisis)* (1-Cons) (4.61) (4.78) (1-Crisis)* (1-Cons) (-0.23) (-2.02) 
N 44,860 44,860 N 44,860 44,860 
R2 0.055 0.050 R2 0.052 0.049 
No. of firms 10,748 10,748 No. of firms 10,748 10,748 
Test of equality (p.value):   Test of equality 
(p.value): 
  
REER volatility*Crisis 0.002 0.430 Firm volatility*Crisis 0.453 0.062 
REER volatility*(1-Crisis) 0.000 0.000 Firm volatility*(1-
Crisis) 
0.000 0.008 
Panel 3: Global crisis 
 Size Profits  Size Profits 
REER volatility* -0.050** -0.018 Firm volatility* -0.070* -0.109** 
Crisis*Cons (-2.57) (-1.12) Crisis*Cons (-1.95) (-2.24) 
REER volatility* 0.014 0.012 Firm volatility* 0.013 0.011 
Crisis*(1-Cons) (1.42) (1.14) Crisis*(1-Cons) (0.81) (0.75) 
REER volatility* -0.076*** 0.001 Firm volatility* -0.206*** -0.083** 
(1-Crisis)*Cons (-8.40) (0.21) (1-Crisis)*Cons (-5.92) (-2.56) 
REER volatility* 0.019*** 0.017*** Firm volatility* 0.003 -0.019* 
(1-Crisis)* (1-Cons) (5.29) (4.75) (1-Crisis)* (1-Cons) (0.26) (-1.72) 
N 43,464 43,464 N 43,464 43,464 
R2 0.044 0.039 R2 0.041 0.039 
No. of firms 10,807 10,807 No. of firms 10,807 10,807 
Test of equality (p.value):   Test of equality 
(p.value): 
  
REER volatility*Crisis 0.001 0.065 Firm volatility*Crisis 0.031 0.014 
REER volatility*(1-Crisis) 0.000 0.000 Firm volatility*(1-
Crisis) 
0.000 0.052 
Notes: Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. The remaining specifications, which are not 
reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 4.4 to 4.6. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% 
(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table 4.3. 
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Chapter 4- Appendix 
Table A4.1: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
 REER 
volatility 
Firm 
volatility Size Productivity Age Collateral 
REER volatility 1.000      
Firm volatility -0.0.12 1.000     
Size -0.039 0.017 1.000    
Productivity -0.041 0.058 0.193 1.000   
Age -0.005 -0.008 0.155 -0.078 1.000  
Collateral 0.014 -0.068 0.103 -0.146 0.048 1.000 
 
Notes: The Table reports the correlation matrix between different explanatory variables used in the models. 
 
Table A4.2: Definition of variables 
Variables Description Source 
   
Exports Natural logarithm of real export sales FAME database 
REER volatility A GARCH (1,1) model using monthly real exchange rate series. BIS 
Firm volatility  Squared residual of a regression of sales growth on its own lagged values  FAME database 
  and a set of time fixed effects  
Firm size Natural logarithm of total real assets FAME database 
Productivity Natural logarithm of the ratio of total real sales to total number of  FAME database 
 employees  
Age Natural logarithm of the number of years after establishment FAME database 
Collateral Ratio of net tangible assets to total assets FAME database 
Constrained firms Dummy takes value one if real sales and profits of firms are below the 50th Author’s 
 percentile of the distribution of all firms in the sample period, and zero otherwise interpretation 
ERM Dummy takes value one for the periods 1990-1993, and zero for 1994-2006. Author’s  
Crisis  interpretation 
Global Financial Dummy takes value one for the periods 2007-2009, and zero for 1994-2006. Author’s  
Crisis  interpretation 
 
Notes: The Table reports the definitions of different explanatory variables used in the models.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1 Outline 
This thesis explores different studies on international financial markets, firms’ capital 
structure and firm-level exports in both developed and developing economies with special 
emphasis on country and firm-level studies. This thesis mainly focuses on three main 
areas of international finance: education and the equity home bias puzzle (Chapter 2), 
Asian bond markets and firms’ external finance (Chapter 3) and finally, exchange and 
firm-level volatility and firms’ real export sales (Chapter 4). The conclusion of the thesis 
provides in detail the contribution of each chapter and consequently outlines the main 
implications and prospects of future research of this dissertation. 
5.2 Contribution of each empirical chapter 
The first empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 2) combines two main empirical 
literatures on the equity home bias and the role of education in international portfolios. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in three parts. Firstly, this chapter 
empirically examines the impact of different levels of education namely university 
education, mathematical numeracy and financial skills on the equity home bias of a 
country. The results show a negative and highly significant impact of education on equity 
home bias. The empirical literature on the equity home bias puzzle focuses on various 
institutional factors, financial market features such as exchange rate risk, transaction 
costs, barriers to entry and information asymmetries, and behavioural biases such as 
familiarity with domestic forms, patriotism and optimism towards one’s own country. 
Thus, this chapter mainly contributes to the empirical literature by exploring the impact of 
different levels of education on the equity home bias. 
Secondly, this chapter focuses on the differential impact of education on the equity 
home bias of countries with more and less developed financial markets. Countries with 
larger financial markets benefit from increased liquidity and higher capital mobility, lower 
risk and volatility and more international integration (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1996). 
The results show that improvement in university and mathematical education helps to 
reduce the level of equity home bias in countries which are characterised by less 
developed financial markets. This is an important result which highlights that an increase 
in the level of education improves the financial awareness of individuals, especially in 
less financially developed countries. Further, financial awareness encourages individuals 
to invest in international portfolios and thus reduces the equity home bias in countries 
with less developed financial markets. 
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Finally, this chapter takes into account the recent financial crisis to study how the 
relationship between education and the equity home bias evolved over time across 
countries with more and less developed financial markets. The results show that education 
plays an important role in reducing the equity home bias in less financially developed 
countries during the crisis and non-crisis periods, compared to their more developed 
counterparts. 
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) focuses on the impact of the Asian bond 
market policy initiatives on firms’ choice of external finance. This chapter uses 
difference-in-differences approach to highlight the impact of the regional bond market 
policies in seven Asian economies, namely Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Taiwan is used as a control group as it faced similar 
bond market development which is comparable to these Asian economies. This chapter 
also graphically confirms an upward trend in the bond market size of the seven Asian 
economies which participated in the ABMI, compared to Taiwan which is the control 
group. 
The first contribution of this chapter is that it examines the influence of the policy 
initiatives such as ABMI, ABF and ABF-2 on firms’ access to external finance using the 
difference-in-differences approach. The results show that after the introduction of the 
policies, firms reduced their access to short-term debt and increased their uptake of long-
term debt. The second contribution of this chapter is that it exploits firm-level 
heterogeneity by classifying firms into financially constrained and financially 
unconstrained using two main criteria- profitability and coverage ratio of firms. After 
taking into account the firm-level heterogeneity the results show that unconstrained firms 
reduced their access to short-term debt and increased their access to long-term debt after 
the policy initiative, compared to financially constrained firms. 
In addition to the literature on external finance, this chapter also adds value to the 
literature on firms’ investment spending (Fazzari et al., 1988; Almeida and Campello, 
2007). The third contribution is the investigation of the relationship between external 
finance and investment spending during the post-policy period. The results show that after 
the policy was implemented firms reduced their investment spending using short-term 
debt, while increased their investment outlay using long-term debt. Finally, this chapter 
explores the link between external finance and investment spending for financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms. The results again confirmed a positive and 
significant impact of the policy on financially unconstrained firms. The results showed 
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that unconstrained firms reduced their investment spending using short-term debt and 
increased their spending using long-term debt. 
The third and final empirical chapter (Chapter 4) of this thesis empirically examines 
the impact of both macro-level and micro-level volatility on real export sales of firms. 
This chapter uses a unique firm-level dataset of UK manufacturing firms for the period 
1990-2009. The main contribution of this chapter is mainly threefold. Firstly, very limited 
studies have focused on the relationship between macro and micro-level uncertainties on 
firms’ exports. Majority studies highlight the impact of exchange-rate volatility on exports 
of firms. However, this chapter also studies the effect of firm-level volatility on export 
sales of firms. The development of aggregate volatility might be influenced by various 
factors at the micro-level. Hence, it is important to differentiate between the effects of 
both aggregate and firm-level volatility. The results show that both exchange rate and 
firm-level volatility have negative and significant impact on real export sales of firms. 
The second contribution of this chapter is that it studies the impact of exchange rate 
and firm-level volatility at the firm-level, while all other previous studies use macro or 
disaggregated sector-level data. It also studies the firm-level heterogeneity by exploring 
relationship between financial constraints and volatility at macro- and micro- levels. The 
results illustrate that firms which are financially constrained are negatively affected by the 
volatility at country and firm-level, compared to unconstrained firms. 
The third contribution of this chapter is that for the first time it documents the impact 
of two major financial crises, namely the ERM crisis of early 1990s and the recent global 
financial crisis of 2008. This chapter explores the differences in the impact of exchange 
rate and firm-level volatility on export sales for constrained and unconstrained firms 
during the two separate crisis events. The results show that constrained firms face an 
adverse impact of exchange rate volatility on exports during the ERM crisis, while the 
impact of firm-level volatility is mostly insignificant. However, during the global 
financial crisis, constrained firms face a negative and significant impact of firm-level 
volatility on exports and an insignificant impact of exchange rate volatility on exports. 
5.3 Implications of research 
So far, this concluding chapter has provided the assessment of all the empirical 
chapters. This section will emphasise the possible policy implications of each empirical 
chapter. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) focuses on the role of different degrees of 
education in reducing the equity home bias. The results find a significant impact of 
university education, mathematical numeracy and financial skills in lowering the degree 
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of equity home bias. These results suggest that maintaining higher levels of education and 
financial literacy would substantially increase international portfolio diversification. 
Hence, there is a need to implement financial education in the curriculum, especially in 
the emerging market economies. Improvement in financial literacy of individuals helps in 
increasing financial sophistication and investor competence (Cole et al., 2012). This 
further helps investors to make sound financial decisions for their own financial well-
being. 
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) explores the impact of Asian bond market 
initiatives on capital structure of firms. The results confirm that the policy initiatives 
helped in improving liquidity in the Asian domestic financial markets. The development 
of financial markets helped firms to attain effective financing for business and investment 
which encourages growth of firms (Levinger et al., 2014). These policy initiatives have 
helped in expanding and improving the liquidity in the sovereign bond markets in Asia. 
However, the corporate bond markets still remain less developed, and hence more policy 
initiatives are required for the development of the corporate bond markets. Corporate 
bond markets which are more liquid and significantly advanced are able to contribute 
significantly to the investment and regional growth by providing long-term financing. 
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 4) investigates the impact of exchange rate and 
firm-level volatility on real export sales of firms. The results confirm that both types of 
volatility have a negative and significant impact on real export sales of firms. Next, the 
chapter focuses on the impact of macro and firm volatility on constrained and 
unconstrained firms. The results show that constrained firms are affected badly by both 
exchange rate and firm-level volatility as compared to unconstrained firms. This implies 
that an increase in the exchange rate and firm-level volatility has a negative effect on the 
profitability and market value of firms, resulting in a decline in their access to external 
finance due to increased costs of credit. Further, the chapter focuses on two financial 
crises of the ERM crisis and the global financial crisis. The results highlight that 
constrained firms faced significant adverse impact of exchange rate volatility on exports, 
while the impact of firm-level volatility is mostly insignificant during the ERM crisis. On 
the contrary, during the global financial crisis, constrained firms face a significant 
negative impact of firm-level volatility on exports and an insignificant impact of exchange 
rate volatility on exports. This was also highlighted in some of the studies by Denis and 
Kannan (2013) and Görg and Spaliara (2013) that UK firms faced much adverse shocks 
during the recent financial crisis of 2008. 
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5.4 Prospects of Future Research 
This thesis covers various topics of international finance focusing mainly on the 
international financial markets, firms’ capital structure and exporting behaviour of firms 
in both developed and developing economies. However, there are numerous possible 
avenues for future research following this thesis. The second chapter demonstrates the 
impact of education and financial education on the diversification of international 
portfolios using a panel of developed and developing countries. Due to data constraints 
this study could not be done at a micro-level. However, for future research it would be 
interesting to conduct this study at a micro-level using survey data of individual investors 
in different countries. In this chapter the main focus is on financial education and financial 
literacy. In 2012 the OECD and its International Network on Financial Education (INFE) 
have provided a unique policy forum for governments to exchange views and experiences 
on the issue of financial education. This dataset is provided by the International Gateway 
for Financial Education
57
. As this chapter includes panel dataset for the period 2001 to 
2010 this data item could not be included in the empirical analysis of this chapter. For 
future research it would be interesting to include this data item for further analysis on the 
impact of financial education in different aspects of international financial markets. 
The third chapter studies the impact of Asian bond market policies such as the Asian 
Bond Funds (ABF and ABF-2) on external financing of firms in eight Asian economies 
using the difference-in-differences approach. The treated group includes firms within 
seven Asian countries namely Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. While Taiwanese firms form a part of the control group. For 
possible future extension of this research it would be interesting to increase the treated 
and control groups by including firms within China and India. China can be included as 
an additional country in the group of treated countries and India in the control group in 
addition to Taiwan. 
Finally, the fourth chapter focuses on the impact of volatility at both macro and micro 
levels on real export sales of UK manufacturing firms. This chapter analyses the impact of 
exchange rate and firm-level volatility on real export sales of firms. It would, however, be 
interesting for future studies to investigate the impact of other types of volatility at both 
macro and micro levels arising from stock market movements, movements in market 
value, earnings and cash flow of firms. Further, this chapter gives special emphasis to 
financial constraints and two crisis events by analysing the impact of volatility on exports 
for constrained and unconstrained firms during the ERM crisis and global financial crisis. 
                                                          
57
 The Gateway is a global clearing house on financial education which provides access to a comprehensive 
range of information, data, resources, research and news on financial education issues and programmes 
around the globe. 
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For future research it would also be interesting to consider the firm-level heterogeneity in 
terms of firms’ exporting status. Firms can be classified as export continuers, export 
starters, export switchers and export exiters based on their exporting behaviour and 
financial health. 
5.5 Publication 
Finally, I would like to highlight that most of the estimates presented in Chapter 2 
have been published in the Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money (see Bose, MacDonald and Tsoukas, 2015). Another working paper derived from 
Chapter 3 is available online in the discussion paper series of the Adam Smith Business 
School, University of Glasgow. 
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